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FOREWORD
It is with great pleasure that I write a short foreword to this e-book 
“Life in the Eurozone: With or Without Sovereign Default”. Re-
membering that the Convention of the European University Insti-
tute (EUI) stipulates that our institution should do research on “the 
major issues confronting contemporary European society, including 
matters relating to the construction of Europe”, this e-book certainly 
perfectly contributes to the EUI’s mission. The sovereign debt crisis 
and its implications, which we are witnessing in Europe, are a ma-
jor challenge to European society and have severe impacts on the 
broader European integration process. The publication of the e-book 
comes at a very timely moment and the individual chapters cover 
topics that currently dominate the political, economic and academic 
discussion in and on Europe.
I would like to begin by thanking and congratulating the editors 
of this e-book. When Professors Elena Carletti, Franklin Allen and 
Giancarlo Corsetti held the workshop “Life in the Eurozone: With 
or Without Default” in April 2011 at the EUI, it was my pleasure 
to attend this event and to follow the presentations and discussions. 
The workshop, which was held in the framework of the PEGGED 
project (Politics, Economics and Global Governance: The European 
Dimensions) and which was co-organised with the Wharton Finan-
cial Institutions Center, was of outstanding quality and it is with 
pleasure that I see the workshop’s presentations and results being 
published in this e-book.
Forewordxx
At the time of writing this foreword (May 2011), European policy-
makers are discussing whether the currently agreed multi-billion 
euro bailout loan package for troubled Greece is sufficient or wheth-
er it needs to be extended. Since the European sovereign debt crisis 
fully emerged roughly a year ago, we have witnessed a period with 
dramatic scenarios, economic and financial shocks, numerous meet-
ings and negotiations and far-reaching changes to the Euro system. 
Eventually, the Eurozone heads of state and the EU political machine 
announced during their Council at the end of March that a solid 
solution to tackle the current and future crises has been adopted. 
However, while many important changes in the economic gover-
nance of the euro and regarding bail-out mechanisms have been 
made, we still seem far away from reaching a proper solution. Fur-
thermore, with now Ireland and Portugal receiving bailout packages 
as well, the European heads of state are struggling to convince their 
doubting parliaments and their very sceptical electorates about the 
decisions taken and the reforms initiated. Apart from issues of sov-
ereign debt and the handling of a monetary union, the current crisis 
seems to have put the broader process of the European integration 
project into question.
While there is no place in this foreword to reflect on the reasons for 
this, many economists and media rightly accuse the European lead-
ers, who claim  to have obtained a ‘successful grand bargain’, of again 
dangerously ‘muddling through’ and ‘just kicking the can down the 
road’. One of the biggest problems in the political management of 
the crisis is a total avoidance of considering debt restructuring and 
sovereign default. While there might be strong political reasons for 
this, an increasing number of experts in economics, finance, politics 
and the media claim that – above all in the case of Greece – there is 
no way out of the crisis without the restructuring of debt.
The main contribution of this e-book is that it discusses what such a 
restructuring could look like. Underlining that a Greek default seems 
to be increasingly unavoidable, the e-book reflects on possible ‘end-
game scenarios’ in which Greece restructures its debt. Leaving po-
litical questions aside, the authors highlight financial and economic 
Josep Borrell Fontelles xxi
perspectives and refer to historical experiences and lessons learnt. The 
option of Greece and other countries leaving the Eurozone, which is 
publicly ruled out by European politicians, is also discussed and sce-
narios of a fundamentally changed Eurozone are presented. 
Overall, I am convinced that this e-book will be very stimulating 
for its readers and it will make a major contribution to the ongoing 
political and academic debate.
Josep Borrell Fontelles
President of the European University Institute
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PREFACE
The European University Institute (EUI) and the Wharton Finan-
cial Institution Center (FIC) organized a conference entitled “Life 
in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default?” The event, 
which was held at the EUI in Florence, Italy, on 14 April 2011, was 
financed by the PEGGED project (Politics, Economics and Global 
Governance: The European Dimension) and a Sloan Foundation 
grant to the FIC. The conference brought together leading econo-
mists, historians, lawyers and policy makers to discuss the current 
economic situation in the Eurozone with particular emphasis on the 
issue of sovereign default. The aim was to have an open discussion on 
this timely and important topic to achieve a better understanding of 
the future development of the Eurozone. 
The event was opened by the President of the European University 
Institute, Josep Borrell. It consisted of three panels, a keynote speech 
and a dinner speech. The topic of the first panel was The Current Sit-
uation. Ramon Marimon (European University Institute) provided 
an analysis of the P.I.G.S. (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) with 
particular emphasis on Spain and Portugal. Fabio Panetta (Bank of 
Italy) described the various responses of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and other policy entities in the different phases of the cri-
sis. Helmut Siekmann (University of Frankfurt) discussed the legal 
framework underlying the European monetary union and the limits 
posed by the German constitution. Karl Whelan (University Col-
lege Dublin) described the Irish situation stressing the consequences 
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of the burst of the real estate bubble in 2007 on unemployment, 
growth and other economic indicators.
In the keynote address on Quo Vadis, Euroland? European Monetary 
Union between Crisis and Reform, Martin Hellwig (Max Planck In-
stitute for Collective Goods) argued that the Eurocrisis consists of 
three separate dimensions: a fiscal crisis in Greece and Portugal, a 
banking crisis in Ireland and banking problems in countries like Ger-
many or France with large exposure to the problematic sovereign 
and bank debt. He stressed the difficulty of finding solutions to the 
current problems and at the same the need to arrange for a credible 
system of governance after 2013.
The second panel discussed in more detail How  would Eurozone 
Sovereign Bankruptcy Work? Arnoud Boot (University of Amster-
dam) described the consequences of sovereign restructuring for fi-
nancial stability in particular in light of the size and complexity of 
modern financial institutions. Lee C. Buchheit (Clearly Gottlieb 
Steen & Hamilton LLP) and Mitu Gulati (Duke University) made 
a joint presentation explaining the possible “endgame scenarios” for 
Greek debt restructuring before or after 2013. David Skeel (Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania) described how a sovereign bankruptcy system 
might work. 
The third panel considered Alternatives to Sovereign Bankruptcy in-
cluding the possibility for troubled countries to leave the euro area. 
Edmond Alphandéry (CNP Assurances) discussed the sustainability 
of the current policy measures and concluded that they may well be 
successful. Charles Calomiris (Columbia University) took the op-
posite view and expressed deep scepticism about the survival of the 
Eurozone in its current form. Youssef Cassis (European University 
Institute) focused on the comparison of the current situation with 
historical precedents. Erik Nielsen (Formerly Goldman Sachs) took 
a more moderate position on the sustainability of the Eurozone argu-
ing that, while there were problems, it would survive. 
At dinner, Wolfgang Munchau (Eurointelligence) presented his view 
on How the EU Wants to Solve the Crisis – and Why this is Not 
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Going to Work. He suggested that the Eurozone would be faced 
with the choice of a breakup or closer political union. He was of the 
opinion that the latter solution would be chosen. 
The book ends with a postscript entitled The EU in 2013: Debt 
Defaults and More?, which Janet Kersnar prepared as an article for 
Knowledge@Wharton. This summarizes the various views expressed 
at the conference.  
The discussion at the conference was very lively, reflecting the variety 
of views on the current situation in the Eurozone and at the same 
time the difficulty of reconciling them. Our intention is not to take 
a stance on these views, but rather present all of them in this book 
and let the readers draw their own conclusions. Our hope is that this 
book will contribute to making one step further in finding the right 
solutions to preserve the achievements that the Eurozone has reached 
so far.
A recording of the conference can be viewed at the link
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Economics/Re-
searchTeaching/Conferences/LifeintheEurozone/Index.aspx. 
This e-book is available for free download at the following links:
http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Carletti/
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Economics/Re-
searchTeaching/Conferences/LifeintheEurozone/Index.aspx
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress  
Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Giancarlo Corsetti
xxvi
11
The Current Situation: 
The Euro Crisis: A Crisis of PIGS?
Ramon Marimon 
In this chapter, I will briefly comment on the current situation in 
the Euro area. I am going to concentrate on the - so called - PIGS 
countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain), with particular focus 
on the Iberian ones (Portugal and Spain).
At the dawn of the millennium, PIGS countries, with the exception 
of Greece, seemed to be in good shape. There was great rhetoric at the 
European Union level, arguing that by 2010 these countries would 
be part of the most competitive and dynamic knowledge‐based econ-
omy in the world (recall ‘The Lisbon Agenda’ launched in the Lisbon 
2000, and reinforced in the Barcelona 2002, European Councils). 
Thus, PIGS countries, having passed the ‘Maastricht test’ and being 
fully-fledged members of the Euro-club, benefited from ‘the Euro 
great moderation’ of the turn of the century and, therefore, were able 
to obtain cheap credit in international capital markets, while also 
getting some additional support from the European Union, in the 
form of structural funds which often needed co-financing. Even if 
‘The Lisbon Agenda’ envisioned many reforms, at that point in time 
people were asking, Why should we reform right now? Why we do 
not do what the aristocrats do, what the banker at the door says: bor-
row?  In fact, that is what PIGS countries did. Some countries like 
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Greece and Portugal borrowed from the beginning of 2000. Other 
countries, like Ireland and Spain, did not borrow much at the begin-
ning of the new millennium, but they did later on (see Table 1.)
As a consequence of this excessive borrowing in international capi-
tal markets, housing prices and investment increased dramatically in 
most PIGS countries.1 They became less competitive as labour costs 
went up in comparison to Germany (see Fig. 1). Moreover, govern-
ments started borrowing, and government primary balances went 
down (see Figs. 2 and 3).
 
The Euro area has experienced different growth stories. In terms of 
economic growth rates, PIGS countries, with the exception of Por-
tugal, were doing relatively well at the beginning of the millennium. 
For instance, Spain from the late 1990s to 2007 experienced growth 
rates well above the Euro area, but then growth collapsed as a con-
sequence of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. A similar case, 
although much more pronounced, is that of Ireland (see Table 2).
1 For example, Spanish housing prices went from a yearly growth rate of around 
5% at the turn of century to a peak of 20% in 2004. While housing prices growth 
rates went down after this peak to turn of the century levels by the end of 2006, 
investment in housing reached its peak in the third quarter of 2006: 9.4% of GDP 
(see: Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Lee Ohanian, “La crisis española desde una 
perspectiva mundial2, in La Crisis de la Economía Española: Análisis Económico 
de la Gran Recesión, FEDEA, Madrid, 2010).
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2011.
Table 1. Balance on Current Account
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Figure 1. Normalized Unit Labour Costs
Source: Eurostat
Figure 2. Government Debt to GDP ratio
Source: Eurostat
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PIGS countries have also experienced different employment sto-
ries. In 2000 employment rates were very low in Spain and Greece, 
while they were above the Euro average in Portugal and Ireland 
(see Fig. 4). Furthermore, prior to the collapse of global financial 
markets, employment growth rates were low in Greece and Portu-
gal, while they were high in Ireland and Spain. As a consequence of 
the crisis, currently there are around 5 million unemployed workers 
in Spain. The jobs lost corresponded to those jobs created very fast 
during the years of rapid growth preceding the crisis. Ireland’s experi-
ence was more traumatic since more jobs were destroyed during the 
crisis than had been created in the period 2000-2007. Portugal, on 
the other hand, always exhibited employment rates higher than the 
Source: Eurostat
Figure 3. Governments Primary Balances
Table 2. Differences in Growth Rates in the Euro Area
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2011.
Ramon Marimon 5
rest of the Euro zone. In terms of salaries, Spain permanently showed 
higher increases in real salaries than in productivity. This trend had 
reversed by the beginning of 2010, showing that something has been 
learnt from the crisis.2 
The Portuguese Case
In particular, I think that the situation of Portugal is somehow differ-
ent to the situation of the other PIGS countries. In fact, I believe that 
the situation of Portugal is much more serious than people think and 
than what the employment figures reveal. Basically, Portugal does 
not have much margin without the implementation of radical re-
forms. The problem of Portugal has not been the bankers’ fault. It 
has been neither a real estate bubble, nor a welfare state problem. 
Portugal faces a number of other problems. The main problem of 
Portugal is that it has shown persistent low growth and productivity. 
Another important problem is that bank assets do not look particu-
2 In fact, negotiated real wages experienced positive growth from 2008 to the 
beginning of 2010, while Spanish GDP and employment experienced negative 
growth rates in these years of crisis (see S. Bentolilla (02/12/2010) in: Nada es 
Gratis - http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia).
Figure 4. Different Employment Stories (Employment Rates)
Source: Eurostat
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larly healthy, given the persistent borrowing over the whole period. 
Half of these assets are mortgages, a quarter of them are firm assets 
and the remaining quarter are government assets. A third problem is 
simply that the good people are leaving the country. Highly skilled 
Portuguese workers are going back to the colonies; they are going to 
work in Brazil and Angola. The final important problem in Portugal 
is that, certainly, there has not been the political mood for reforms. 
In view of the problems of Portugal, the main question is: what can 
the rescue package rescue? It is not a question of civil servant auster-
ity, nor a question of raising taxes. Consumption taxes can be a way 
to engineer a ‘domestic devaluation’ in a monetary union; that is, to 
reduce effective real wages without devaluing the currency. However, 
for Portugal it is hard to increase taxes with VAT already at 23%. Of 
course, there is room for other serious reforms. These reforms need 
to dismantle the protected economy, since Portugal still has a very 
protective economy in several dimensions. In addition, the country 
needs to invest in human capital and find a way to attract the good 
people back. The Portuguese Rescue Package of May 3, 20113 is pos-
sibly the most ambitious programme of reforms ever designed for the 
Portuguese economy and, in contrast with the Greek Rescue Package 
of May 2, 2010, gives a fair amount of discretion as to how it can be 
implemented. Nevertheless, as is common with other packages, the 
accent is still too much on the ‘austerity side’, and the political ca-
pacity to implement such a programme is uncertain at best. After all, 
until June 2011 it will not be known which Portuguese government 
will be responsible for its implementation, while even if the Greek 
government was known in May 2010, and many ‘austerity measures’ 
have been implemented, a year later it cannot be said that Greece 
has been rescued by the package, nor even that more ‘cleansing’ debt 
restructuring measures will not be needed.4
3 “Portugal: Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Con-
ditionality”, 3 May 2011, between the Portuguese authorities and representatives 
of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF [Comment added after the 
April 14, 2011 conference] 
4 Harmonised long-term interest rates have changed from May 2010 to April 
2011 in the following way: Greece, from 7.97% to 13.86%; Portugal, from 5.02% 
to 9.19%; Ireland, from 4.86% to 9.79%, and Spain, from 4.08% to 5.33% 
(Source: ECB).
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Is Spain different? 
In my view, Spain is in a better situation than Portugal. Although 
Spain has exhibited higher persistent volatility, this could also imply 
that it may be easier for Spain to come back to a path of economic 
growth. Regarding the banking sector, it seems that the big bank-
ers have learnt the lesson of the Latin America experience. Finally, I 
believe that Spain has a potentially strong capacity to export and to 
offer quality services.
Despite the better situation of Spain in comparison to Portugal, it is 
clear that Spain also faces a number of major problems. The first is 
that Spain is characterized by a persistent dual economy (see Foot-
note 3). The second is that the country currently has a lost genera-
tion, which corresponds to the workers that have been doing tem-
porary jobs or have been unemployed for long periods of time.  The 
third is related to immigration. It is a pending reform addressing 
the real integration of the immigrant population. The fourth is as-
sociated with human capital. While there is a significant proportion 
of workers with low skills that need to be upgraded, highly skilled 
workers are hard both to attract and retain. The fifth problem is re-
lated to the budget decentralization of the country. In this aspect, the 
government needs to find proper co-responsibility for the regions. 
Finally, the entrepreneurial sector is relatively weak, making it dif-
ficult to observe sustainable productivity growth. In summary, while 
Spain is in a better situation than the other members of the PIGS 
team, it shares with them that recovery to sustained growth may well 
take a few years, and that how many years it will take depends on 
the political commitment and support to implement much needed 
reforms. Spain may not need a ‘rescue package’ but, like the other 
members of the club, it is facing the difficult problem of simultane-
ously meeting long-term and short-term objectives: to implement 
costly reforms that should bring benefits in the future - possibly, for 
all - but meanwhile taking into account that increasing the burden 
on some (e.g. reducing the opportunities for ‘the lost generation’) 
may have persistent negative effects.
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Life in the Eurozone With or  
Without Sovereign Default?
Fabio Panetta
In my presentation, I will comment on two issues. First, I will review 
the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the financial and 
sovereign debt crisis.  Second, I will comment on the possible alter-
native solutions to the sovereign debt crisis. 
The role of the ECB in the financial and sovereign debt crisis
The role of the ECB during the financial and sovereign debt crisis 
has been characterized by a set of operations. These operations have 
changed significantly over time. In the first phase of the financial cri-
sis, from August 2007 to September 2008, money markets became 
impaired and banks tightened their lending standards and increased 
their demand for liquidity and long-term funding. In response to 
this, the ECB increased the frequency of its long-term operations 
and extended their duration up to six-months. Moreover, in order to 
contain tensions in the money market, it changed the intra-month-
ly pattern of its refinancing operations, in order to accommodate 
banks’ preference for front-loading in order to fulfill the reserve re-
quirements.
In the second phase, from September 2008 to December 2009, the 
Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default? 10
financial turmoil evolved into a global financial crisis. Banks tight-
ened their lending standards significantly. The real economy in Eu-
rope and worldwide entered into the worst recession in decades. 
At this point, the ECB reduced its policy interest rate down to 1% 
and implement the so-called non-standard measures (NSMs). These 
NSMs were monetary policy actions implemented to complement 
interest rate reductions. In the Euro area, these measures focused on 
banks, which are the main actors of the Euro Area financial system, 
with the aim of sustaining bank funding and the supply of credit 
through enhanced liquidity provision. Among the most important 
NSMs are the introduction of the Fixed Rate Full Allotment (FRFA) 
tender procedures in all ECB refinancing operations and the exten-
sion of the duration of refinancing operations up to one year. Other 
NSMs were the expansion of eligible collateral, the purchase of cov-
ered bonds, and the provision of additional foreign exchange liquid-
ity. The implementation of these unusual measures emphasizes the 
fact that, in order to contain the effect of the crisis, the ECB took 
exceptional measures that have changed its operation framework 
radically.
The third phase of the financial crisis is the sovereign debt crisis, 
which started in April 2010. By the end of 2009, financial conditions 
improved and the ECB started the exit from non-standard measures. 
However, in the spring of 2010, tensions escalated in sovereign bond 
markets due to concerns regarding fiscal sustainability and the ECB 
decided to suspend the exit from the previous mentioned NSMs. 
The FRFA tender procedure was re-introduced in 3-month opera-
tions and the so-called Securities Markets Programme (SMP) was 
launched in May 2010. The SMP was based on the acquisitions of 
sovereign bonds issued by Euro Area countries. The interventions of 
the SMP were characterized by three facts. First, they were sterilized. 
This implies that they did not affect the monetary policy stance. Sec-
ond, the interventions conducted by the SMP were temporary, like 
the other NSMs. Third, these interventions were limited in scope in 
order to avoid “undue volatility” and preserve the transmission of 
monetary policy.
Overall, the ECB operational framework has worked well during the 
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financial crisis, with the NSMs fitting well into the existing frame-
work. However, it is important to emphasize that these measures 
have represented exceptional responses to exceptional circumstances. 
They are temporary, looking ahead for the return to the traditional 
liquidity management and to a normal scale of central bank inter-
mediation. In this context, it is very important to study carefully the 
lessons that we have learnt from the financial crisis in order to design 
the “new normal” situation.
The sovereign debt crisis
The main causes of the financial and sovereign debt crisis were fiscal 
profligacy, weakness of the banking system, and low competitiveness 
and productivity. The main effects have been a sharp increase in pri-
mary deficits and public debt, an increase in sovereign spreads, high 
financial volatility, and low liquidity in capital markets.
In principle, there exists a set of possible solutions to the sovereign 
debt crisis in the Euro Area. The first option, inflation, is ruled out 
by the ECB mandate of price stability. Moreover, inflation would 
not solve the underlying problems. The second possibility is devalua-
tion, which is impossible in a monetary union. Furthermore, an exit 
from the EMU would entail huge costs, especially for weak coun-
tries. Once we rule these two possibilities we are left with two pos-
sible solutions: default (or restructuring) of the sovereign debt; and 
fiscal consolidation and economic reform. I will focus on these two 
options in turn.
It is well known that there is a lively debate on the costs and ben-
efits of sovereign default, with a number of arguments in favor and 
against it. On the one hand, the main arguments in favor of sover-
eign default are that it could make the burden of the fiscal consolida-
tion socially “acceptable”, and that it would solve the debt overhang 
problem, thus improving growth. On the other hand, there are at 
least three strong arguments against sovereign default. The first argu-
ment is that even after default a tough consolidation would be still 
necessary (the countries hit by the sovereign crisis have large primary 
deficits). The second argument is that the cost of debt would rise. 
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The third argument is that there are strong repercussions on growth 
associated with wealth effects, trade disruptions, capital outflows.
The prevailing view of the official sector is that the costs of default 
are likely to be well above the benefits and that default would not ad-
dress the root causes of the sovereign debt crisis. However, this is just 
a piece of the story. In my view, the main reason why many in the 
official sector are against sovereign default is that it is very risky given 
its potential impact on financial stability through financial contagion 
and given the close link between sovereign risk and bank risk in the 
Euro area. 
In view of these reasons, European authorities opted for the fourth 
solution, i.e. fiscal consolidation and economic reforms. This is a 
challenging task given the precarious economic and financial condi-
tions of the European countries affected by the crisis. The success of 
this task will depend on how rigorously the reforms will be imple-
mented and to what extent the actual implementation of the reforms 
will be sufficient to restore economic growth. The implementation 
of the reforms has not been exempt of problems. For instance, in the 
initial stage of the reform process Portugal seemed to lack political 
support and Greece appeared to show some degree of reform fatigue. 
It is important to emphasize that without economic growth, there is 
no plan that can be successful. 
Another important factor that will affect success or failure in the 
fiscal consolidation is the Crisis Management Framework (CMF), 
which will be chosen in the European Union. Since May 2010 when 
the EFSF was established, there have been enormous progresses in 
the discussion of the CMF but there are many important issues that 
are still on the table. 
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Life in the Eurozone With or  
Without Sovereign Default? 
—The Current Situation—
Helmut Siekmann
It is still too early to give a comprehensive and final analysis of the 
crisis. Keeping in mind the complexity of what has happened it is 
also problematic to come to simple and clear-cut judgements. But 
with this “caveat” a few facts appear to be clear:
1. From the beginning on and also now with the turn to a 
“sovereign debt crisis” the crisis is and has been at the core a crisis of 
financial institutions, mainly of some big banks, but by no means all 
banks. 
2. In the second place, it has now become a crisis of sovereign 
states and other governmental institutions. They have amassed debt 
on a scale which is not sustainable. 
3. But it should not be forgotten that there has to always be 
someone who lends the money; and to a large extent it was again 
banks and other financial institutions. 
4. The risk of write-offs of sovereign debt has increasingly 
been transferred from the market players to the central banks as they 
bought or accepted sovereign debt as collateral. Only by these ac-
tions does the sovereign debt problem now directly affect European 
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institutions.
Despite all the turns and twists the crisis has taken so far and might 
take in the future it is and was in essence a crisis of banks which 
expand credit and lend too much money and do not charge a risk 
adjusted price (interest rate). 
Although many analysts and some politicians have been referring to 
the crisis as a crisis of the euro or even worse of the European Union, 
it is in essence not a problem of the currency when a sovereign is not 
able or not willing to pay its debt. There is no stringent link between 
fiscal problems of a state and the currency used in this country as 
legal tender. Only if a government has the power to print the money 
it needs to pay back its debt might the currency be in danger. This 
is also why the ECB is not allowed to lend money to the EU or its 
Member States, Article 123 TFEU.
In addition to an almost complete failure of financial markets and of 
economic sciences, the crisis has also demonstrated a total failure of 
the supervisory system – both of its rules and of their enforcement. 
Finally, an increasing lack of obedience to strict legal norms and con-
tracts has been observed, and this is – in the medium term - the most 
frightening aspect and should be kept in mind before keenly design-
ing new rules.
A. Definition of Sovereign Default
When pondering the effects of sovereign default, it should in the first 
place be clarified what is going to be the object of the analysis. Defin-
ing the matter of a discourse is not a pointless academic ritual, as one 
might suspect, but a prerequisite for a meaningful exchange of ideas. 
This simple fact seems to have slipped from memory in the present 
debate, in academia, in politics, and in the media. Instead, quite a bit 
of ambiguity has spread, which in turn leads to murky results. 
The term “sovereign default” can have at least two distinctively dif-
ferent meanings:
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1. the fact that a government entity is not willing or not able to 
fulfil its financial obligations properly
2. the initiation of a formalized legal procedure1 designed to 
resolve a situation of insolvency or illiquidity. 
This distinction ought to be observed meticulously. 
In addition to these fairly precise meanings, the term “sovereign de-
fault” is often used to designate a situation of financial distress of 
a debtor which is a state, a government, or any other public sector 
entity with the exact boundaries undefined. This demarcation is so 
vague that it is meaningless for a scholarly debate. The public and 
the host of quasi-experts, however, seem to like it, as a high degree 
of inaccuracy saves a lot of thinking. For these reasons it shall not be 
used further on. 
B. Insolvency and the Law
Default and sovereign default clearly have a legal connotation. In 
any case, insolvency, in the sense of the unwillingness or inability to 
pay one’s debt, is always a breach of the law and regularly a breach 
of contract. This is only too often forgotten. This breach disregards 
one of the basic principles for the functioning of a society: pacta sunt 
servanda. This principle is not only a demand of justice but also of 
efficiency, of economic efficiency. 
Default has also close ties with insolvency or bankruptcy law: Bank-
ruptcy law – and this is also too often forgotten - at its core provides 
for a procedure to distribute the assets of a failing entity in an orderly 
manner to the creditors. In case the entity is a legal person, it is dis-
solved at the end of the procedure. The bona fide natural person 
will eventually be relieved from all or parts of his debts. Usually a 
1 This procedural aspect is mainly discussed in the context of the insolvency of 
a sovereign s. International Monetary Fund, Orderly and Effective Insovency 
Procedures – Key Issues, 1999; Aden, Insolvenzpanverfahren und Fiskalvermögen 
eines Staates, ZRP 2010, p. 191; Mayer, Wie nähert man sich einem internation-
alen Insolvenzverfahren für Staaten?, ZInsO 2005, p. 454; Mayer, Staateninsolvenz 
nach dem Argentinien-Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – Eine Chance für 
den Finanzplatz Deutschland?, WM 2008, p. 10; Paulus, Überlegungen zu einem 
Insolvenzverfahren für Staaten, WM 2002, p. 725; Paulus, Rechtlich geordnetes
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legal obligation – backed by criminal sanctions – has been imposed 
to timely petition for such a procedure in case of a legal person for 
two grounds:
— illiquidity
— insolvency
This is the basic setup which has developed over the centuries.
The statutory rules on insolvency, however, have been expanded in 
order to provide instruments to keep the failing legal entity alive if 
it is worth the effort: Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code and 
similar provisions in the German insolvency code (sixth part “In-
solvenzplan”: §§ 217-285, seventh part “Eigenverwaltung”: §§ 270-
285). These instruments have some merits but they come at a cost, 
especially be-cause of their effects on competition and crisis preven-
tion. Often they make the non-fulfilment of obligations worthwhile.
C. Insolvency of a Government Entity
Government entities of any kind, which are probably meant by the 
term “sovereign”, have to discharge public duties. They cannot sim-
ply be dissolved at the end of an insolvency procedure. The tasks 
continue to exist. This makes it impossible to use the existing insol-
vency codes unaltered to handle the financial failing of a state. 
Another distinctive difference between sovereign and private debtors 
is the genera-tion of revenue: States and many other government 
entities do not depend on mar-kets and voluntary exchange of goods 
to obtain the necessary resources for their existence and operation. 
They are entitled with taxing power. Taxing power basically implies 
the right to take away means from its owner without compensation. 
Taxing power is one of the key features of the modern state. The legal 
capacity to generate income without having to deliver any goods or 
services in exchange is one of the crucial traits, which discerns states 
- or “sovereign” entities, whatever they are - from all private entities. 
It is, however, an open question whether such an entity commands 
the physical power to exercise its right against a rebellious people. 
An-other obstacle might be the lack of adequate resources in the 
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population. 
When a government entity does not fulfil its financial ob-
ligations (“sovereign default”), it is a breach of legal obliga-
tions as much as it would be in the private sector. But there 
is an additional trait. Such a demeanor by a government entity has 
also to be judged by Article 126 para. 1 TFEU, which prescribes 
that the Member States of the EU “shall avoid excessive government 
deficits”. This holds not only true for the members whose currency 
is the Euro but for all Member States. Although the wording leaves 
some room for interpretation, a deficit which leads to a default is al-
ways “excessive”. Hence a default of an EU Member State is a breach 
of the primary law of the Union unless it can be demonstrated that 
exceptional circumstances justified the deficits.
D. The Often Forgotten Role of the Creditors
In the course of the present crisis the focus of attention has not been 
directed suffi-ciently on the creditors. Bailing out Greece was origi-
nally essentially bailing out French, Spanish and German banks and 
– what is often forgotten - their creditors. They were again salvaged 
without sufficient (legal) reason for shifting the burden of a default 
from (private) creditors to the taxpayer. In Germany it was again to 
a large extent the usual suspects which are anyhow owned or were 
taken over by German government entities: HRE, Commerzbank, 
and several Landesbanken. Similar findings are true for the shielding 
of Ireland and Portugal.
The desirable close scrutiny of the reasons why those banks lend a 
breath–taking amount of money to sovereign entities, whose credit is 
not beyond any doubt, is still overdue. This should be in the focus 
of attention. Mandatory clauses to allow a restructuring of bonds - 
now in the legislative process - might mitigate the problem to some 
extent but leave a lot of questions open, for example in respect of risk 
weight of “sovereign debt” in statutory rules. Serious flaws and in-
consistencies exist in the regulatory framework, especially on capital 
adequacy, which have not been ad-dressed so far.
 However, in the meantime a tacit bail-out of banks (bank holding com-
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panies) and private creditors has taken place. Especially in Germany 
a major fraction of southern European sovereign debt is now not only 
held by state owned banks2 but by agencies of the federal government3 
founded to help restructuring some of the failing German banks.4 
They are no banks but are often referred to as “bad banks”.5 A large 
share of the debt is also held by the European System of Central banks. 
E. Prevention of Default
The EU-law on economic and fiscal policy is so far primarily ori-
ented towards prevention and not so much on crisis resolution. This 
is also one of the reasons why ad-hoc measures had to be taken in 
the case of Greece and why the temporary support mechanisms the 
EFSM and EFSF were set up “somewhat” outside the framework of 
the Treaty – with quite some legal risk.
I. Fiscal discipline
1. Primary law of the EU
In the words of the primary law “sustainability” of fiscal policy is 
required. The Maas-tricht Treaty declared “the sustainability of the 
government financial position” to be the essential criterion for the 
necessary convergence which in turn forms the basis for the mon-
etary union.6 Even if this clause belongs to the transitional provisions 
it  can be used as a basis for interpretation of the permanent require-
ment that “Member States shall avoid excessive government debts”.7
The compliance with budgetary discipline is a permanent obligation 
2 KfW appr. 8,4 billion Euro Greek sovereign debt, Commerzbank appr. 2.9 bil-
lion Euro Greek sov-ereign debt, state banks appr. 2,5 billion Euro Gree, sovereign 
debt.
3 Appr. 8.8 billion Euro Greek sovereign debt.
4 Westdeutsche Landesbank AG, Hypo Real Estate Holding AG.
5 WestLB AG has transferred 85 billion Euro to the “Erste Abwicklungsanstalt”, 
founded 11 Dezember 2009. It is a public law entity within the “Finanzmarktsta-
bilisierungsanstalt” which in turn is a public law entity guaranteed by the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 1 Oktober 2010 HRE has transferred loans and securities to 
the amount of about 173 billion Euro to the “FMS Wertmanage-ment”, another 
public law entity within the “Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt”. A large portion of 
these portefolios is southern European government debt. 
6 Article 140 (1) indent 2 TFEU.
7 Article 126 (1) TFEU.
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of all Member States.8 It has to be monitored by the Commission on 
the basis of two reference values: the ratio of the planned or actual 
government deficit to gross domestic product and the ratio of gov-
ernment debt to gross domestic product.9 The reference values are 
specified in the protocol (No. 12) on the excessive deficit procedure 
added to the Maastricht Treaty and are carried through in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty).10 They 
read as follows:
— 3% for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit 
to gross domestic product at market prices;
— 60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic 
product at market prices.11  
The protocol with the reference values is part of the primary law 
of the Union.12 They are quite frequently referred to as “Maastricht 
Criteria”. This might cause confusion as the admission criteria men-
tioned above are also called “Maastricht Criteria”. For this reason it 
should always be made clear which criteria are meant and the latter 
be called “convergence criteria”. 
 
In essence, both the procedural and the substantial rules for en-
forcing the require-ment of permanent budgetary discipline are 
laid down in the primary law of the Union.13 However, true sanc-
tions have not been embodied. Specifically an exclusion of a Mem-
ber State from the Eurozone is not foreseen.14 But already at the 
initiation of the monetary union serious concerns were raised 
that the procedure provided in the primary law would be too te-
dious and – above all – the political determination would be lack-
ing to impose sanctions.15 Definitions and specifications of the 
8 Hahn, Der Stabilitätspakt für die Europäische Währungsunion, JZ 1997, p. 
1133.
9 Article 126 (2) TFEU.
10 Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure, Official Journal C83, 
30/3/2010, p. 279.
11 Article 1 of the protocol.
12 Article 51 TEU.
13 Article 126 (2) – (14) subparagraph 1 TFEU.
14 P. Kirchhof, Die Mitwirkung Deutschlands an der Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion, in: Festschrift Franz Klein, 1994, p. 61 (72).
15 Zeitler, Die Europäische Währungsunion als Stabilitätsgemeinschaft, Wertpa-
pier-Mitteilungen, 1995, 1609 (1611).
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rules on gov-ernment debt and deficits and the deficit procedure 
have been undertaken by the secondary law of the Union but no 
reduction of the scope of discretion for imposing sanctions.16 
2. Secondary law of the EU
For this reason predominantly Germany demanded a “stability pact” 
preferably with automatic sanctions.17 This was, however, not com-
patible with the discretionary powers of the Commission and the 
Council in the primary law.18 A separate treaty – complementing the 
provisions in the TEC on the monetary union - would have been 
questionable from the legal point of view as well.19 Changing clauses 
of the primary law of the Union would not be possible; supplement-
ing them only in fields which do no yet fall into its competences or 
which have been left explicitly open to further accords.20 As a result 
the somewhat awkward type of pact that we have at present was fi-
nally realized.
a) The original stability and growth pact of 1997
To enhance the compliance with the requirement of permanent bud-
getary discipline the so called stability and growth pact has been set 
up by secondary law of the Union. The term “pact” was coined to 
emphasize the underlying political consensus even though the term 
is used in other legal acts of the European Union in the strict sense 
of the word. It can be considered to be a reminiscence of the initially 
discussed separate treaty. This has been the cause for some confusion 
in the not so well informed public. Technically the pact consists of 
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the applica-
tion of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed t the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, Official Journal L 332, 31.12.93, p. 7; amended 
several times, codified version: Council Regulation (EC) No 479/93 of 25 May  
2009, on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure an-
nexed t the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal L 145, 
10.6.2009, p. 1; Council Regulation (EC) no 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 
specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 
104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty, Official Journal L 332, 31.12.93, p. 1.
17 Details by Hahn, Der Stabilitätspakt für die Europäische Währungsunion, JZ 
1997, p. 1133 (1134).
18 Now Article 126 AEUV.
19 Smits, The European Central Bank, p. 85; Häde, Ein Stabilitätspakt für Eu-
ropa?, EuZW 1996, 138 (140).
20 Häde, Ein Stabilitätspakt für Europa?, EuZW 1996, 138 (142).
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one resolution of the European Council,21 which is not binding, and 
two – binding – regulations of the Council. One contains mainly 
substantive provisions22 and the other mainly procedural rules.23 The 
resolution contains a multilateral promise to achieve an almost bal-
anced budget in the medium range.
 
The regulations are part of the secondary law of the Union. Regula-
tion 1466/97 was based on Article 99 (5) TEC and contains an early 
warning system and the obligation of the Member States to provide 
a stability program. Regulation 1467/97 was based on Article 104 
(14) TEC and attempts to speed up the procedure and to clarify it. 
 
b) The amendments of 2005
Mainly on behalf of France and – ironically – Germany, these regula-
tions were amended in 200524 when France and Germany failed to 
comply with the reference values. The amendments left the reference 
criteria untouched, since they are also part of the primary law of 
the Union,25 but allowed to take more circumstances into account 
to excuse from a failure to meet them. Discretionary powers were 
extended. Procedural provisions were also changed to make it more 
difficult to adopt sanctions against non-compliant Member States. 
In addition to that, the deadlines for imposing sanctions were pro-
longed. These amendments were preceded by a Council decision not 
to continue with the deficit-procedure against France and Germany 
which was later declared not to be in accordance with the European 
21 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability und Growth Pact Amster-
dam, 17 June 1997, Official Journal C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.
22 Council Regulation (EC) no 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies, Official Journal L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1; amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) no 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005, Official Journal L 174, 7.7.2005, 
p. 1.
23 Council Regulation (EC) no 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementa-tion of the excessive deficit procedure, Official Journal 
L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6; amended by the Council Regulation (EC) no 1056/2005 of 
27 June 2005, Official Journal L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5.
24 Council Regulation (EC) no. 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005, Official Journal L 
174, 7.7.2005, p. 1; Council Regulation (EC) no. 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005, 
Official Journal L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5.
25 Art. 51 TEU. It might be argued, however, that they could be modified by acts 
of the secondary law on the basis of Article 126 (14) subparagraph 2 TFEU.
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Union law by the Court of Justice.26 
 
c) The proposed reform of the pact
Again under pressure from Germany the Commission submitted on 
29 September 2010 a comprehensive package of measures to pre-
vent and correct macroeconomic imbalances including procedures 
to prevent and handle excessive budget deficits. A major part of the 
package is proposals for amending the stability and growth pact. The 
main subject matters of the package are:
1. An alert mechanism through a scoreboard27 
2. Preventive surveillance based on discussions with the 
 Member States and in-depth reviews28 
3. A budgetary framework for Member States
4. Amendments of the excessive imbalance procedure (EIP) 
 applying to EU Member States
5. An enforcement mechanism for the Euro area members.
Altogether six legislative proposals for concrete legal instruments 
were submitted. The regulation on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances is completely new. It is set up to detect 
imbalances and to establish a corrective procedure.29 Also new is the 
regulation that aims to establish national budgetary frame-works of 
quality.30 These requirements for the budgetary frameworks of all 
Member States are based on Article 126 (14) TFEU. In particular, 
they aim to specify the obligations of national authorities to comply 
with the provisions of Article 2 of the Protocol (No 12) on the exces-
26 ECJ, Judgement of 13/7/2004 – C-27/04 (Commission vs. Council), Eu-
ropäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2004, p. 465; Juristen-Zeitung, 2004, p. 
1069  with comment Kotzur; see also Dutzler/Hable, Das Urteil des Europäischen 
Gerichtshofs zum Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts – eine Klarstellung?, Viertel-
jahreszeitschrift des Instituts für Europäische Politik 27 (2004), p. 301.
27 Articles 3 and 4 proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, 
COM(2010) 527 final, 2010/0281 (COD).
28 Article 5 proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, 
COM(2010) 527 final, 2010/0281 (COD).
29 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, COM(2010) 527 
final, 2010/0281 (COD).
30 Proposal for a Council Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks of 
the Member States, COM(2010) 523 final, 2010/0277 (NLE).
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sive deficit procedure.
Two proposals are submitted for amending the regulations which 
constitute in essence the stability and growth pact.31 They are based 
on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU.
The new enforcement mechanism for the euro area members is di-
rected to budgetary surveillance32 and to correct excessive macroeco-
nomic imbalances.33
The effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance is based on Ar-
ticle 136 in combination with Article 121 (6) TFEU. The respective 
regulations are now called the “preventive” arm and the “corrective” 
arm of the stability and growth pact. They allow fines not only for 
excessive deficits but also for exceeding the debt level of the reference 
values. The discretionary power of the Council is reduced signifi-
cantly.34 
The package clearly contains elements of a common fiscal policy for 
the Member States and a first step towards macroeconomic guid-
ance. It reminds one of the “planification” in France and the “global 
steering” of the economy (“Globalsteuerung”), which had been at-
tempted in Germany from 1966 on but largely failed.
3. Lack of common fiscal policy
A common fiscal policy is in theory not indispensable for the func-
31 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EU) amending Regulation (EC) No 
1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, COM(2010) 526 final, 
2010/0280 (COD); proposal for a Council Regulation (EU) amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the exces-
sive deficit procedure, COM(2010) 522 final, 2010/0276 (COD).
32 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the effective enforce-ment of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, COM(2010) 
524 final, 2010/0278 (COD).
33 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
enforcement meas-ures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro 
area, COM(2010) 525 final, 2010/0279 (COD).
34 Proposals 522 and 526 final, p. 3.
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tioning of a monetary union. The adverse effects of an unsustainable 
fiscal policy could be left to the markets. Markets tend, however, to 
react (too) late and – as we have seen – in a not very rational man-
ner.35 The rationality of financial markets has proven to be largely a 
myth. That is why it was prudent by the Maastricht Treaty to estab-
lish rules about a sustainable fiscal policy of the participating states 
to prevent a situation where sanc-tions of the market (high interest 
rates, denial of loans) would have to come in and remind a member 
of the Eurozone of its (legal) obligations.36 
The widespread complaint about the lack of a common fiscal policy 
(or even a com-mon economic policy) reveals an almost total igno-
rance of the present design of federal systems. The constitution of the 
United States of America does not provide for a common fiscal policy 
of the members of the federation. In contrast to Germany the U.S. 
constitution allows to a large extent grants of the federal government 
to the states; also under conditions. With those strings attached, the 
federal government can exert some influence on the policy but this is 
far from a federal equalization system or even a common taxation. So 
far there is no clear evidence that the great autonomy of the states in 
the U.S. has adversely affected the functioning of the currency used 
there. Of course, in the long run too diverse developments might 
threaten the stability of the whole setup but that is not primarily a 
problem of the monetary system. It is a question of coherence of the 
federation in general.
In essence, the EU appears to have more rules to secure a sound fiscal 
policy of its members than the U.S. has for its states on the consti-
tutional level; and there is no fundamental criticism that the U.S. 
dollar cannot work in a federation with so little common economic 
and fiscal policy. Especially rules on (balanced) budgets are definitely 
state law and a request for financial aid by the state of California was 
35 This was known already at the time of framing the monetary union: Report on 
economic and mone-tary union in the European Community, OPOCE, 1989, p. 
24; later Beson, L’euro et les marchés fi-nanciers, in: L’euro dix ans après, Colloque 
de la CEDECE, 18 juin 2010.
36 The states were to be exposed to the reactions of the markets on their fiscal poli-
cy Häde, Haushaltsdisziplin und Solidarität im Zeichen der Finanzkrise, EuZW 
2009, 399 (402).
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turned down by the federal government. 
Also the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany contained 
no clause re-stricting debt or deficit of the members of that federa-
tion. In the German constitution only a weak clause had been intro-
duced in 1969 that both the central state (“Bund”) and its members 
(“Länder”) should align their fiscal policy to the requirements of the 
macro-economic balance and that for this reason restrictions on bor-
rowing could be imposed by the federation. In addition to that, it 
could be decreed that reserves were to be built up during economic 
upswings that could be spent during downturns to stimulate the 
economy. These rules were strictly reserved to fight business cycles 
and not to cope with structural deficits in the budgets; and they were 
anyhow disregarded. 
It took as long as 2009 until the federal constitution of Germany was 
amended and for the first time binding rules on deficits for the states 
(“Länder”) were introduced by the central state (“Schuldenbremse”). 
Until then the European Union had - also compared with the central 
government of Germany - more legal rules directing the fiscal policy 
of its Member States than the Federal Republic of Germany. This led 
to the awkward result – and it was one of the reasons for the funda-
mental changes of the fiscal federalism in Germany in 2009 – that 
the federal government could not legally force the Länder to avoid 
“excessive deficits” in order to fulfill Germany’s obligations towards 
the European Union! 
The amendments to the German constitution imposing stiffer rules 
on the member states of the federation abolishing basically the right 
of the “Länder” to run a structural deficit from fiscal year 2020 on, 
raise quite some constitutional concerns because it had been an un-
disputed right of the members of any kind of federation to finance 
part of their budget by borrowing money. Interdicting any structural 
deficit except in time of disaster might have taken away too much 
“sovereignty” from the “Länder”. They might have lost an essential 
part of their “statehood” or “sovereignty”. This would be a breach 
of the federal constitution since the amending power is limited in 
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Germany, Article 79 (3) of the federal constitution.37 A case on this 
question is pending in the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. 
II. Rules for Financial Aid
1. Necessity of support
European Union law does not contain an (explicit) legal obligation 
to support Member States with financial problems. When creating 
the Monetary Union there was a clear decision against establishing 
an equalization system which could provide for such assistance. 
Only Article 122 para. 2 TFEU was – as a compromise – finally 
designed in a way that it can serve as a basis for financial aid but 
only under extraordinary circums-tances. But it does by no means 
establish a claim, not even an obligation to assist. Even if the very 
restrictive preconditions are met it is totally up to the discretion of 
the Council to grant the aid: “Where a Member State is in difficulties 
or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural di-
sasters or exceptional occur-rences beyond its control” such aid may 
be provided.38  
This clause demonstrates further that from the point of view of the 
EU-law a default of a Member State is considered to be in the first 
place an internal problem of the affected state and its respective cred-
itors. It is not desirable and instruments have been set up to prevent 
it, but when it occurs crisis fighting and resolving mechanisms have 
been set up only for those Member States, whose currency is not 
the Euro (“Member States with a derogation”39).40  From this point 
of view, default is also not considered to be a problem of the com-
mon currency, the EURO, even if some media and many politicians 
relentlessly claim the opposite. The framers of the Maastricht Treaty 
did this knowingly and willingly as otherwise the boundary to a true 
37 New rules imposing rigid limits on the “Länder” to run a budget deficit are 
considered to be incom-patible with Article 79 (3) of the federal constitution, 
see e.g. Hancke, Defizitbegrenzung im Bundesstaat – Verfassungsmäßigkeit einer 
verbind-lichen Verschuldungsregel für die Bunde-sländer, DVBl. 2009, 621 (626).
38 Article 122 para. 2 TFEU.
39 Article 139 para. 1.
40 Article 143.
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federal system would have been touched or even transgressed with 
severe consequences in regard of German constitutional law. This is 
also the reason why clear limits for support of government entities by 
the Union or the ECB have been set up. 
2. Potential support measures
a) No privileged access of public sector to financing
Any privileged access to financial institutions by Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law or pub-
lic enterprises is strictly prohibited by EU primary law.41 Thus the 
banking system has to be dismissed as an instrument to prevent a 
sovereign default.
b) No assumption of sovereign debt by the Union or its members 
To strengthen the determination of the Member States to comply 
with the required budgetary discipline the Treaty explicitly excludes 
any liability of the Union or any Member State for the commit-
ments42 of any central government or any other public sector entity 
of a Member State. Not only liability is legally excluded but also the 
(voluntary) assumption of such commitments.  The wording leaves 
some space for interpretation as bilateral payments or credit guaran-
tees must not necessarily be judged as “assuming” a commitment. 
c) No financing of the public sector by the ECB
Any type of credit financing of the Union or the Member States by 
the ECB or by a central bank of a Member State is strictly prohib-
ited. This prohibition is absolutely comprehensive. It holds not only 
for the Union and central governments but for all other bodies, offic-
es or agencies, regional, local or other public authorities. It includes 
all other bodies governed by public law and public enterprises.43 An 
exception is only made for those publicly owned credit institutions 
which can be given the same access as commercial banks.44 
To secure this strict interdiction the ECB and the national central 
41 Article 124 TFEU.
42 Article 125 para. 1 TFEU.
43 Article 123 para. 1 TFEU.
44 Article 123 para. 2 TFEU.
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banks may not purchase any debt instruments issued from the public 
sector. This covers especially government bonds. However, only the 
“direct” purchase is forbidden. This way the Eurosystem should be 
enabled to intervene in the markets to procure their proper function-
ing. In no way was it intended to open a back door for an (indirect) 
financing of governments. Keeping this in mind, the purchase of 
government bonds the ESCB started in early summer 2010 was from 
the beginning onwards not without a legal risk. The longer it lasts 
the more it becomes legally questionable as proper functioning of the 
markets can hardly be used any more as a justification. So it is not 
a question of the structure of the balance sheet of the ECB when it 
demands that the support of some of the Member States with debt 
problems have to be supported with other tools and its purchases 
have to terminate now. 
d) Voluntary support
There might be, however, an opening for voluntary financial aid by 
the Union or its Member States. The wording of Article 125 TFEU 
does not prohibit it explicitly but it is often contended that it would 
change the nature of the EU and would jeopardize the basis of the 
monetary union. Often the term “Transferunion” is used in this con-
text. So the reluctance of Germany to participate in support mecha-
nisms is not pri-marily based on short sighted opportunistic reasons, 
as often is contended, but on very serious legal grounds. A deviation 
from the outlined principles would almost automatically lead to a 
constitutional question in Germany as it would overstretch the man-
date given by the German legislature for the transfer of sovereign 
powers to the EU.45
The Treaty intended to disallow any support payments for a Mem-
ber State in dis-tress. This was made especially clear as in a separate 
clause (voluntary) financial assistance is allowed under certain, very 
restrictive conditions: “Where a Member State is in difficulties or is 
seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disas-
ters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control” such aid may be 
provided.46 The wording leaves, however, some space for interpreta-
45 Fassbender, Der europäische „Stabilisierungsmechanismus“ im Lichte von 
Unionsrecht und deutschem Verfassungsrecht, NVwZ 2010, p. 799 (801-803).
46 Article 122 para. 2 TFEU.
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tion as bilateral payments or credit guarantees must not necessarily 
be judged as “assuming” a commitment. Also the term “occurrences 
beyond its control” might be interpreted in different ways. It was 
inserted later in the course of the framing process of the Treaty as a 
result of compromise.47 This way any incentive for circumventing the 
rules should be excluded.
These rules do, however, not apply to Member States of the Europe-
an Union whose currency is not the Euro. In case a “Member States 
with a derogation”48 is in “difficulties or seriously threatened with 
difficulties as regards its balance of payments the Council can even-
tually grant “mutual assistance” and “appropriate methods” there-
fore.49 In case a “sudden crisis” in the balance of payments occurs 
the Member State may take the necessary protective actions as well.50 
Such measures have been taken in the case of Hungary, Latvia and 
Romania. They are a common instrument of the EU administered by 
the Commission. In this case the EU is considered to be allowed to 
borrow money on the financial markets. In the course of the present 
crisis the Council has expanded the sum granted twice: from €12 to 
€25 to €50 billion.
The mere existence of the rules governing the ways and means to 
support Member States in financial distress shows that the Treaty did 
not want to allow it in other instances. 
In one of the most recent scholarly publications in Germany dealing 
with the problem it has, however, been pointed out that following 
Article 3 para. 1 TFEU a distinction has to be made between ex-
clusive competences of the EU and competences it shares with the 
47 See for details Louis, The no-bailout clause and rescue packages, Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 47 (2010), p. 971 (982), who favors an interpretation 
which would allow voluntary aid under strict conditionality; similarily Her-
rmann, Griechische Tragödie – der währungsverfassungsrecht liche Rahmen für 
die Rettung, den Austritt oder den Ausschluss von überschuldeten Staaten aus der 
Eurozone, EuZW 2010, 413 (415).
48 Terminology introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 139 para. 1 TFEU.
49 Article 143 para. 1 subpara. 2, para. 2 TFEU.
50 Article 144 para. 1 TFEU.
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Member States.51 Monetary policy for the Member States whose cur-
rency is the euro falls under the exclusive competences of the EU and 
this leaves no space, absolutely no space, for national measures. This 
could be set in contrast to economic policy which is not mentioned 
there and only partially in Article 6 TFEU. These shared compe-
tences would leave space for measures of the Member States. 
Budgetary rules and fiscal policy in general could be treated in a sim-
ilar way. As far as provisions exist, they have to be obeyed, e.g. Article 
126. Actions of the EU need a mandate. The principle of subsidiar-
ity and the principle of conferral hold, Article 5 TEU. This restricts 
substantially potential actions of the EU. But Member States - not 
the EU - would be free to grant financial aid or to set up a permanent 
support mechanism as far as they follow the spotty provisions set up 
in this field by the Treaty. This could also be done in conformity with 
the constitutional law of Germany. 
The proposed amendment to the Treaty (Article 136 para. 3 new 
TFEU)52 follows apparently this line of thinking. 
III. Support for Greece
In May 2010 financial support was given to Greece because of the 
imminent danger that the country could not refinance its outstand-
ing debt and because its budget deficit which after some corrections 
of the statistics reached a two-digit number as a fraction of the GDP. 
The aid was basically granted as credit guarantees on a bilateral basis. 
Greece had promised to solve its budgetary problems by a rigorous 
austerity program with spending cuts, tax rises and an overall reduc-
tion in social security benefits.53 
Whether the aid is in conformity with the principal provisions of the 
Treaty is questionable. The wording “assume the commitments” in 
Article 125 para. 1 TFEU would have to be interpreted in a way that 
51 Thym, Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechtskonstruktion und 
verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle, EuZW 2011, p. 167.
52 Infra IV.
53 See for details Louis, The no-bailout clause and rescue packages, Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 47 (2010), p. 971.
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new voluntary guarantees by Member States would not be covered. 
Article 122 para. 2 TFEU could be a basis when the situation of the 
Greek finances would be considered to be an “exceptional occurrence 
beyond the control” of Greece.
IV. Temporary Support Mechanisms 
A few days after the rescue operations for Greece the heads of states 
and government of the Member States agreed to set up a support 
mechanism on a much larger scale for future financing problems of 
Member States. It was going to have an accumulated volume of euro 
750 billion, distributed on three pillars:
— European Financial Stability Mechanism  
 (EFSM) (€60 billion)
— European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (€440 billiion)
— Credits by the International Monetary Fund  
 (IMF) (€250 billion).
The lion’s share of the aid should be granted in the form of guar-
antees and not in direct payments. The good credit ratings of most 
Member States were to be used to refinance the outstanding debt at 
much lower costs than the failing countries could have negotiated. 
The whole support mechanism was designed to be only of tempo-
rary nature to terminate by 2013. It should (possibly) be replaced by 
a permanent solution on a sound legal basis.
1. Credits of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The support mechanism is completed by loans from the Internation-
al Monetary Fund (IMF). For some time there was strong resistance 
against the participation of the Fund in rescue operations within the 
EU or more precisely in the Euro area as it is designed to give sup-
port in the case imbalances due to the lack of foreign currencies. The 
fund, however, commands a lot of experience in doing so and it is 
neutral towards many special interests within the Union. In addi-
tion, there are few alternatives as long as the EU has not set up a fund 
of its own and still wants to provide aid.
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2. European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM)
The European Financial Stability Mechanism is an instrument of the 
European Union. It is financed from general funds of the Union and 
administered by the Commission. Setting up an instrument of the 
EU is questionable from a legal point of view unless a very broad 
interpretation of Article 122 para. 2 TFEU can be supported.
3. European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
The European Financial Stability Facility is a separate entity set up 
by the Member States that have introduced the euro. It is designed 
as a special purpose vehicle to borrow money on the capital markets 
by issuing debt instruments guaranteed by the Member States not 
in need. The proceeds are passed on to the member in distress. This 
way there is no direct aid from Member States or the Union to other 
members. The volume of guarantees was distributed according to the 
share each member central bank’s holdings of the capital of the ECB. 
The liability is limited to that fraction.
Technically a corporation under the law of Luxembourg with a seat 
in Luxembourg City was set up. This corporation issues bonds which 
are guaranteed by the various Member States. The corporation was 
given the desired top rating by the rating agen-cies. Its first applica-
tion was the support for the Republic of Ireland.
4. Purchase of debt instruments by the ECB
In addition to this three-pronged mechanism the purchase of debt 
instruments issued by Member States by the ESCB since early sum-
mer 2010 played a considerable and growing role with the result that 
a major share of the sovereign debt of the supported members or its 
banks is already held by the ECB. Only a fraction of it is actually 
bought and held by the ECB. The rest is carefully distributed among 
the national central banks. A “restructuring” of sovereign debt would 
hit now to a great extent the ESCB.
As the legality of this procedure has become increasingly doubtful 
with time passing on, the ECB has rightfully demanded that this task 
has to be fulfilled by the rescue mechanism set up by the EU. Ac-
cording to the fundamentals of the monetary union resolving bud-
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getary problems of Member States is in no way a task of the ECB or 
the ESCB as a whole. 
The recent augmentation of the capital of the ECB has not been 
necessary in view of the purchase of the “sovereign” debt instruments 
even if the ECB takes into account a certain risk that they may fail. 
A central bank does not have to follow any kind of capital adequacy 
rules since it cannot become insolvent. It can even carry on a loss 
on its balance sheets indefinitely. It is unclear whether the taxpayer 
eventually will have to bear a loss, as it is everything else but sure that 
the Member State whose central bank shows finally a loss in conse-
quence of capital requirements of the ECB will be liable for those 
losses. The same holds true for direct losses of the national central 
banks.
So it is not only economic reasons but primarily obedience to the law 
that the purchase of these debt instruments has to come to an end.
V. Creation of a Permanent Support Mechanism (ESM)
The heads of states and governments agreed 17 December 2010 to 
lay ground for a permanent support mechanism.54 It was recognized 
that it would be legally prudent to structure it as a (multilateral) 
support of the members of the Eurozone and not of the EU.55 As 
consequence a new paragraph 3 of Article 136 TFEU was created 
following the procedure set up by Article 48 TFEU to serve as a 
sound legal basis for this mechanism. This provision allows Mem-
ber States, not the EU, to grant support on a voluntary basis under 
strict conditionality.56 The details of the new European Stabili-zation 
Mechanism (ESM) are still being negotiated.
F. Conclusion
(1) In the primary law of the EU several safeguards have been set up 
to prevent the default of a Member State.
54 Draft European Council Document EUCO 30/10 of 17.12.2010.
55 Thym, Euro-Rettungsschirm: zwischenstaatliche Rechtskonstruktion und 
verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle, EuZW 2011, 167.
56 Attachment to Bundesrat-document 872/10.
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(2) This includes budgetary rules which exceed the provisions for the 
members of federal systems like the U.S. or Germany (until 2009). 
(3) The Maastricht Treaty refrained deliberately from setting up any 
kind of equaliza-tion system. 
(4) A claim for financial assistance within the Eurosystem does not 
exist and its conformity with German constitutional law would be 
questionable.
(5) A default of a Member State would be the result of an illegal bud-
getary policy of the respective state but it would not infringe the law 
of the EU when the Union or its Members let it happen.
(6) Voluntary financial aid of the EU to a Member State is allowed 
only under very narrow conditions. Whether they are fulfilled in the 
present crisis is questionable.
(7) A support mechanism set up by the Member States aside from 
institutions of the Union could be judged as in conformity with EU 
law and German constitutional law.
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Appendix
I. The IMF
Dubious competence according to the IMF Agreement
Article V - Operations and Transactions of the Fund
Section 1.  Agencies dealing with the Fund
(…)
Section 2.   Limitation on the Fund’s operations and trans-
actions
(…)
Section 3.  Conditions governing use of the Fund’s general 
resources
(a) The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general 
resources, including policies on stand-by or similar arrange-
ments, and may adopt special policies for special balance of 
payments problems, that will assist members to solve their 
balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish ad-
equate safeguards for the temporary use of the general re-
sources of the Fund.
(b) A member shall be entitled to purchase the currencies of 
other members from the Fund in exchange for an equivalent 
amount of its own currency subject to the following condi-
tions:
(i) the member’s use of the general resources of the Fund 
would be in accordance with the provisions of this Agree-
ment and the policies adopted under them;
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(ii) the member represents that it has a need to make the 
purchase be-cause of its balance of payments or its reserve 
position or developments in its reserves;
(iii) the proposed purchase would be a reserve tranche purchase, or 
would not cause the Fund’s holdings of the purchasing member’s cur-
rency to ex-ceed two hundred percent of its quota;
(iv) the Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of this 
Article, Article VI, Section 1, or Article XXVI, Section 2(a) that the 
member desiring to purchase is ineligible to use the general resources 
of the Fund.
II. The EU and its members
1. No excess deficits
Article 126 TFEU 
1. Member States shall avoid excessive government 
 deficits.
2.-14. (…)
2. No privileged access to financial institutions
Article 124 TFEU
Any measure, not based on prudential considerations, es-
tablishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public 
law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial 
institutions, shall be prohibited.
3. No assumption of sovereign debt by Union or Member States
Article 125 TFEU
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1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the com-
mitments of central governments, regional, local or other 
public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or 
public undertakings of any Member State, without preju-
dice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution 
of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for 
or assume the commitments of central governments, region-
al, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed 
by public law, or public undertakings of another Member 
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for 
the joint execution of a specific project.
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, 
specify definitions for the applica-tion of the prohibitions 
referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.
4. Only Support by the EU under exceptional circumstances
Article 122 TFEU
1. Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for 
in the Treaties, the Council, on a proposal from the Com-
mission, may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Mem-
ber States, upon the measures appropriate to the eco-nomic 
situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the sup-
ply of certain products, notably in the area of energy.
2. Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters 
or exceptional occurrences be-yond its control, the Council, 
on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under cer-
tain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member 
State concerned. The President of the Council shall inform 
the European Parliament of the decision taken.
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III. The ECB
1. Financing of sovereign entities by the ECB prohibited
Article 123 TFEU (101 TEC)
1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility 
with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of 
the Member States (hereinafter re-ferred to as ‘national cen-
tral banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, of-fices or 
agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public 
authori-ties, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall 
the purchase directly from them by the European Central 
Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit in-
stitutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by 
central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national 
central banks and the European Central Bank as private cred-
it institutions.
2. Indirect purchase legal but restricted by powers of ECB:
Article 127 TFEU (105 TEC)
1. The primary objective of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks (hereinafter referred to as the ESCB) shall be to 
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective 
of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general eco-
nomic poli-cies in the Union with a view to contributing to 
the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down 
in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. (…)”
2. The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall 
be:
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— to define and implement the monetary policy of the 
Union,
— to conduct foreign—exchange operations consistent 
with the provisions of Article 219,
— to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the 
Member States,
— to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.
3.- 6.  (…)
IV. Proposed Amendment to Article 136 TFEU
The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a sta-
bility mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the 
stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required 
financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to 
strict conditionality.
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Ireland’s Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Karl Whelan 
1. Introduction 
Among the countries currently experiencing sovereign debt crises, 
Ireland’s case is perhaps the most dramatic. As recently as 2007, Ire-
land was seen by many as top of the European class in its economic 
achievements. Ireland had combined a long period of high economic 
growth and low unemployment with budget surpluses. The country 
appeared to be well placed to cope with any economic slowdown as 
it had a gross debt-GDP ratio in 2007 of 25% and a sovereign wealth 
fund worth about €5000 a head.
 
Fast forward four years and Ireland is shut out of sovereign debt 
markets and in an EU-IMF adjustment programme. Its debt-GDP 
ratio has soared over 100% and the sovereign wealth fund is effec-
tively gone. In this short paper, I provide a brief review of how this 
rapid change came about and discuss potential future developments 
in relation to Ireland’s sovereign debt situation. 
2. The Rise and Fall of the Celtic Tiger 
It is now well known that Ireland’s famed “Celtic Tiger” ended with 
the collapse of a housing bubble and a banking crisis. Many have 
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thus been tempted to describe the Irish boom as largely built on an 
unstable credit splurge. However, this would underestimate the true 
progress made by the Irish economy during the two decades prior to 
2007. 
The Birth of the Tiger 
Before the “Celtic Tiger” became a well-known phrase during the 
1990s, the Irish government had implemented a wide range of poli-
cies that helped to produce large increases in labour productivity. 
The 1960s saw a move away from protectionist trade policies and set 
Ireland on the path to EU membership in 1973. Industrial policies 
focused successfully on encouraging export-oriented foreign direct 
investment. There was also a gradual improvement in educational 
standards as policies to provide universal secondary education in the 
1960s were subsequently followed by a large expansion of the third-
level sector. As a result of these policies, Irish productivity growth 
consistently outpaced other advanced economies from the early 
1970s onwards and by the middle of the last decade, Irish labour 
productivity was very close to US levels (see Figure 1)1. 
Figure 1: US and Irish Labour Productivity (PPP-Adjusted, Source: US BLS)
While Ireland’s pre-Tiger supply-side policies may have been good 
ones, its macroeconomic stabilisation policies were not so good. Ire-
land reacted to the global slowdown of the 1970s by running very 
large fiscal deficits, which cumulated in a debt crisis in the 1980s. At 
the same time, the traditional currency link with sterling was dropped 
1These data come from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics International Compari-
sons website. www.bls.gov/fls/intl_gdp_capita_gdp_hour.htm.
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for membership of the European Monetary System, which provided 
an unstable monetary regime featuring regular devaluations. 
By the mid-1980s, Ireland had a debt-GDP ratio over 110 percent 
and was paying out almost 10 percent of GDP per year in interest 
payments. Tax rates had been raised to punitive levels in a series of 
failed attempts to stabilise the deficit and growth had stagnated.
 
It was at the depths of this previous crisis that the birth of the Celtic 
Tiger took place. The period from 1987 onwards saw fiscal problems 
dealt with via a programme that focused on restraining spending 
and by 1989, Ireland’s debt dynamics had clearly moved in direction 
of sustainability. At the same time, the EMS finally also delivered a 
period of monetary stability. With macroeconomic stability restored 
and good fundamental policies in place, the Irish economy began to 
grow at an impressive rate. 
Indeed, Ireland in the late 1980s was primed for growth. While its 
workers were becoming increasingly productive, Ireland was sig-
nificantly under-employed by international standards. As Figure 2 
shows, only about 30 percent of the population was at work in the 
late 1980s. This underemployment partly reflected an exceptionally 
high unemployment rate (Figure 3). However, it also reflected demo-
graphic and social factors.2
Figure 2: Employment-Population Ratios of Ireland, UK and US
 
2 See Honohan, Patrick and Brendan Walsh (2002). “Catching up with the Leaders: 
The Irish Hare,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity part 1, pages 1-57. and
Whelan, Karl (2010). “Policy Lessons from Ireland’s Latest Depression,” The Eco-
nomic and Social Review, Volume  41, pages 225-254.
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rates
Ireland’s baby boom occurred in the 1970s and peaked in 1980, 
so the depressed Ireland of the 1980s was supporting a very large 
population below working age. This demographic pattern gradually 
unwound over time so that by the late 1990s, Ireland had a higher 
fraction of the working age population than either the US or the UK 
(see Figure 4). Ireland in the late 1980s also had a very low rate of 
labour force participation: While female labour force participation 
had increased steadily in other countries throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, this pattern was not replicated in Ireland (see Figure 5). How-
ever, when the economy recovered, there was a large female labour 
supply ready to enter the workforce. 
Figure 4: Fraction of the Population Aged between 15 and 65.
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Figure 5: Labour Force Participation Rates
The combination of these factors meant that the Irish economy be-
came an incredible employment creating machine. Employment rose 
steadily from 1.1 million in the late 1980s to 2.1 million in 2007. 
Combined with steady improvements in productivity, the Irish econ-
omy delivered a period of extraordinary growth: From 1987 to 2007, 
economic growth averaged 6.3 percent per year.
 
This exceptional economic growth allowed Irish governments to 
achieve a holy grail that was the envy of politicians around the world: 
They lowered tax rates and raised spending year in and year out and 
yet economic growth delivered sufficient tax revenues to generate a 
string of budget surpluses. By 2007, Ireland’s low stock of debt ap-
peared to position the country well for coping with a slowdown. 
The Housing Boom 
Unfortunately, Ireland’s position in 2007 was not nearly as strong 
as it appeared to many outsiders or to the government of the time. 
Despite high levels of labour productivity, the later years of the Irish 
boom saw the build-up of dangerous imbalances. At the heart of 
these imbalances was an extraordinary housing boom. 
At the turn of the millennium, Ireland still had a relatively small 
housing stock, the smallest stock per capita in the European Union.3 
With population growing, incomes expanding rapidly and EMU 
3 Somerville, R.A. (2007). “Housing Tenure in Ireland,” The Economic and Social 
Review, pages Volume 37, 107-134.
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providing access to mortgage finance at historically low rates, there 
was a surge in the demand and ability to pay for housing. As a result, 
house prices in Ireland quadrupled between 1996 and 2007, a pace 
of increase double that seen in the United States over the same period 
(see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: House Prices in Ireland and the US
The response to this increase in housing demand was an extraordi-
nary construction boom. The total stock of dwellings—which had 
stood at 1.2 million homes in 1991 and had gradually increased 
to 1.4 million homes in 2000—exploded to 1.9 million homes in 
2008. House completions went from 19,000 in 1990 to 50,000 in 
2000 to a whopping 93,000 in 2006. Figure 7 puts this in context by 
comparing house completions per capita with their equivalent in the 
United States. It shows that while Ireland’s rate of housing comple-
tions during the 1970s and 1980s, had been comparable to that seen 
in the US, housing activity gradually increased in Ireland—particu-
larly after 2002—to the point where per capita completions were 
four times as high in Ireland as in the US.
 
Construction became a dominant factor in the Irish economy. With 
the economy already at full employment, much of the labour em-
ployed in the construction boom came from the new EU member 
states in Eastern Europe, and this inward migration further fuelled 
the demand for housing. By 2007, construction accounted for 13.3 
percent of all employment, the highest share in the OECD. Indeed, 
with the exception of Spain and Portugal, Ireland’s share of construc-
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tion employment exceeded all other OECD member states by al-
most five percentage points.
The Irish government of recent years placed much of the blame for 
the economic collapse on the international financial crisis. However, 
the evidence suggests that Ireland was heading for a rough landing 
even in the absence of an international recession. Measured against 
various “fundamental” factors, Irish house prices became more and 
more over-valued and, by early 2007—well before the first outbreaks 
of the international crisis—Irish house prices began to fall.4 
As house prices fell, the demand for new houses began to collapse 
with the attitude of potential buyers swiftly changing from being 
desperate to “get on the property ladder” to deciding to wait to get a 
better price later. In mid-2008, the new Minister for Finance, Brian 
Lenihan noted that the housing market had “come to a shuddering 
halt”. Figure 7 illustrates the scale of the collapse in housing con-
struction, while Figure 8 shows how the subsequent decline in con-
struction employment directly accounted for about two-thirds of the 
jump in the Irish unemployment rate after 2007. House prices have 
now fallen about 40 percent from their peak values and continue to 
fall. 
Figure 7: Housing Completions Per Thousand People
4 There was relatively little discussion in Ireland at the time of the idea that house 
prices were unsustainable even though it didn’t require sophisticated analysis to 
suggest that house prices were over-valued.  Notably, when Irish academic econo-
mists such as Alan Ahearne or Morgan Kelly questioned the sustainability of house 
prices, they received a very negative reaction from the Irish government.
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Figure 8: Fraction of Labour Force in Construction and in Unemployment
3. The Sovereign Debt Crisis 
With the Irish economy having placed so many of its eggs in the 
construction basket, one might have expected the authorities to have 
been careful to prepare for what was going to be an inevitable slow-
down. This, however, was not the case. While a very low debt-GDP 
ratio due to years of fast economic growth may have appeared to 
provide a significant cushion against any downturn, Ireland’s fiscal 
situation turned out to be heavily dependent on the health of its 
property sector.
 
A Huge Deficit Opens Up 
The collapse in construction activity, and the corresponding jump in 
unemployment, resulted in a large loss in income tax revenues and 
an increase in social welfare payments but if the fiscal consequenc-
es of the housing crash had been limited to these impacts, Ireland 
would have been positioned to cope well. However, Ireland’s tax base 
had been altered during the later periods of the boom to collect more 
and more tax revenue from construction activity.
Figure 9 shows the share of total tax revenue due to income taxes 
(the black line on the left scale) and due to asset-based taxes such as 
Karl Whelan 49
stamp duties, capital gains tax and capital acquisition tax.5 Thanks to 
booming housing activity and surging house prices, the share of tax 
revenue due to these asset-based taxes rose steadily during the 1990s 
and then rapidly during the period after 2002. At the same time, 
there was a corresponding reduction of a similar magnitude in the 
amount of revenue collected from income taxation. When construc-
tion activity collapsed, this substantial source of government revenue 
disappeared almost overnight.
Figure 9: Composition of Tax Revenues
 
By late 2008, the collapse in construction activity was apparent and 
the world economy was entering a severe recession. Irish real GDP 
declined by 3.5 percent in 2008 and by 7.6 percent in 2009. Despite 
having had years of budget surpluses, Ireland was suddenly facing a 
yawning fiscal gap. Indeed, it was apparent by early 2009 that, with-
out fiscal adjustments, Ireland was heading for deficits of as large as 
20 percent of GDP. 
The scale of these potential deficits meant that, despite the low start-
ing level of debt, the Irish government realised there was no room 
for discretionary fiscal stimulus to ease the effects of the severe 
downturn. Instead, from late 2008 onwards, the Irish government 
has implemented a sequence of contractionary budgets featuring a 
cumulative total of tax increases and spending cuts worth €20.8 bil-
5 Ireland does not have a standard property tax. Instead, the government levied a 
stamp duty tax that was paid in full when a house was purchased. With high levels 
of housing activity, this collected a lot of revenue during the boom and almost 
nothing in recent years.
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lion. These adjustments are the equivalent of 13 percent of 2010’s 
level of GDP or €4,600 per person and represent the largest budget-
ary adjustments seen anywhere in the advanced economic world in 
modern times.6 Despite these enormous adjustments, the decline in 
the size of the Irish economy has been so severe—nominal GDP has 
declined by almost 20 percent—that the European Commission are 
still projecting a budget deficit of 10.6% in 2011. 
The Banking Crisis 
The tale of the Irish fiscal crisis is gruesome enough if one focuses 
alone on the collapse of the construction sector and its effects on 
revenues and expenditures. However, the straw that broke the Irish 
camel’s back was the effect on the state finances of the government’s 
attempts to deal with a banking crisis. 
The acceleration in housing activity after 2002 that is evident in 
Figure 10 was largely financed by the Irish banks. These banks sig-
nificantly changed their business model during the later years of the 
boom. Prior to 2003, the Irish banks had operated in a traditional 
manner, with loans being roughly equal to deposits. After 2003, 
these banks increased their property lending at rapid rates and fi-
nanced much of this expansion with bonds issued to international 
investors.
Figure 10: Loans and Deposits at the Guaranteed Irish Banks
 
6 The IMF’s October 2010 World Economic Outlook examined historical epi-
sodes of fiscal consolidation in fifteen advanced economies over 1980-2009. As a 
percentage of GDP, Ireland’s 2009 consolidation was the biggest the IMF research-
ers could find. The subsequent adjustments for 2010 and 2011 were of similar size. 
International Monetary Fund (2010). World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3: “Will 
it Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Consolidation”. 
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From less than €15 billion in 2003, international bond borrowings 
of the six main Irish banks rose to almost €100 billion (well over half 
of GDP) by 2007. In addition to rapidly expanding their mortgage 
lending, the Irish banks also built up huge exposures to property 
developers, many of whom had made fortunes during the boom and 
were “doubling down” on property with ever more extravagant in-
vestments. Many of these development loans were used for invest-
ments that could only have paid off if property prices continued 
to rise. Leading the way was the now-notorious Anglo Irish Bank, 
which specialised in property development. Anglo expanded its loan 
book at over 20 percent per year and is now known to have had a 
series of serious corporate governance problems.
 
During 2008, as evidence built up of the scale of the Irish construc-
tion collapse, international investors became concerned about the 
exposure to property investment loans of the Irish banks. These 
banks found it increasingly difficult to raise funds on bond markets 
and by late September 2008, two weeks after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, the Irish bankers turned up at government buildings look-
ing for help.
 
The Irish government’s decision on September 30, 2008 to give a 
near-blanket guarantee for a period of two years to the Irish banks 
has been, and will continue to be, hotly debated. The government 
appears to have taken seriously the assurances of the Irish Central 
Bank that the banks were fundamentally sound and were merely suf-
fering from a short-term liquidity problem. Thus, the government 
appears to have believed that the guarantee would not have conse-
quences for the state finances. However, there is also evidence that 
senior civil servants, as well as Merrill Lynch (who had been recruited 
as advisors in the weeks prior to the decision) warned against the 
dangers of a blanket guarantee.
 
By Spring of 2009, it became apparent that the losses at the Irish 
banks were extremely large, most notably at the dreaded Anglo Irish 
Bank. This paper will not focus on the various strategies the Irish 
government adopted from that point onwards to deal with the crisis. 
However, the fact that the liabilities of the banks were guaranteed by 
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the government played a key role in limiting options to restructure 
insolvent banks in a way that would have seen losses shared with 
private creditors. Thus, in 2009, the government began using state 
funds to recapitalise the guaranteed banks.
 
The Endgame 
By 2010, it was clear to international financial markets that in addi-
tion to a serious problem with its budget deficit, Ireland was facing 
a large bill of uncertain size in relation to fixing its banking sector. 
A National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was set up to issue 
government bonds to the banks to purchase distressed property as-
sets at a discount and as 2010 went on and NAMA acquired more 
properties, it became clear that the final bill for recapitalising the 
Irish banks would be enormous. 
In September 2010, the government provided a “final estimate” that 
Anglo Irish Bank would cost the state about €30 billion or almost 
€7000 per person living in Ireland today. The cost of these losses is 
being covered by a “promissory note” which will make cash pay-
ments over a number of years but which was fully counted against 
Ireland’s general government deficit in 2010, leading to what must 
be a world record official deficit of 32 percent of GDP.
 
As the economy failed to show evidence of a strong recovery, inter-
national markets also became increasingly concerned with the future 
losses of the Irish banks due to mortgages and business loans. The 
banks had been able to issue bonds from late 2008 to early 2010 un-
der the protection of the state guarantee. However, as concern about 
potential sovereign default began to rise, this guarantee ceased to be 
of much use. Many of the bonds that had been issued matured in 
September 2010, when the original guarantee ran out.
 
When the banks failed to find new sources of market funding to roll 
maturing bonds or replace the corporate deposits that also began to 
leave the system at this point, they turned to the ECB for emergency 
funding. Borrowing from the ECB by the guaranteed banks, which 
had been negligible prior to the crisis, jumped from €36 billion in 
April 2010 to €50 billion in August to €74 billion in September. 
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The banks also began to run out of eligible collateral to use to obtain 
loans from the ECB, at which point the ECB allowed the Central 
Bank of Ireland to begin making “emergency liquidity assistance” 
loans to the Irish banks.
 
International markets, which had been reasonably confident 
throughout 2009 that Ireland would make it through without a 
sovereign default and which generally had a favourable view of the 
Irish government’s fiscal adjustment programme, became increas-
ingly concerned that the Irish banking sector was going to destroy 
the creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign. Bond yields on sovereign 
debt rose in September and October and then moved up dramatical-
ly in November following the famous Deauville declaration of Mrs. 
Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy.
 
4. The EU-IMF Bailout and Future Prospects
 
By mid-November, the game was up for the Irish government. Fail-
ing to see any sign of improvements in the banking situation, the 
ECB appears to have made its continued support for the Irish bank-
ing system contingent on Ireland applying the EU and IMF for a 
multi-year lending programme.
 
The EU-IMF Deal 
In late November, the Irish government agreed a multi-year funding 
deal with the EU and the IMF. The programme contained commit-
ments to implement a further €15 billion in fiscal adjustments over 
the period 2011-2014, including a €6 billion adjustment for 2011 
that was implemented in the budget passed in December 2010. Fig-
ure 11 shows the path for the Irish budget deficit that is projected by 
the European Commission. The deficit is projected to remain high 
over the next few years but to gradually move towards 3 percent of 
GDP in 2015.
 
The EU-IMF programme also contains a set of measures to stabilise 
the banking sector. Rather than stabilise the banking situation, the 
announcement of the EU-IMF deal appears to have intensified the 
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problem for a while, as deposits continued to flee the Irish banking 
system and reliance on central bank funding increased even further. 
The programme included a commitment to conduct a further round 
of “stress tests” on the Irish banking system. These tests were released 
at the end of March and were accompanied by a commitment from 
the Irish government to provide a further €24 billion in funding to 
recapitalise the continuing Irish banks to high levels.7 It remains to 
be seen whether these announcements will stabilise the funding situ-
ation for these banks. 
Figure 11: Budget Deficit as a Percent of GDP
With the latest announcements, the Irish government has now pro-
vided (or is about to provide) recapitalisation funds of about €70 bil-
lion (about 45 percent of the 2010 level of GDP) to offset the losses 
made by the Irish banks. Some of this money may eventually provide 
a return if the state’s shares in banks such as Allied Irish or Bank of 
Ireland are sold to private ownership at some point in the future but 
the vast majority of these funds are simply gone.
 
Debt Sustainability 
The official EU-IMF line is that Ireland will return to borrowing in 
the sovereign debt markets in late 2012 and will be able to do so at 
rates that allow the debt to be sustained. This will be re-enforced by a 
slow but steady return to economic growth that will see the economy 
growing by 3 percent per year in real terms by 2014.
7 Anglo and the smaller but equally profligate Irish Nationwide Building Society 
are being wound down.
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The black line in Figure 12 shows the debt-GDP ratio that would 
be associated with this relatively rosy scenario. The debt-GDP ratio, 
which had been as low as 25 percent in 2007 but is estimated to be 
112 percent in 2011 is now projected to peak at 120 percent in 2013 
and only slowly decline thereafter. Interest as a share of GDP, which 
had started the crisis at only one percent, is projected to stabilise at 
about 6 percent in GDP, while the primary deficit is projected to 
move from 8.6 percent in 2010 to a primary surplus of 3 percent in 
2015 (see Figure 13).
Figure 12: Debt-GDP and Debt-GNP
Figure 13: Composition of Non-Bank Deficit (EC Projections)
 
There are some arguments in favour of such a scenario occurring. 
Despite very high yields on secondary market debt, the coupon rates 
on Ireland’s existing private debt are very low. The average interest 
rate that Ireland paid on its debt in 2010 was about four and half 
percent. The average interest rate on EU-IMF package of 45 percent 
of GDP is higher than that on existing debt but it also has a relatively 
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long maturity of seven and half years, so Ireland will not be under 
huge pressure over the next few years to replace this funding with 
private borrowing. Thus, official projections are based on the idea 
that the average interest rate that the Irish government will pay on 
its debt will stabilise at about 5.4 percent in 2014 (see Figure 14) 
which provides room for a small primary surplus to start reducing 
the debt ratio.
Figure 14: Average Interest Rate on Irish Government Debt
There are also some compelling arguments against the official sce-
nario. The assumed return to steady 3 percent growth may be too 
optimistic. Ireland cannot rely on a return of many of its previous 
sources of growth such as productivity catch up, demographic pat-
terns and growth in participation.
 
Fiscal adjustment and debt overhang problems will continue to de-
press domestic demand. And while the Irish government regularly 
points to the role improving competitiveness should play in boosting 
exports in the coming years, the plan appears premised on a smooth 
recession-free ride for the world economy in the coming decade. It 
also assumes that the government will not be providing further funds 
to recapitalise the Irish banking sector, which owes vast quantities 
to emergency lending to the ECB and Irish Central Bank. Taken 
together, the official analysis paints a fairly rosy scenario which may 
not come to pass.
 
Another factor worth noting is that Ireland’s debt burden looks even 
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higher when measured relative to GNP as opposed to GDP. For most 
countries, there is very little distinction between these two measures. 
However, a large (indeed, increasingly large) fraction of Irish output 
is due to profits that are repatriated by multinationals. The relatively 
low corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent that is charged on these profits 
has been a repeated source of controversy but it is unlikely that the 
Irish government is going to introduce large changes to this rate as it 
is seen as central to industrial policy. For this reason, most of the tax 
burden falls on the domestic incomes measured by GNP and as the 
blue line in Figure 12 illustrates, this measure of the debt-burden is 
set to top 150%.
 
As of now, financial markets appear to be placing more emphasis on 
the negative factors than on the positive factors stressed by the EU 
and the IMF. Yields on Irish government debt are above 10 percent 
and this pricing appears to be based upon the assumption that there 
will be a debt restructuring. Against this background, the official 
plan’s assumption that private sovereign borrowing will recommence 
in late 2012 seems optimistic. There may be some secondary market 
activity in Irish debt at the current high yields but it’s questionable 
whether Ireland can sell the large amounts of debt that would be 
required to finance itself once the EU and IMF funds run out.
 
An ESM Solvency Test? 
Based on the European Commission’s projections, Ireland is likely 
to run out of money in early to mid-2013 if it cannot access funds 
in the private sovereign bond market. At present, my guess is that 
Ireland will not be able to sufficiently return to the sovereign bond 
market to avoid having to request funds from the new European 
Stability Mechanism.
 
According to the ESM “term sheet” released in March, a request for 
funds from the ESM will require a “sustainability analysis” to assess 
whether “a macro-economic adjustment programme can realistically 
restore the public debt to a sustainable path.”8 If the debt burden 
is deemed unsustainable, then “the beneficiary Member State will 
be required to engage in active negotiations in good faith with its 
8 See www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/actualite/2011/03-mars/21-mes/esm.pdf
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creditors to secure their direct involvement in restoring debt sustain-
ability.” 
It is not clear how such a sustainability analysis will work but if the 
Irish government manages to stick to its current adjustment pro-
gramme and the macroeconomic assumptions underlying this pro-
gramme come to pass, it seems likely that an ESM analysis will pro-
duce similar projections to those currently published by the EU and 
IMF showing a stabilisation and reduction in the debt-GDP ratio. 
Most likely, under such a scenario, the debt will be deemed sustain-
able. If, however, Ireland falls short of the targets set in the current 
adjustment programme and the debt outlook looks worse in 2013, 
then this will raise the question of whether private sector debt should 
be restructured.
 
A Uruguay style “light dusting” restructuring (to borrow the phrase 
used by Buchheit and Gulati, 2011)9 in which maturities are ex-
tended while coupon payments are maintained at existing levels, 
may prove attractive for the EU and IMF because a second deal for 
Ireland would see the balance of risk on Irish sovereign debt shift-
ing over from private bondholders to the official sector. Moreover, 
with both the IMF and soon the ESM claiming a creditor status that 
is senior over private bondholders, such a deal could be a tipping 
point that rules out private purchases of Irish government bonds for 
a number of years. A light dusting approach would lock in a large 
volume of privately supplied funds that could share the burden that 
could be associated with any later more severe restructuring of Irish 
sovereign debt.
 
Which route is chosen, and how any potential restructuring is or-
ganised, are likely to depend on events elsewhere. Greece appears to 
be closer to the point of sovereign debt default than Ireland and the 
consequences of any attempts to restructure Greek debt would have 
a significant impact on the attitude of the European authorities to 
applying a similar approach to Ireland. 
9 Buchheit, Lee and G. Mitu Gulai (2011). “Greek Debt – The Engame Sce-
narios”, Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default?  Eds. Franklin Allen, 
Elena Carletti and Giancarlo Corsetti. USA, FIC Press 2011, pp.83-95. e-book 
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Quo vadis, Euroland? European 
Monetary Union Between Crisis 
and Reform
Martin Hellwig
1. European Monetary Union Before 2008
Developments of the past year have led many to say: We told you 
so. European Monetary Union was bound to erode the stability cul-
ture that the Bundesbank had nourished so that other countries were 
bound to follow. The temptation to finance budget deficits through 
the printing press would be overwhelming. And this prediction has 
now been confirmed. All the safeguards of the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact have come to naught.
This reaction comes in particular from German economists, many 
of whom accompanied the formation of European Monetary Union 
with dire predictions. They forget that the Maastricht Treaty and the 
protection that European Monetary Union provided to the Bundes-
bank prevented Mr. Lafontaine, the new Federal Minister of Finance 
in 1998, from changing the Bundesbank Act so as to make the insti-
tution subservient to the Federal Government. They also forget that 
Mr. Schröder as Federal Chancellor was most prominent in prevent-
ing the application of the Stability and Growth Pact in the early 
2000’s. In other words, erosion of the stability culture of the Bundes-
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bank is also a matter of generation change within Germany. There 
are reasons to believe that European Monetary Union has slowed this 
erosion rather than accelerated it.
I have previously commented on these developments in a contribu-
tion to the Festschrift for the Centenary of the Swiss National Bank, 
which was written in 2006 and published in 2007.1 At the time, I 
stressed the following points:
 – Through the formation of the European Monetary Union, 
monetary policy has been depoliticized. Whereas the 
Bundesbank was very much a part of German political 
debate, the ECB as a supranational institution is removed 
from national political debate. Moreover, national politi-
cians who rail against the ECB’s policies find that there are 
usually other politicians, from other countries who have dif-
ferent views about these policies – and who insist that the 
ECB is as much, or as little, beholden to them as to the 
railing plaintiff.
 – Depoliticization does not imply an end to frictions and dis-
putes. Disputes about the appropriate intermediate targets 
of monetary policy or about the tradeoff between a reliance 
on rules and discretion arise naturally, and the central bank-
ing community is the more likely to cultivate these conflicts, 
the less it feels threatened by politicians and governments. 
In the case of European Monetary Union there are ample 
grounds for such “professional” disputes because the pur-
suit of price stability in an area with multiple non-integrated 
market systems presents a difficult new challenge. Moreover, 
it might take time, for the institution and the surrounding 
media, to get used to the much decreased importance of the 
exchange rate.
 – Threats to the ECB’s independence might be expected to 
come from the European Commission. The European Com-
mission has a history of ambition to enlarge its own turf. 
This ambition has mostly worked against Member State 
prerogatives, but there was every reason to expect it to work 
against the ECB as well. In fact, in the discussion about 
1 “Switzerland and Euroland: European Monetary Union, Monetary Stability and 
Financial Stability”, in: The Swiss National Bank 1907 – 2007, Zürich 2007.
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the Constitution for the European Union, the President of 
the ECB had already found it necessary to protest against 
a suggestion, which he understood to have come from the 
Commission, that would have “simplified” the procedure 
changing some of the strategically important articles of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the 
European Central Bank.
 – Lack of credibility of the “Stability and Growth Pact” was 
identified as a problem. It therefore seemed likely that, at 
some point over the medium run, we would come across 
a problem like the one that Greece has posed over the last 
year. For this eventuality, in 2006/7, I predicted that the 
European Union would move forward as it had in past cri-
ses, with a mixture of muddling through and changes in 
governance. I warned that, in such a context, the ECB’s in-
dependence might be at stake. If a Treaty revision introduc-
ing a mechanism to deal with the fiscal crisis of a Member 
State government were to stipulate that, in such a crisis, the 
ECB should contribute to reducing damage and frictions 
and if this stipulation was part of a larger package, then the 
requirement that changes to the Treaty must be ratified by 
parliaments in all Member States would not be worth much 
as a safeguard for the ECB’s independence.
 – Finally, I argued that there is an unnatural tension in a sys-
tem with a supranational authority for monetary policy and 
national authority in banking supervision. While appreciat-
ing that bail-outs of insolvent banks belonged in the domain 
of national finance ministers, I suggested that mechanisms 
of co-ordination and assignments of tasks for the national 
authorities and the central bank as a lender of the last resort 
were not sufficiently well specified. The information that 
transpired about the various memoranda of understanding 
on the matter did not inspire much confidence.
2. Why Is the Current Crisis so Difficult to Handle?
With hindsight, it is clear that my analysis in 2006/7 was too san-
guine. Whereas I expected the coming fiscal crisis of a Member State 
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to be dealt with pragmatically, without too much ado, the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis has now been with us for over a year and the 
European Union is still far from finding a way out and from estab-
lishing workable governance mechanisms for the future. Moreover, 
we are not just dealing with the Greek sovereign debt crisis, but with 
crises in other countries as well. 
The main reason why it has been so difficult to come to terms with 
these problems is that we are not just dealing with one crisis, but 
with three crises at the same time. We have, first, the kind of fiscal 
crisis that we see in countries like Greece and Portugal. We have, 
next, the kind of banking crisis that we see in countries like Ireland 
or Spain, where local banks have gone on lending sprees and nour-
ished real-estate bubbles and, when the bubbles burst, their solvency 
was impaired. We have, finally, the kind of latent banking crisis that 
we see in countries like Germany or France where banks with very 
fragile balance sheets have large exposures to sovereign debt from 
Southern Europe and/or to bank debt from Ireland and Spain. These 
three crises are entangled with each other, and it is difficult to disen-
tangle them. 
The difficulties came into evidence after the Deauville meeting of 
Merkel and Sarkozy when they announced that, in the future, under 
the successor to the EFSF, any support of sovereign debtors would 
require a bail-in of creditor banks. Merkel and Sarkozy thought that 
they were just talking about the future, a regime that was to be im-
posed after 2013. But they forgot that, as of now, there are outstand-
ing bonds that will mature in 2020. Would such bonds benefit from 
a grandfathering clause? Or would the bondholders be subjected to 
the bail-in requirement after 2013? Just raising the question creates 
unrest for today’s financial markets – and for the German and French 
banks that may be holding such bonds. And what about debt that 
will be maturing in 2012? This debt will have to be refinanced, per-
haps by issuing new debt with a maturity extending beyond 2013. 
Conditions under which this debt can be issued in 2012 will depend 
on prospects for how this debt will be treated after 2013. These con-
ditions in turn affect how today’s holders of debt maturing in 2012 
assess the prospects of actually receiving their dues. These consider-
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ations show that it is difficult to even talk about proper governance 
post-2013 while we must be afraid that the effects of such talk will 
disturb today’s markets and deepen the triple crisis that we have. 
Following the markets’ reactions to the Deauville announcement, 
EU finance ministers tried to quiet the markets by saying that bail-
ins would only be required when a debtor were to have a solvency 
problem. For support with liquidity problems, no bail-in would be 
required. To me, this is another example where concern about the 
current mess precludes a sensible discussion of future governance. 
From a debtor’s perspective, the problem is always just a liquidity 
problem. And the private creditor will agree if that helps him avoid a 
bail-in. If you think about the substance of the matter, you will no-
tice that, for sovereign debt, the concept of insolvency as an objective 
inability to pay is not an operational concept. To assess a sovereign 
debtor’s ability to pay, one would have to deal with questions like: 
What is the debtor country government’s ability to get the country’s 
elites to pay taxes? What is the debtor country government’s abil-
ity to get a political consensus for selling assets? What is the debtor 
country government’s ability to restrict public-sector salaries? These 
questions have played a key role in sovereign debt crises, in Weimar 
Germany as well as the Latin American countries in the eighties, in 
Greece and, to some extent, even in the United States today. Because 
these questions go to the core of what makes a national polity and 
society, I see no scope for providing “objective” standards for dealing 
with them. By relying on the non-operational distinction between 
insolvency and illiquidity, the finance ministers lay the foundations 
for bad governance in the future. 
If we were able to clean up the current crises right away, we might 
be able to have a clean slate for discussion of governance after 2013. 
Unfortunately, this is not very likely. To some extent, this is a matter 
of technical and legal problems. More importantly, there is no politi-
cal will to clean things up right away. On this point, Germany bears 
much responsibility. From the very beginning of its intervention in 
the financial crisis, in October 2008, the German government has 
been bent on preventing transparency about the costs of intervention 
by shifting risks into the future. In October 2008 and the following 
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months, support was mainly provided in the form of guarantees. As 
we all know, guarantees do not cost anything, and they do not have 
to be put on the budget. The “bad bank” law in 2009 allowed banks 
to place dubious assets with the government. The government takes 
current write-offs (or not) on these assets, and a reckoning with the 
banks is deferred for twenty years. The support package for Greece 
and the EFSF have the great advantage that you do not have to tell 
the taxpayers that you are bailing out banks again. The advantage is 
all the greater if you can say that you are just dealing with a liquidity 
problem and no taxpayer money will be lost. I am afraid that, as long 
as there is no change in attitude concerning the costs and benefits of 
transparency, we will not be able to clean up the system, and discus-
sions about governance after 2013 will be contaminated by all three 
of the crises that we have right now. 
In this context, it is not helpful that so much of the political discus-
sion last year has been formulated in terms of solidarity and in terms 
of a currency crisis. There has been a lot of discussion of the sort that 
if it was not for Greece or Spain, German exports would not be do-
ing as well as they are. Therefore, Germany should feel an obligation 
to support the peripheral countries with their debt problems. The 
story can also be told in another way: If it had not been for Euro-
pean Monetary Union, the interest rate premia for the peripheral 
countries’ sovereign debts would probably have remained where they 
were prior to 1995, which, except for Greece, is twice as much as 
what they have become after the crisis – and a large multiple of what 
they were before 2007! And Germany would have had a higher real 
investment and higher real growth in the first half of the decade. This 
part of the story should presumably be part of the solidarity equation 
as well.2
More importantly, talking about these matters in terms of solidar-
ity creates significant political risk. Solidarity is a big word which 
means different things to different people. For a government to use 
taxpayer money in the name of solidarity, there must be some ac-
ceptance of this solidarity among the electorate. In this respect, there 
2 H.-W. Sinn, Rescuing Europe, CESifo Forum 11, Special Issue, August 2010,  
W. Franz, C. Fuest, M. Hellwig and H.-W. Sinn, A Euro Rescue Plan, CESifo 
Forum 11, No. 2, 2010, pp. 101–104.
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are significant differences across countries, even for solidarity within 
the country itself. Outside of certain political and intellectual elites, 
there is as yet little acceptance of any general notion of cross-border 
solidarity within the European Union. Public political discussion in 
the European Union mostly takes place along national lines. Within 
the different national discourse communities, notions of solidarity 
towards other nations tend to be seen with suspicion. The European 
Union is seen as a mechanism that siphons off money from national 
uses. The turbulence of last year’s discussions has very much rein-
forced these suspicions. We may deplore the populism that we see 
in these debates, but we should not underestimate the risk of an 
uncontrollable political backlash – in all affected member states. In 
this respect, the open disrespect for existing law that has been shown 
by many participants has been very harmful. So has been the lack 
of transparency about who is being supported, public employees in 
Greece taking early retirement or German and French banks avoid-
ing significant write-offs.
The discussion has also not been helped by euro-skeptical journalists 
and populist politicians interpreting the crisis as a currency crisis. 
The crisis is not a crisis of the euro and its internal or external stabil-
ity. The internal purchasing power of the euro has not been affected. 
The external purchasing power of the euro has declined somewhat in 
the spring of 2010, but the devaluation vis à vis the dollar was hardly 
more than a correction of an excessive revaluation in the years 2002 
– 2009, excessive that is, relative to differences in inflation rates. 
Journalists and politicians like to tell stories about such exchange 
rate movements, but there is no story to be told. Movements like the 
ones we have seen have been a recurrent phenomenon since the re-
introduction of flexible exchange rates in the seventies, and for most 
of them we do not have any explanations. (I also would not wish to 
refer to the subsequent revaluation of the euro vis à vis the dollar as 
an indication that the crisis has been overcome.)
As for the governance of the euro, I appreciate that, over the past 
year, there has been a lot of controversy about the behavior of the 
ECB. However, I do not see this development as running counter 
to the depoliticization and professionalization of the debate about 
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monetary policy that I had observed in previous years. The discus-
sions that we have had about ECB policy during the last year and a 
half have mostly not been about issues of independence of the cen-
tral bank or about the responsibilities of the ECB for the overall 
economy. These discussions have been narrowly focused on how the 
ECB should deal with the crisis. Leaving aside the legal question of 
whether the ECB’s decisions and policies are compatible with the 
Treaty, I believe that most of those discussions can be interpreted as 
instances of reasonable professional dissent in central banking. Thus, 
I do not see the ECB as having been captured by President Sarkozy 
or any other head of government or head of state.
There is a lot of criticism against the ECB buying up all sorts of 
things, including strange assets, toxic assets, etc. I have no idea what 
the quality of these instruments are but I have been thinking that, if 
the losses are there anyway, they have to be borne by someone and, if 
the banks that invested in these instruments are unable to bear them, 
then using seigniorage to cover these losses may not be the worst 
idea. I do, however, fear that if political systems or financial systems 
get used to the ECB solving their problems, then using seigniorage 
to underwrite losses on poor investments will end up being a very 
bad idea indeed.  This is precisely why I believe that we need to think 
about what an appropriate and credible governance system for the 
period after 2013 would be. 
3. Underlying Problems That Must Be Addressed
The preceding remarks indicate why the current crisis is so serious 
and why it is so difficult to get out of it. I now turn to the issues that 
we need to think about when we ask what would be a good system 
of governance for the future. In so doing, I will make believe that the 
problem of transition out of the current crisis can be ignored and 
proceed as if we could start with a clean slate.
If we think about what actually went wrong over the last decade, we 
must be concerned about the implications of the lack of an exchange 
rate mechanism for capital flows and for governance in the euro area. 
In providing a fairly sanguine assessment of European Monetary 
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Union in 2006, I very much underestimated this problem. 
We have a common currency, but not a common price system. Mar-
kets are not integrated to such an extent that regional and national 
price movements are as highly correlated as they would be in a single 
sovereign region or country. Year by year, the variance of inflation 
rates across the different member states of Euroland is much higher 
than the variance of inflation rates across American states, Swiss can-
tons, or German Länder. If exchange rates were flexible, these differ-
ences in inflation rates would by and large be reflected in exchange 
rate movements. Anticipation of exchange rate movements would 
force nominal interest rates to be different in different countries. 
In a currency union, however, the exchange rate is fixed, and there 
is no reason why borrowers in different countries whose credit risks 
are similar should be charged different nominal interest rates. When 
nominal interest rates are the same, however, differences in infla-
tion rates induce differences in real interest rates. In countries with 
higher inflation rates, real interest rates are lower, and, ceteris pari-
bus, investment demand will be higher. Higher investment in turn 
boosts aggregate demand, which contributes to rising prices. Some 
of the capital flows that we have seen in the years before the crisis 
reflected these differences – in inflation rates, real interest rates and 
investment demand – and reinforced them. Thus funds flowed from 
countries like Germany, where inflation was much below the average 
and therefore real rates were higher, to banks – and ultimately real-
estate investors in countries like Ireland and Spain where inflation 
rates were higher and real interest rates accordingly low. For public 
debtors in the peripheral countries, there also was the temptation 
to borrow more as entry into the European Monetary Union had 
eliminated the high risk premia that they had had to pay in the past.3 
I am not concerned about these capital flows per se. As a consequence 
of monetary union, some such capital flows were to be expected – 
and were fully intended. Previous interest rate differentials had been 
very high and had contributed to preventing capital from flowing 
to destinations where it would be most productive. After all, these 
interest rate differentials contained not just the premia for expected 
3 On this argument, see again Sinn (fn. 2) and Franz et al. (fn. 2).
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differences in inflation rates or expected exchange rate movements, 
but also the premia for the associated exchange rate risks. Eliminat-
ing these impediments to the flow of capital would contribute to 
raising welfare in countries receiving these flows and putting them to 
productive use as well as providing returns for investors in countries 
with surplus savings. 
However, governance mechanisms for these capital flows were insuf-
ficient. Capital flows to banks in Ireland and Spain took too little 
account of the dangers inherent in the Wicksellian dynamics of real 
interest rates, investment and housing price appreciation generating 
a bubble. In Greece and Portugal, there was too little concern about 
fiscal sustainability. In both contexts, there was a lack of discipline, 
on the side of lenders as well as borrowers. 
This lack of discipline was to some extent due to the lack of an 
exchange mechanism. For a country that has its own currency, the 
exchange rate typically provides a disciplining mechanism. This 
mechanism may work because it goes against the country’s pride to 
see the exchange rate devalued, and therefore policies that destroy the 
international competitiveness of important industries may come to 
be questioned when the loss of competitiveness affects the exchange 
rate. Or it may work because lenders distrust the country govern-
ment’s ability to finance its activities without using the printing press 
and therefore refuse to lend in the country’s currency, a constellation 
which Eichengreen and Hausmann have called original sin.4 
Many argue that, if only Greece or Portugal had been able to bor-
row in their own currency, they could now devalue their currencies 
and they would be fine again. Arguments get the matter backwards. 
If these countries still had had their own currencies, they would not 
have been able to borrow in their own currencies in the first place, at 
least not to the same extent and at the conditions that they actually 
got. Given the constraints on domestic-currency borrowing, they 
might have borrowed in foreign currencies, but, as they did so, they 
would have had to consider the risks inherent in such borrowing. 
4 B. Eichengreen and R. Hausmann, Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, in: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, New Challenges for Monetary Policy, Kansas 
City 1999,  329 – 368.
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With significant foreign-currency-denominated loans outstanding, 
they would have to consider that a devaluation of the currency would 
not only restore the international competitiveness of some industries 
but also inflate the value of their foreign-currency-denominated debt 
in terms of the home currency. The experiences that Latin American 
countries have gathered over the past three decades with different 
exchange rate policies provide ample warnings. None of them has 
been able to eliminate the consequences of original sin, the inabil-
ity to borrow freely in one’s own currency and the risks inherent in 
foreign-currency borrowing. 
In Euroland the disciplining mechanisms that are based on exchange 
rate movements and exchange rate risks are missing. On the one 
hand, as mentioned, this reduces frictions and enhances efficiency 
in cross-border capital flows. On the other hand, it increases the 
temptation for sovereign borrowers and their lenders to neglect fiscal 
sustainability. 
Fiscal sustainability, fiscal discipline and a respect for (intertemporal) 
government budget constraints are important because each mem-
ber state government is in principle independent and sovereign in 
its own fiscal policy. This independence is the only way to accom-
modate the very different attitudes towards fiscal policy and, more 
fundamentally, towards the role of the state that we have in different 
countries. For instance, the UK has a very strong market orientation 
in economic policy, the French government a very strong desire for 
state control over the economy. (Germany is somewhere in between, 
in principle very market oriented but in the details sometimes quite 
interventionist.) These differences induce difference in the extent to 
which economic fluctuations put the government at risk. It would 
be difficult to put the implied fiscal policies under a common set of 
principles.
Differences in attitudes towards the role of the state also concern 
the question how much society, and in particular the social and eco-
nomic elites, are willing to pay for the state. In the case of Greece, as 
in Latin America three decades ago or Weimar Germany in the twen-
ties, we are not just talking about an external transfer problem; we 
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are also talking about an internal transfer problem due to the unwill-
ingness of significant parts of society to contribute to government 
finance.5 In this context, of course, we also must take account of 
the expensive monuments that statesmen like to build to themselves, 
Olympic Games and the facilities that they require, or certain kinds 
of industrial policy, industrial policy as a disguise for social transfers 
or industrial policy as a realization of economically unviable techni-
cal dreams like the Concorde.
In all these issues, political legitimacy is derived from national politi-
cal discourse. EU interference is resented and cannot be taken too 
far. Therefore, it is all the more important for participants in national 
discourse to be aware of the fact that the government is subject to a 
budget constraint, and that the presumed benefits of certain policies 
and certain monuments must be compared to their costs. In this 
respect, the elimination of a disciplining mechanism for government 
borrowing is very problematic. 
The Stability and Growth Pact should have provided for such a 
mechanism, but in the early 2000’s, Germany and France prevented 
its application because their governments considered the Pact to be 
an infringement of their sovereignty. This experience carried a more 
general lesson, namely, arrangements for imposing fiscal discipline 
will not work if the parties whose job it is to enforce them are not 
interested in doing so. This was true of the Council with the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. It was also true of the Commission with 
the No-Bail-Out Clause of the Maastricht Treaty. In last year’s crisis, 
the Commission had nothing to gain by fulfilling its official role 
as a guardian of the Treaty. In contrast, it had a prospect of signifi-
cantly enlarging its own turf by working towards a new regime that 
would provide for inter-state bail-out in the European Union. Given 
these experiences, I find it remarkable that negotiations about future 
5 On the internal transfer problem in Latin America in the eighties, see H. Reisen 
and A. v. Trotsenburg, Developing Country Debt: The Budgetary and Transfer 
Problem, Development Center Studies, OECD 1988, on Weimar Germany, see 
H. James, The German Slump: Politics and Economics 1924 – 1936, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1986, and S. Schuker, American “Reparations” to Ger-
many, 1919 – 33: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis, Princeton Studies 
in International Finance No. 61, 1988, International Finance Section, Princeton 
University, Princeton, N.J. 1988.
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governance have completely neglected the problem of credibility.6 
Ever since Deauville, we have been en route towards a Stability and 
Growth Pact 2, which is going to have the same governance prob-
lems as its predecessor.
Current discussion focuses on “competitiveness”. As far as I can tell, 
this is a weasel word that makes believe that EU institutions are ad-
dressing the issues when, in fact, the meaning of the word is not clear. 
In the present context, it might be deemed to concern the prob-
lem that higher-than-average wage and price inflation in a member 
state erodes the ability of firms in that state to compete in domestic, 
EU and world markets. This problem is associated with the kind of 
Wicksellian dynamics that I mentioned above, where differences in 
inflation rates induce differences in the real rate of interest, which 
then drive capital flows. This being said, I fail to see what policy in-
terventions would be called for and what policy instruments would 
be used to deal with such developments. (Remember that wage set-
ting mechanisms are quite different in different countries.)  Nor do I 
see how EU institutions would induce member state governments to 
actually intervene. I therefore suspect that word itself is a device used 
to hide the fundamental dissent between different member states as 
to what the economic coordination mechanism should be that the 
Council is presumably looking for. 
Coming from a background in microeconomics and competition 
policy, I feel very uneasy about the word “competitiveness” because 
it has been abused so much. When a politician uses the word “com-
petitiveness”, he usually means that he wants his country’s “cham-
pions” to conquer the world. For this purpose, he does not mind 
subsidizing them with taxpayer money or giving them a monopoly 
position at home as a generous source of finance. Having observed 
Mr. Sarkozy in his previous incarnation as Minister of Finance at the 
time of the Sanofi-Aventis merger, I know that this is his mode of 
thinking. I am therefore concerned that a governance arrangement 
focused on “competitiveness”, which makes sense in some macro set-
tings where you are talking about wages being set semi-exogenously 
through collective bargaining or through the government providing 
6 This point is already raised in Franz et al. (fn. 2)
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a benchmark, may end up being intermingled with particular no-
tions about microeconomics and competition policy, in an attempt 
to get the rest of the European Union to adopt a form of industrial 
policy which, for France, has been very costly, one of those monu-
ments that politicians like to build for themselves.7
So far, I have only talked about the problem of fiscal discipline on 
the side of the borrower.  What about the lenders? The Wicksellian 
dynamics to which I pointed were driven by differences in real rates 
of interest that are induced by differences in inflations rates when 
nominal rates of interest are the same. But, why should nominal 
rates be the same? Why should we take it for granted that interest 
rates on Greek government bonds ought to be (almost) the same as 
interest rates on German government bonds? If fiscal sustainability 
in the different countries is different, nominal interest rates should 
be different. Yet, prior to the crisis, differences in nominal interest 
rates for different member state governments were negligible. Were 
there no reasons to believe that default risks differed? In my 2007 pa-
per, I observed that the failure of financial institutions and financial 
markets to take account of the fact that different sovereign borrowers 
had different fiscal capacities represented an anomaly. 
The anomaly can now be explained. Market participants gamed the 
system, and they seem to have been right. Of course I am just specu-
lating here about what bankers thought in 2001, 2002, and so on. 
They might just have been dumb and not appreciated that the differ-
ent member states differed in their ability to pay their debts. But they 
might also have been very clever and anticipated that the Maastricht 
rules were not going to withstand the pressure of a crisis. If this is 
what they thought, they were right, at least so far. They may yet be 
proved to have been wrong if the debts they hold will be subjected 
to haircuts after all. However, the very weakness of the banks in the 
wake of the subprime-mortgage crisis provides a strong reason why 
governments have shied away from such haircuts. 
7 For a comprehensive discussion, see Monopolkommission, Wettbewerbspolitik 
im Schatten „Nationaler Champions“, XV. Hauptgutachten 2002/2003, Nomos-
Verlag 2005, pp. 21 – 28; English translation of an abbreviated version pp. 575 
– 585.
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If we want the lenders to take a part in imposing discipline on bor-
rowers, we need to have bail-ins in the future. On this point, how-
ever, we should not deceive ourselves. There has been a lot of talk, 
but as yet no scheme that I would consider to be credible. If a new 
treaty this year or next year stipulates bail-ins of creditors in future 
debt crises, I expect that, if by 2020, we have another debt crisis and 
the solvency of banks is at risk, the bail-in clauses that are agreed now 
will be found to be just as good as the sanctions mechanism of the 
Stability and Growth Pact or the no-bail-out clause of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Moreover, the banks will know this, and, given the experience 
we have just had, they will be confident about their ability to “con-
vince” the European Union and its member states that the applica-
tion of bail-in clauses in a crisis is likely to have dire consequences.
4. Some Recommendations
In thinking about future governance, we must above all worry about 
the credibility of the regime we install. There is no foolproof recipe 
for doing so, but some improvements over the current regime – and 
current plans should be possible. Most importantly, we should begin 
to think about banks, their behavior and their governance, as part of 
the problem of Euroland governance. Until now, discussions about 
banking systems and discussions about Euroland governance have 
been treated as if they were completely unrelated. I consider this 
separation of the two sets of issues to be a big mistake. We need to 
integrate the discussions of the governance of the banking system 
with the discussion about how to reform the Euro system. In the fol-
lowing, I formulate a few recommendations in this direction.
Recommendation 1: 
Whatever governance mechanism is set up to discipline fiscal 
policy should be sensitive to information about the country’s 
banking system.
This recommendation is based on the observation that fiscal prob-
lems in Ireland and Spain have not arisen from unsound fiscal poli-
cies but from unsound banking practices, in combination with a too-
big-to-fail or a too-political-to-fail approach of the government. By 
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the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact, Ireland and Spain were 
doing wonderfully even as the risks were building up. The problems 
that caused the Irish situation to blow up and that are still causing 
significant pressure for Spain never even appeared on the radar screen 
of the Stability and Growth Pact. Given that banking systems can 
be too political to fail and given that bank bail-outs may overtax the 
national taxpayers, institutions observing fiscal sustainability should 
have an eye for banking developments and the fiscal risks they imply. 
In my opinion, this matter is not being given enough attention.
Recommendation 2: 
Make bank supervisors independent.
Traditionally, banking supervision has been treated as a national pre-
rogative, usually in the domain of the finance minister. In the past, I 
have supported this arrangement on the grounds that, with too-big-
to-fail policies, ultimately, the risks of poor banking supervision are 
borne by the taxpayer. If we look at the actual record, however, for 
how banking supervision has done under the authority of finance 
ministers, I find that there is a good case to be made for indepen-
dence. In the years prior to the crisis, governments have been more 
concerned about not throwing sands into the wheels of “their” banks 
than about protection of taxpayers from the fallout of the risks that 
these banks assumed. This has been the case in Ireland, where the 
government and the supervisors did not want to damage the ability 
of Irish banks to get funds from abroad. This has also been the case in 
Germany where the government and the supervisors did not want to 
interfere with the ability of the Landesbanken and of the real-estate-
finance institutions to earn money abroad. In both cases, taxpayers 
were not served well by government use of authority over banking 
supervision. The rationale for this authority is thereby undermined.
Underlying these failures is the deeper problem that politicians and 
governments tend to look at banks as a source of funds rather than a 
source of risks. When this attitude prevails, they are more concerned 
about getting the banks to fund close to the politicians’ hearts than 
about getting them to avoid risks that might be costly to the tax-
payers. Whereas, in theory, supervision under the authority of the 
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finance minister reflects the potential involvement of taxpayers in 
bailing banks out, in practice, it may provide the basis for a symbiosis 
of governments and banks, where  banks provide funds for certain 
activities and governments protect the banks from excessive competi-
tion. Before the deregulation of the seventies and eighties, there were 
many regulations that explicitly called for bank funding of specified 
activities, with highly adverse effects on the risks to which banks 
were exposed, while government guarantees as well as restrictions 
on competition in banking provided the banks with rents. Examples 
are geographic restrictions on mortgage lending (Texas), very high 
minimum reserve requirements (Portugal), requirements to invest in 
government bonds (Sweden). The symbiosis thrived on the lack of 
transparency about the costs of political intervention and the lack of 
transparency about the risks to which banks were exposed.
Even after the financial crisis, the underlying attitude is still there. 
Discussions about Basel III were dominated by banks claiming that 
sharper regulation would induce a credit crunch, as if a lack of fund-
ing possibilities had been a key characteristic of the past decade. The 
German government was most concerned about preserving the status 
of public-sector banks in Germany, among them the main culprits 
in the crisis, with estimated costs to the taxpayer in the range of 50 
bn. to 150 bn. EUR. Given the observation that, in practice, govern-
ments are not much concerned with risk from their banks and that 
prudential supervision is often blunted or even abused for political 
purposes, the theoretical case for putting banking supervision under 
the authority of the government seem practically irrelevant.
Recommendation 3: 
Strengthen the competences of European supervisory institu-
tions and of European networks of national supervisors. 
I have two reasons for this recommendation. First, the Irish experi-
ence shows that banking supervision at the national level can have 
significant repercussions for other member states of the European 
Union. Charles Goodhart’s saying, “Banks are international in life, 
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but national in death”, does not quite fit the Irish experience.8 In 
Euroland today, the costs of bank bail-outs are not just borne by the 
national taxpayer but by taxpayers all over. This suggests that na-
tional banking supervision should be subject to some co-ordination 
and control at the supranational level.
Second, I believe that the problem of regulatory capture is reduced 
if we have a network of bank supervisors acting in co-ordination but 
with some degree of independence. Something like this has been 
observed in competition policy for network industries such as tele-
communications or electricity. Here, the workings of the European 
networks of national regulators  have reduced the amount of capture 
by comparison to what we had before, largely, I believe, because each 
regulator could point to regulators in other countries as benchmarks. 
Just as  importantly, the desire to be accepted by one’s peers at the 
European level has affected the motivation of sector-specific regula-
tors.  
A final point: I would not wish to have banking regulation inte-
grated into the central banks. In the crisis, it did not make much 
of a difference whether a country’s supervisory authority was inte-
grated with the central bank or not. This suggests that this question 
is of little consequence for the performance of banking supervision. 
However, the American experience shows that, if banking supervi-
sion and monetary policy are under the same roof, the integrity of 
monetary policy can be compromised by concerns about financial 
institutions. Such a development can lead to bad monetary policy. 
It can also become a source of moral hazard as the financial indus-
try develops a sense that, if they get into trouble, the central bank 
will bail them out. There should be transparency in the sense that 
supervisors should know where monetary policy is going and the 
central bank should know what the state of the financial system is, 
but the different functions should not be under the responsibility of 
the same institution. 
8 C.A.E. Goodhart, “Procyclicality and financial regulation,” Banco de España, Es-
tabilidad Financiera 16 (2009), p. 16. Goodhart puts the formulation in quotation 
marks, perhaps in deference to Mervyn King’s “global banks are global in life but 
nation in death”, for which, unfortunately, I have not found a reference.
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Sovereign Debt and Banks:  
Need for a Fundamental View on 
the Structure of the Banking  
Industry
Arnoud W.A. Boot
The credit crisis has made us all aware of the fragility of banks, and 
the financial sector at large. These very same banks also show up in 
the Euro sovereign debt crisis. EU banks outside Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland may own a few hundred billion euro’s of the total out-
standing public debt of those three countries. Any debt restructur-
ing will therefore have serious consequences for the balance sheets 
of those institutions. For EU (and Euroland) policymakers this has 
further complicated their decision making on the financial problems 
of some of the member states. 
Debt restructuring – possibly in all three countries – might be ines-
capable. Since many of the banks that hold the sovereign debt will 
be considered systemic in their home country, the countries involved 
might feel compelled to help these banks deal with the losses on the 
sovereign debt that restructuring implies.
A key concern is with the size of domestic financial sectors. This 
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particularly applies to many EU countries where the total balance 
sheet of the domestic financial sector often is a staggering multiple of 
the national product of the country. Moreover, there exists no mech-
anism for burden sharing in case of failure of EU-wide operating 
banks. In case of a failure of a bank, its home country is essentially 
left on its own. Also this complicates a debt restructuring: no real 
EU-level procedures are in place to deal with failing banks. While 
some improvements are being made in EU level supervision (based 
on the 2008 de Larosière Report), the EU level arrangements can-
not do much more than provide for some coordination. No burden 
sharing is in place and national supervisors remain in charge together 
with the national Ministries of Finance (for dealing with the poten-
tial financial consequences).1  
Against this backdrop strengthening the resilience of the financial 
system is a paramount concern. In my view we need to deal with 
the complexity of the financial sector, and measures affecting the 
structure of the industry might have to be taken. Let me offer some 
thoughts on how to deal with the complexity of financial institu-
tions.
Dealing with size and complexity: breaking-up banks and living wills2 
The issue of complexity of financial institutions is heavily debated. 
In other industries one is tempted to say that market forces will fig-
ure out what the optimal configuration of a firm might be (subject 
to anti-trust concerns). However, in banking complexity can induce 
and worsen externalities that one might want to contain. More spe-
cifically,
i. complex institutions might be difficult to manage and su-
pervise, and effective market discipline might not be expect-
ed (problem of opaqueness);  
ii. a complex financial institution may have many, difficult to 
1 At the EU level European Supervisory Authorities are being created, including 
the European Systemic Risk Board. Some exposure on sovereign debt is being as-
sumed by the European Financial Stability Facility as well as the ECB.
2 Adapted from my paper “Banking at the Crossroads: How to deal with Market-
ability and Complexity?”, prepared for the April 5-6, 2011, FED Atlanta 2011 
Financial Markets Conference, Navigating the New Financial Landscape.
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discern linkages with the financial system at large. This may 
augment TBTF, or rather too-interconnected-to-fail con-
cerns;
iii. as a consequence systemic concerns might become more 
prominent;
iv. complexity might paralyze supervisors and put them in a 
dependent position; e.g. how is timely intervention possible 
if the complexity of the institution cannot be grasped by 
supervisors?
On the latter point, one element of the current reform proposals 
asks financial institutions to have a living will available, i.e. a detailed 
recovery and resolution plan that would allow for an orderly and ef-
ficient resolution of financial difficulties when they may arise. Such 
a living will aims at overcoming the complexity of an institution, 
and the paralysis it may cause with the supervisor when problems 
emerge. Taking this concept seriously should probably mean that all 
relevant financial institutions organize themselves in a way that they 
can be easily dissolved when problems arise. So the complexity might 
have to be dealt with upfront, and would then have direct implica-
tions for the organizational structure of the business, i.e. for a bank’s 
business model. 
One is tempted to conclude that one way of dealing with the com-
plexity is to disentangle activities and put them in separate legal 
structures (‘subsidiaries’). Those subsidiaries could deal on an arms-
length basis with each other, with each being adequately capitalized 
without recourse on each other. This would resemble the non-oper-
ating holding company structure that is discussed in some OECD 
studies. With such a structure supervisors could possibly more eas-
ily (and timely) target, i.e. rescue, systemically important parts of a 
financial institution in case of distress; other parts could be sold or 
dismantled. 
In this spirit one could look at the arrangements in New Zealand. In 
that country much of the banking system is in the hands of foreign 
players. New Zealand’s authorities were skeptical about this lack of 
control, and instituted structural requirements to address them. The 
Sovereign Debt and Banks: Need for a Fundamental View on the Structure of the Banking Industry 80
requirements entail enforced organization of activities within subsid-
iaries, but on top of that requirements that make the New Zealand 
based subsidiaries operationally independent from their foreign par-
ents. Without effective pan-European arrangements, this might be 
necessary for individual EU countries to contain risks.
Can separate legal structures under one corporate roof be effective?
Whether such separate legal structures are really effective is unclear. 
In the market there might still be reputational spillovers between 
the different parts. Similarly, the market may still expect intra-group 
cross subsidization or joint risk bearing with the group’s financial 
strength being perceived behind any individual activity. 
In practice, financial institutions typically have corporate structures 
that include a myriad of legal entities. It cannot be emphasized 
enough that banks in this way have become horrendously complex. 
HSBC for example has in excess of two thousand entities. These are 
typically not designed to augment transparency and/or reduce com-
plexity, but rather to engage in regulatory arbitrage (e.g. capital man-
agement) and economize on taxes. The legal structures themselves 
are typically not stand-alone in any meaningful way but linked to-
gether through intra-group transactions, joint back offices and other 
shared facilities and activities. While these interlinkages might help 
in obtaining synergies, the complexity that comes with it seems at 
odds with having effective living wills, or having a business structure 
that is receptive to supervision or market discipline. 
Complexities are even more magnified once we take into account 
cross border activities and differences in bankruptcy regimes across 
countries. Potential conflicts are enormous in case of a crisis con-
sidering problems associated with burden sharing. Note that living 
wills and the timely intervention they could facilitate might be really 
valuable in these cross border situations especially when intervention 
occurs before losses become overwhelming.
One may expect that the industry will vigorously oppose such trans-
parent and arms-length structures that – in their view – would limit 
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synergies. The incentives of financial institutions might also be to 
seek complexity and in doing so hold supervisors ‘hostage.’ The im-
plicit TBTF (or too-complex and/or interconnected-to fail) backing 
may further amplify disagreements between the bankers privately 
optimal choices and those of society. The reality is that the non-
operating holding company structure as envisioned in the OECD 
studies – with transparency via arms-length contracts, no recourse 
and separate capitalizations –  is a far cry away.
Breaking up banks?
A valid question is whether in face of this opposition one should not 
be more active and possibly go for a more radical break-up scenario. 
This refers to structural measures that seek to prescribe the structure 
and allowable businesses of banks and other financial institutions. 
Several policymakers have advocated such measures. The British have 
arguably been most adamant. Both Mervyn King (Governor Bank 
of England) and Adair Turner (Chairman of the Financial Services 
Authority) have both hinted at the need to split up banks. However, 
the UK Independent Banking Commission (the ‘Vickers Commit-
tee’) seems to shy away from break-up scenarios.
If the complexity makes it impossible for supervisors to (credibly) 
intervene in a timely fashion, one may start thinking about the desir-
ability of breaking-up banks. One question is whether this is really 
possible. And the other is how breaking-up banks squares with the 
broader objectives of supervision, and particularly the lessons learnt 
from the financial crisis. At least two lessons could be identified:
•	 Contagion should be addressed;
•	 Core commercial banking functions might have to be safe-
guarded.
The latter typically refers to the payment system and local deposit 
and lending operations. If a break-up indeed increases transparency 
and reduces complexity, timely intervention might become easier 
and this could help serve both lessons. 
Sovereign Debt and Banks: Need for a Fundamental View on the Structure of the Banking Industry 82
What to do?
In my view the complexity of banks together with the sizable risks 
that banks impose on the economy at large (and EU countries in 
particular) necessitate actions that simplify the structure of banking 
institutions. With the enormous complexity of existing institutions 
and the difficulty that regulators (and legislators) have in grasping 
the intralinkages (within) and interlinkages (across) financial institu-
tions, much could be gained. Also, well known problems like how 
to deal with the cross border operations of banks (international co-
ordination) and the shadow banking system at large would need to 
be addressed. 
What does not help is that there are no well established prescriptions 
on how to go about redesigning the financial architecture. Hope-
fully, for the foreseeable future, the design of the financial system will 
(continue to) be high on the research agenda of academics as well as 
regulatory and other public bodies.
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Greek Debt -- The Endgame 
Scenarios
Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati
 
At about this time last year, we wrote a short paper entitled “How 
to Restructure Greek Debt.”1 The intervening months have seen the 
following major events in the Eurozone debt crisis:
•	 In May 2010, Greece concluded an agreement with the Eu-
rozone member states, with the backing of the IMF, for ac-
cess to a €110 billion facility (€80 billion from the Eurozone 
and €30 billion from the IMF).2 That amount was judged 
to be sufficient to allow Greece to repay -- in full and on 
time -- all public sector debts maturing during the three-
year IMF program period and to cover anticipated budget 
deficits during that period.  One objective of this total bail-
out of Greece was to staunch any risk of contagion to the 
other European peripheral countries.
1 Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603304.  The 
published version of this paper can be found at Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, 
Restructuring a Nation’s Debt, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 46 (June 2010).
2 See Ronald Janssen, Greece and the IMF:  Who Exactly is Being Saved?  CEPR 
Draft (July 2010) (available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/
greece-imf-2010-07.pdf ).
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•	 The European Central Bank promptly embarked on a pro-
gram of open market purchases of Greek and other Euro-
zone periphery debt in order to “ensure an orderly monetary 
policy transmission mechanism.”3 This program continues, 
in fits and starts, as of this writing.  The ECB is thought now 
to own €40-50 billion of Greek sovereign bonds purchased 
in the secondary market.
 
•	 On October 18, 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and French President Nicholas Sarkozy took a stroll on a 
beach in Deauville, France.  When they returned holding 
hands (in a figurative sense, naturally), they announced 
plans to alter the EU treaty to put in place a permanent 
“crisis management system” that would include provisions 
to ensure the “adequate participation of private creditors”.4 
Unfortunately, Mr. Sarkozy and Mrs. Merkel did not con-
fide to the markets precisely what this “adequate participa-
tion” entailed.  Predictably, the markets assumed the worse, 
resulting in a sell-off of Eurozone periphery sovereign debt.5 
Yields on that paper moved sharply higher.
•	 In late November 2010, Ireland asked for, and received, its 
own €85 billion bailout package, also with IMF condition-
ality.6
   
•	 To calm the markets after the Deauville adventure, the fi-
nance ministers of the five biggest EU member states an-
nounced on November 28, 2010 that “any private sector 
involvement [in Eurozone sovereign debt restructurings] … 
3 See Ansgar Belke, Driven by the Markets?  ECB Sovereign Bond Purchases and 
the Securities Market Program, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Working 
Paper (June 2010) (available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activi-
ties/cont/201006/20100610ATT75796/20100610ATT75796EN.pdf ).
4 See Erick Nielsen, Eurozone Bond Haircuts Must Look Appealing, Financial 
Times, November 9, 2010.
5 See Peter Spiegel, Anger at Germany Boils Over, Financial Times, November 
16, 2010; Simon Tilford, Eurozone Politicians are Playing with Fire, CER Insight, 
November 15, 2010.
6 See Ian Traynor, IMF and EU bail out Ireland amid fears of Eurozone contagion, 
The Guardian, November 22, 2010.
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would not be effective before mid-2013”.7 In other words, 
investors were assured -- or thought they had been assured -- 
that all existing Eurozone sovereign debt instruments would 
be immune from a debt restructuring.
•	 On March 8, 2011, Greece filed a registration statement 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission en-
abling the country to issue bonds to “diaspora” Greek inves-
tors at rates significantly below market.8 
 
•	 On April 6, 2011, as this paper was being written, Portugal 
asked the European Union for financial assistance.9
 
•	 March 23, 2011 saw the release of a term-sheet for a per-
manent facility to assist distressed Eurozone sovereigns af-
ter 2013, the European Stabilization Mechanism (“ESM”). 
The term sheet makes clear that ESM loans will be given 
preferred creditor status.10 A similar claim to preferred credi-
tor status has not been made (or at least not yet been made) 
for the €80 billion EU contribution to the Greek bailout 
package.
•	 Last month, the Greek Finance Minister said publicly that 
even the €110 billion EU/IMF facility might not be enough 
to tide Greece over until 2013.11
   
To date, one or more of the following concerns about permitting a 
restructuring of Eurozone sovereign debt have induced the official 
sector to continue a policy of total bailouts of all afflicted countries.
7 Statement by the Eurogroup, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118050.pdf
8 A Greek Diaspora Bond Odyssey, Financial times (Alphaville), March 9, 2011 
(available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/03/09/509211/a-greek-diaspora-
bond-odyssey/).
9 See Peter Wise and Peter Spiegel, Portugal appeals for EU bail-out, Financial 
Times, April 7, 2011.
10 See The Eurozone’s ESM Permanent Bailout Fund, Financial Mirror, March 
23, 2011 (available at http://www.financialmirror.com/Columnist/Global_Mar-
kets/752).
11 Id.
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•	 Contagion.  Confronted with a debt restructuring in one 
country, will the markets recoil from all peripheral Eurozone 
countries, perhaps sparking a general crisis?
•	 Effect on banks.  Eurozone commercial banks hold the 
lion’s share of Greek sovereign bonds.  A debt restructur-
ing that significantly reduced the balance sheet valuation of 
these assets could threaten the solvency of some institutions, 
perhaps requiring a recapitalization from the host govern-
ment.
•	 Honi soit qui mal y pense.  Would a Eurozone sovereign 
debt restructuring indelibly stain the reputation of the Euro 
and perhaps even undermine the foundations of the mon-
etary union itself?
 
Although each of these constraints is still present to some degree 
one year after the Greek debt crisis erupted, it is no longer obvious 
that they, individually or in aggregate, continue to justify complete 
paralysis.  The markets have had an opportunity to focus on the dif-
ferences in the financial positions of the various peripheral Eurozone 
countries.  Putting aside the obvious fact that the policy of total of-
ficial sector bailouts has not prevented contagion (see Ireland and 
Portugal), blind indiscriminate contagion has diminished as a risk. 
As for the commercial bank holders, they have been given a year to 
sell or hedge exposures, or otherwise provision against an eventual 
hit to the value of their Greek positions.  Some are no doubt still 
uncomfortably exposed, but this list should be smaller than it was a 
year ago.  (It is not clear to us whether all banks have in fact made 
hay while this sun has been shining, but they have at least been given 
a chance to do so.)
We have now been asked to update our earlier assessment of the 
Greek debt situation in light of these developments.  In particular, 
we have been asked to speculate on possible endgame scenarios for 
the Greek debt crisis.
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We divide these scenarios into three groups:  (i) Greece goes the dis-
tance with the current IMF/EU program and a debt restructuring is 
avoided altogether, (ii) a debt restructuring of some kind becomes 
unavoidable after June 2013 when the EU’s “read my lips -- no re-
structuring until 2013” promise lapses by its terms, and (iii) a liabil-
ity management transaction affecting some or all of the Greek debt 
stock is launched before 2013.
The Official Scenario -- Greece Goes the Distance
Under this scenario -- which enjoys the public support of Greece’s 
official sector sponsors (the IMF and the EU) as well as the Greek au-
thorities themselves -- Greece will stick with its program of fiscal aus-
terity for the full three years.  At the end of that period (apparently 
the initial prediction of renewed market access in 2012 has now been 
withdrawn), Greece returns to the capital markets to refinance its 
maturing debt and fund amortizations due on the EU/IMF bailout 
loans.  The markets, this theory contends, will be so impressed with 
the turnaround in Greece’s fiscal position that private sector monies 
will be advanced in sufficient quantities and at tolerable interest rates 
to permit Greece to resume normal rollovers of its maturing debts. 
Over time, Greece will run primary budget surpluses and will begin 
to nibble at its (admittedly) colossal debt stock.  This, says the official 
sector, is the benignant future that awaits both Greece and all of its 
lenders.
 
The Risks
•	 On its current path, the Greek public sector debt in 2013 
will represent 150-170% of GDP.  Moreover, more than half 
of that debt stock will by then be in the hands of official sec-
tor creditors (the EU, the ECB and the IMF), at least one of 
which (the IMF) claims for itself preferred creditor status. 
Will the private capital markets really be eager to resume 
financing a country in this precarious position?
•	 Two more long years of fiscal austerity lay ahead for Greece. 
Will the Greek politicians be able to hold the social/political 
consensus together that long?
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•	 What happens if Greece begins to miss its IMF performance 
targets?  Will the IMF and EU casually relax the condition-
ality so that drawdowns can continue under the €110 billion 
facility, or might German parliamentarians insist on taking 
a harder line?  Waiving compliance with the fiscal perfor-
mance targets in order to avoid a debt default, of course, 
risks sending this message to other prospective borrowers 
from official sector bailout facilities:  “Eurozone countries 
in financial distress can expect assistance from the EU and 
IMF in two -- but only two -- circumstances:  (i) when those 
countries adopt and stick to stern fiscal austerity programs 
or (ii) when they don’t”.
•	 The €110 billion facility was intended by its authors to be 
an overwhelming demonstration of financial firepower -- a 
veritable Hank Paulson bazooka.  If this was the antidote to 
contagion, however, it failed.  Ireland has succumbed.  So 
has Portugal.  If one of these other countries decides to pur-
sue a debt restructuring before 2013, might not that prec-
edent fuel calls for something similar in Greece?
 
Post-2013 Scenarios
We see four possible scenarios if Greece is unable to regain market 
access in late 2013.  Three involve a post-2013 restructuring of the 
Greek debt stock, while one envisions that Greece muddles on for an 
indefinite period as a ward of the official sector.
 
Scenario One:  The Official Sector Takes the Spear.  By June 2013, 
more than one-half of the Greek debt stock will be in the hands of 
official sector lenders.  By significantly restructuring their own claims 
against the country, these official sector lenders could attempt to ren-
der Greece presentable to the private markets.
The Risks
•	 It is difficult (read, nearly inconceivable) to envision a po-
litical environment that would permit the EU and ECB -- 
much less the IMF -- to sacrifice their taxpayers’ money in 
order to ensure full and timely repayment of commercial 
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creditors, some of whom are earning yields in excess of 12%.
•	 Will the EU carry the burden of such a restructuring alone, 
or will it expect the IMF to chip in?  And if the latter, what, 
if anything, will be left of the IMF’s sacrosanct “we never 
restructure” status?
Scenario Two:  The Private Sector Creditors Take the Spear:  Un-
der this scenario, the holders of the remaining Greek debt stock still 
in private hands in mid-2013 will be presented with a restructuring 
proposal that effectively eviscerates the value of their paper.
The Risks
•	 Even a total write-off of that remaining one-third to one-
half of the debt stock may not be enough to return Greece 
to creditworthiness.
•	 These creditors will never go gentle into the good night of 
a total loss of value.  Something coercive, something truly 
ugly, will be needed to prod them into the abattoir.  What 
effect would this have on future lending to Greece or, for 
that matter, to other Eurozone sovereigns?
 
Scenario Three:  All Together Now.  The third alternative involves 
a joint debt restructuring by both official and private sector lenders 
sometime after the middle of 2013.  With private sector involve-
ment, the official sector can’t be accused of mollycoddling commer-
cial lenders; with official sector involvement, those commercial lend-
ers would not face a total write off of the value of their claims.
The Risks
•	 Some might argue that this demonstration of fraternal 
solidarity will only end up alienating the affections of both 
groups, the official and the private lenders.  Would it not be 
better, they might argue, to keep one camp sweet for future 
borrowings?
•	 Unless the terms of the two restructurings were calibrated 
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to be equivalent in a net present value sense, this approach 
risks intercreditor jealousy and suspicion.
Scenario Four:  Wardship.  Perhaps the paralyzing fear of a Euro-
zone sovereign debt restructuring will persist even after 2013 has 
come and gone.  If so, Greece could be relegated to the status of a 
ward of the official sector for an indefinite period. The remaining 
bonds in the hands of commercial lenders, and the amortizations 
due on the first round of EU/IMF loans, would presumably all be 
paid with the proceeds of drawings under successor official sector 
credit facilities.  After the passage of a few more years, virtually all of 
the Greek debt stock will then be owed to its official sector rescuers.
The Risks
•	 This could be politically unpalatable to the Greeks.  Some-
one is bound to say that when Greece took the first €110 
bailout, this was equivalent to a bibulous landlubber accept-
ing the King’s shilling from the sergeant of a Royal Navy 
press gang in order to buy one more round of drinks:  when 
the poor fellow wakes up in the morning he will be facing 
ten years before the mast in His Majesty’s service.  
 
•	 It can’t be a very pleasant alternative for the official sector 
either.
Pre-2013 Restructuring Scenarios
If for any reason Greece cannot, or does not wish to, wait until mid-
2013 before addressing its debt stock (a decision that presumably 
would require at least the passive acquiescence of the EU, the IMF 
and the ECB), broadly speaking we see two possible scenarios.
The EU’s post-Deauville assurance that there will never be a restruc-
turing of an existing Eurozone sovereign debt instrument (at least 
until 2013) presents something of an obstacle to any pre-2013 re-
structuring of Eurozone sovereign debt instruments.  The face-saving 
solution may be linguistic.  A voluntary liability management trans-
action undertaken by the debtor country before 2013, the argument 
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goes, is not a “restructuring” as that term was used in the post-Deau-
ville assurance.  Restructuring, it may be claimed, connotes a degree 
of coercion on the affected creditors.  But if the creditors themselves 
elect voluntarily to participate in a liability management transaction 
to improve the creditworthiness of their debtor, who in the official 
sector can or should gainsay that decision?
Scenario One -- A Light Dusting.  One possibility would be to 
approach the private sector (principally northern European commer-
cial bank) holders of Greek bonds with a mild restructuring proposal 
that limits, or even neutralizes altogether, any net present value loss 
they would suffer as a result of participating in the transaction.  A 
simple Uruguay-style12 reprofiling of the debt stock with no haircut 
to principal would fit this bill. To ensure widespread creditor ac-
ceptance, some might urge that any new instrument issued to effect 
the restructuring benefit from credit enhancement (a partial guar-
antee from the official sector, for example, or collateral security à 
la Brady bonds) so as to neutralize the negative NPV consequences 
of the stretch-out of maturities. One obvious motivation for a mild 
restructuring of this kind would be to cushion its effect on the bal-
ance sheets of overexposed northern European commercial banks. A 
second motivation, of course, would be to move existing debt ma-
turities beyond the current program period so as to liberate a portion 
of the €110 billion bailout facility for other purposes.
 
The Risks
•	 Will such a light dusting of the debt stock return Greece 
to a sustainable position, or will it be just the first of a two 
stage restructuring with the real blood-letting deferred to 
stage two?
•	 Neutralizing the negative NPV effect of a maturity stretch 
out by adding credit enhancements is expensive and con-
traindicated for a country facing a severe debt crisis.  But 
asking bondholders voluntarily to accept an NPV loss, how-
12 In 2003, Uruguay “reprofiled” its external debt stock by extending the maturity 
of each of its 18 series of bonds by five years.  There was no haircut to principal; 
coupons were kept the same.  See Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. Pam, Uruguay’s 
Innovations, 19 J. Int’l Banking L. and Reg. 28 (2004).
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ever, will surely test the sponsors’ powers of persuasion.
•	 Overexposed commercial banks that currently hold Greek 
sovereign paper in their “hold to maturity” book at or near 
par value may want an assurance that a transaction of this 
kind will not require an immediate marking of their posi-
tions to market values.
Scenario Two:  The Full Monty.  For the sake of completeness, the 
final option would involve a full restructuring of the Greek debt 
stock prior to 2013 in order to give the country a visibly sustainable 
debt profile as soon as possible.  Such a restructuring would presum-
ably look to cut the size of the debt stock in nominal terms as well as 
to iron out the maturity profile, all to the end of positioning Greece 
to return to the capital markets within a reasonable period of time 
following the closing of the transaction.
The Risks
•	 A Full Monty approach would require all concerned to jet-
tison any illusions about sponsoring a wholly voluntary 
transaction.
•	 This will lead to the usual discussion about how -- in the 
odious patois of investment bankers -- to “incentivize” the 
bondholders to participate.  Change local law to compel 
participation (more than 90% of the debt stock is governed 
by Greek law)?  Threaten a payment default on any unten-
dered bonds (the “abandon all hope ye who do not enter 
here” tactic)?  Declare any non-tendered bonds ineligible at 
the ECB discount window?
•	 Having spent billions of Euros of taxpayer money to stave 
off any restructuring of Eurozone sovereign debt, will the 
political class in Europe really be prepared now to careen to 
the other extreme of countenancing a savage debt restruc-
turing?
•	 A major tremor of this kind affecting the Greek debt would 
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indeed be felt in Lisbon, Madrid and elsewhere in peripheral 
Europe.
The Historical Perspective
We have all been here before.
In August of 1982, Mexico was forced to declare a moratorium on 
the repayment of its external debt owed to commercial banks.  Over 
the course of the next two years, more than twenty other countries 
followed suit -- it later came to be called “the global debt crisis” of 
the 1980s.
Then, as now, the lenders to these sovereigns were primarily com-
mercial banks.  Then, as now, some of those banks were dangerously 
overexposed and could not have endured any significant writedown 
of the value of their sovereign credit portfolios.  Then, as now, the 
banks approached the official sector institutions asking that the offi-
cial sector either lend the sovereign borrowers the money to continue 
normal debt service on their bank credits or, failing that, guarantee 
the banks’ loans.
Then, unlike now, the banks were rebuffed.  The official sector flatly 
refused to bail the banks out of their bad credit decisions in the early 
1980s.  But, in recognition of the balance sheet fragility of some of 
those institutions, the official sector (and in particular the U.S. Trea-
sury Secretary) agreed to use its influence over the sovereign debtors 
to promote a debt restructuring technique that avoided any need for 
the banks to write down the value of their sovereign portfolios.
This technique, later named after U.S. Treasury Secretary James Bak-
er, had four components.
•	 The debtor country was required to sign up to an IMF sta-
bilization and adjustment program.
•	 The principal of the banks’ loans was rescheduled over rela-
tively brief periods -- 18 to 24 months.
•	 Interest payments on those rescheduled loans, however, had 
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to be kept current to avoid negative accounting consequenc-
es for the banks.
•	 Because many countries lacked the resources even to pay 
interest, the banks were compelled to lend the debtors “new 
money” which was then recycled back to the banks as inter-
est payments on their existing exposure.13 
As the 1980s rolled sweetly on, the four elements of this Baker Plan 
debt restructuring technique were repeated, sometimes four or five 
times, in the afflicted debtor countries.  In public, Secretary Baker 
and others expressed fathomless confidence that the banks would 
never experience a loss on their sovereign credits.  Why?  The debtor 
countries, it was predicted, would after years of IMF tutelage “grow” 
out of their debt problems.  In private, however, the official sector 
players warned the commercial banks to begin provisioning their 
loan loss reserves against the possibility that a loss might someday 
materialize.
After seven years of the Baker Plan, a new U.S. Treasury Secretary, 
Nicholas Brady, announced (on March 10, 1989) a shift in U.S. 
Government policy toward the management of the global debt cri-
sis.  Secretary Brady encouraged the banks to write off a portion of 
their exposure to the debtor countries, and to stretch out repayment 
of the balance for 30 years, as a means of ending the global debt crisis 
in a single stroke.  And, more or less, the Brady Initiative did just 
that.  Banks swallowed (modest) losses on their sovereign portfolios; 
debtor countries regained (modest) market access; the banks’ loan 
loss reserve provisions (built up over the prior seven years) cushioned 
the balance sheet effect of the losses.  A banking crisis in the devel-
oped countries did not follow the launch of the Brady Initiative.
The debt management technique adopted by Secretary Baker and his 
official sector colleagues in 1982 therefore had the effect of grabbing 
the commercial bank creditors by their noses and holding them in 
place as the lenders of record until a more durable solution to the 
problem could be implemented.  The concession made to the bank 
13 See Lee C. Buchheit, Whatever Became of Old New Money, Int’l Fin. Law 
Review, December 1990.
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lenders at the time was a restructuring technique that avoided ac-
counting losses while the banks were provisioning their loan loss re-
serves.  When the day of reckoning eventually arrived with Secretary 
Brady, the losses were felt by the bank creditors that had made the 
loans in the first place.
 
Contrast this to the debt management technique being used in Eu-
rope in 2010-2011.  This time around, the official sector players are 
not holding the original lenders by the nose; the official sector is 
actually buying out the original lenders in full and on time as each 
existing bond matures and is paid by drawing down an official sector 
credit lines.  The difference is this -- if the sword of a debt restructur-
ing must eventually fall in order to render Greece’s debt stock man-
ageable (something that most economists view as inevitable), that 
sword will fall principally on the neck of the official sector lenders. 
The original creditors will have swapped places in the tumbrel with 
official lenders quite literally in the shadow of the guillotine. 
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Rules-Based Restructuring and 
the Eurozone Crisis
David A. Skeel, Jr.
For many who follow the sovereign debt markets, the current Euro-
zone crisis is “déjà vu all over again,” only closer to home.  After 
a series of sovereign debt crises climaxed with Argentina’s default 
nearly a decade ago, many observers concluded that rescue fund-
ing—the traditional response to a crisis—was no longer a plausible 
response.  Some found rescue funding problematic in principle, due 
to the moral hazard it creates.  But the biggest concern was practical: 
after its many outlays, the IMF’s funding was increasingly limited.  
For a time, all options were (at least in theory) on the table.  Most in-
sisted that the traditional “ad hoc” machinery was adequate, perhaps 
as supplemented by the addition of “collective action” provisions in 
all new bond issuances.  Others argued that it was time for a more 
comprehensive, rules-based, bankruptcy-like solution.  In the end, 
the U.S. Treasury led a move toward more universal use of collective 
action in bonds, and more sweeping solutions were set to the side.
With the crises in Ireland, Greece and now Portugal, many of the 
same arguments have reappeared, but with a European flavor.  Under 
the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), the default solution 
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in the Eurozone is rescue financing, but concerns about costs of res-
cues, their apparent ineffectiveness, and the moral hazard they invite 
has prompted serious calls for alternative approaches.
My remarks focus in particular on the question whether a compre-
hensive, rules based approach is plausible or desirable.  The discus-
sion that follows briefly considers:
1. The lessons of the Great Recession for the current crisis;
2. The contours of a sovereign bankruptcy framework;
3. Implications of distinctive EU features such as the Euro-
zone’s federal structure and and common currency;
4. The linkages between sovereigns and major banks; and
5. The appropriate decision maker for a bankruptcy process.
A Lesson from the Great Recession
Thus far, European decision makers have taken something of a two-
pronged approach to the crises that have enveloped Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal. The response to the immediate crises has been ad hoc 
bail out arrangements.  But European officials have announced that 
they will require creditor haircuts as part of any bailout starting in 
2013. The U.S. experience with systemically important financial in-
stitutions in 2008 suggests that it will be very difficult to make the 
commitment to forego future bailouts credible.  After bailing out 
the investment bank Bear Stearns in March, 2008, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson insisted that the government did not intend 
to bail out other banks.  But the threat was not seen as credible by 
market participants. Up until a few days before Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, Lehman, its potential 
buyers, and market participants all believed that Lehman would be 
bailed out.  A similar dynamic may well be at work in Europe. Unless 
a credible, adequately-specified alternative to bailouts is put in place, 
the market will anticipate continued bailouts, and this will create 
enormous pressure for bailouts.  
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A Model for Sovereign Bankruptcy
The deepening crisis in Portugal suggests that bailouts, at least as 
configured thus far, may not stanch even the current crisis.  Nor do 
collective action provisions seem to be adequate to the task.  While 
there are legitimate questions as to whether a rules-based, bankrupt-
cy framework is a realistic alternative, the limitations of the existing 
strategies suggest that it is time to revisit the question.  
In earlier work, Patrick Bolton and I outlined a potential bankruptcy 
framework.  In this section, I describe the core features of the frame-
work, which includes clear priority rules, a two stage voting process, 
and a new financing mechanism.1 
With respect to priority, the sovereign bankruptcy framework should 
include a straight first in time priority framework, together with vot-
ing procedures that call for absolute priority treatment– that is, the 
assurance that higher priority creditors will be paid in full, and that 
any haircut will be aimed first at lower priority creditors.  Under our 
proposal, priority would be based on the time that the credit was 
extended, with the debt of any given year taking priority over debt 
issued in a subsequent year.  Based on this priority, the sovereign 
debtor would divide its creditors into classes at the outset of a two 
tier voting process for restructuring the sovereign’s debt.  For the pur-
poses of the first vote, the debtor would make a proposal as to how 
much of its overall debt would be discharged– that is, how large the 
overall haircut to creditors would be.
If a majority of all creditors approved the haircut, the debtor would 
submit a restructuring plan outlining the proposed treatment of each 
class of creditors for a second, class-by-class vote.  If the requisite 
majority of each class voted yes, the plan would be implemented ac-
cording to its terms.    In the event that one or more classes rejected 
the plan, on the other hand, the court would reduce the creditors’ 
1 The discussion that follows is drawn from Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 189 
(2005).  This article extends an approach developed at greater length in Patrick 
Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign 
Bankruptcy Framework be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2004).
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claims in the amount of the agreed upon haircut, starting with the 
lowest priority creditors and working up the priority hierarchy.  
This two step approach has several crucial virtues.  Perhaps most im-
portantly, it would clarify creditors’ priorities outside of bankruptcy 
and sharply reduce the risk of debt dilution.  The first in time priority 
scheme would apply outside of, as well as in, sovereign bankrupt-
cy, because creditors would know that any subsequent bankruptcy 
would be governed by the first-in-time priority scheme.  For sover-
eigns that actually invoked the procedure, the two step voting struc-
ture would provide a mechanism for pushing the parties towards a 
resolution even if bargaining breaks down, much as the threat of liq-
uidation or cramdown do in ordinary corporate bankruptcies under 
U.S. Chapter 11.
 
The principal exception to absolute priority in our sovereign bank-
ruptcy framework comes with its second key feature, interim financ-
ing.  As with corporate debtors in Chapter 11, our framework would 
provide first priority for interim financing in order to counteract 
the debt overhang problem that otherwise might discourage lenders 
from financing the restructuring process.  Because of the risk that 
priority treatment would encourage overborrowing, however, we dis-
tinguish between two categories of loans.  Loans to finance the sover-
eign’s trade debt would be presumptively permissible, whereas some 
form of approval, such as from a majority of the sovereign’ s creditors 
would be required for larger loans.  This strategy would effectively 
cabin the size of interim loans.  In addition to minimizing the risk of 
overborrowing, it would also reduce the impact on the IMF’s budget 
if it continued to serve as interim financer.
Is the Eurozone Different?
When this and other bankruptcy-oriented proposals were intro-
duced in the early 2000s, critics objected that they would create 
moral hazard for debtors—making default too tempting—and that 
they would improperly interfere with the sovereignty of a financially 
distressed nation.   How serious are these concerns in the Eurozone, 
and what other distinctive Eurozone factors need to be considered?
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It is not clear whether debtor moral hazard would differ in Europe, 
as compared to Argentina and other developing world nations.  Por-
tugal, Greece, and Ireland depend heavily on financing from credi-
tors within the Eurozone, which might discourage a precipitous 
bankruptcy filing (and seems to have been a key factor in Europe’s 
decision to bail out Ireland).  Whether or not this is the case, a suf-
ficiently stringent bankruptcy process would limit the risk of un-
necessary filings.
The sovereignty issue, on the other hand, cuts sharply in favor of 
bankruptcy.  By entering the EU, these countries already have ceded 
a portion of their sovereignty to the larger EU structure.  A bank-
ruptcy framework would be much less intrusive in this context, 
where each country is already part of an interconnected framework.
Another distinctive feature, the common currency, also may coun-
sel in favor of a sovereign bankruptcy framework.  Because Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal have adopted the euro, they do not have the 
option of devaluing their currency in response to their crises.  Bank-
ruptcy would serve as a substitute for currency adjustments.
Implications for European Banks
Perhaps the biggest concern with bankruptcy—or any other restruc-
turing of sovereign debt, for that matter—in the Eurozone is the 
potential effect on large European banks that hold large amounts of 
sovereign debt.  Concerns about the possible damage to German and 
French banks in the event of an Irish default figured prominently in 
the decision to bail out Ireland.  While the risk of contagion is a le-
gitimate concern, it may make more sense for the countries in which 
the banks are located to make the decision whether to intervene in 
the event a sovereign bankruptcy destabilizes a foreign bank.
Who Would Oversee the Process?
Most previous sovereign bankruptcy proposals have proposed that 
the IMF or another international organization serve as the decision 
maker for the bankruptcy process.  In our earlier work, Bolton and 
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I proposed that sovereign bankruptcy cases be handled by ordinary 
bankruptcy or insolvency judges.  The debtor would be permitted to 
file in the courts of any nation (other than the debtor itself ) whose 
law governed a nontrivial amount of the debtor’s debt.
This approach may not be ideal for the Eurozone.  This conclusion is 
informed in important respects by our experience in the recent crisis. 
Faced with bankruptcy filings in which the U.S. and Canadian gov-
ernments had a vested interest with Chrysler and General Motors, 
U.S bankruptcy judges exhibited what appeared to be a disappoint-
ing lack of independence.  This raises questions about the likely ef-
fectiveness of a single insolvency judge.  One alternative, similar to 
proposals that have been made in other contexts, might be to select 
a panel of three judges from within EU to handle a bankruptcy case. 
Conclusion
The intractability of the EU.crisis suggests the need to consider radi-
cal innovations such as bankruptcy.  And the distinctive qualities of 
the EU framework suggest that the standard objections to sovereign 
bankruptcy are less relevant in the EU context.
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The Economic Consequences of 
the Euro Pact
Edmond Alphandéry
In November 1919, Keynes published his famous book: “The eco-
nomic consequences of the peace”. Taking a challenging view on the 
issue of war reparations that were to be due by Germany, he argued 
that it was in the Allies’ interest to be more accommodating. “If Ger-
many is to be milked, she must not first of all be ruined”,1 he wrote, 
explaining that in order for Germany to pay, she had to be able to 
export enough goods in the first place.
At the present juncture of the Eurozone crisis, in the aftermath of 
the European Council of March 25, 2011 which has tried to design 
a “comprehensive” framework for permanent crisis prevention and 
resolution after June 2013, it is worth raising, as Keynes did after the 
first World War, the question of “sustainability”. This notion is key 
because if one or two (even more) countries were at that time posting 
budget deficits which make their public finance unsustainable, then 
according to the conclusions of the European Council, they could 
be required to engage into negotiations with their creditors on the 
terms of their contracts, which might jeopardize the financial sector 
of the Eurozone.
1 Cited by Liaquat A. Hamamed, Lords of Finance, Penguin book, 2009, page 
109. 
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In order to explore the various scenarios ahead, as the title of this 
panel2 suggests we are invited to look at past experiences (like Argen-
tina which had to abandon its currency board in 2001 or the demise 
in August 1971 of the Gold Exchange Standard). The starting point 
is therefore the assumption that the Eurozone is an area of “fixed 
exchange rates” between its Member States. Should a country leave 
the Eurozone and go back to its own national currency, it would 
then recover its own monetary sovereignty and could manipulate its 
exchange rate to regain competitiveness, etc.
This assumption neglects the fundamental fact that the Eurozone 
cannot be considered as a “fixed exchange rate” area for the sheer 
reason that national currencies have disappeared (we don’t have ex-
change rates any more). It underestimates the political dimension 
of EMU. The likelihood that this scenario comes true is therefore 
as high as to see Texas or California abandon the dollar for a new 
currency!
One cannot put on the same footing a Country which may decide 
to forego the peg of its currency as it is free of its movements to do 
so, with a State like Greece or California which are part of a bigger 
political entity and share the same currency with their neighbours, 
and have therefore to abide by a set of common rules and constraints. 
Should a government want to get rid of the euro, it would soon real-
ize that besides the enormous damages to its financial stance and to 
its economy that such a decision would entail, it would have to put 
in place capital controls and coercive measures to force its people 
to use the new “national currency” in lieu and place of the euro. 
It would therefore in fact be faced with the prospect of leaving the 
European Union, an occurrence of devastating consequences for the 
country, notwithstanding the risk for its democratic institutions. It is 
no surprise that this outcome is only contemplated by extreme right 
political parties like the “Front National” in France, which are not 
sparing of demagogical and irresponsible proposals.
Now another scenario which may not be totally ruled out even 
though its likelihood remains extremely small, draws on the blow out 
2 “Alternatives to sovereign bankruptcy?”
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of the Eurozone and on the breakdown of the euro. Many euroscep-
tic economists fantasise on this outcome, arguing that the Eurozone 
is not an “optimum currency area”, that it has built-in asymmetries 
which may entail corrections that are too painful to be implemented,
etc. The burst of the euro (or the split of the Eurozone into two parts) 
which could happen only with the explosion of the European Union 
itself, would trigger a systemic shock worldwide of much wider am-
plitude than the collapse of Lehman Brothers itself, and would prob-
ably lead to enormous political tensions in Europe. For these reasons, 
we can remain confident that everything will be undertaken at any 
price to prevent this apocalyptic scenario to materalize. Besides, it is
interesting to observe that market participants seem more and more 
convinced of the lack of credibility of this assumption, as is reflected 
in the decorrelation between the evolution of the euro exchange rate 
(which has steadily appreciated over the last months), and the evolv-
ing situation in the Eurozone where solvency issues in some Member 
States still remain a matter of major concern.
The question which we therefore should better raise has to do with 
“sustainability”: should a Member State (or more) risk to fail, what 
devices should be put in place to ease its debts, walk the nation back 
through a path of sustainability and make easier its access and return 
to financial markets?
Due to the idiosyncratic dimension of our European institutions, 
one cannot draw on sovereign default prevention and resolution 
from other countries in the past or abroad when one has to deal with 
the case of a Eurozone Member which would be unable to face its 
financial obligations.
What characterizes the Eurozone is precisely the bonds of solidar-
ity interwoven by the member states over the years, through the 
construction of a European community. The establishment of the 
various devices and institutions that have been put in place to cope 
with the crisis that the Eurozone has been suffering for the past 18 
months, is based on the dynamics between the ethic of responsibility
called upon each nation taken individually and the principle of soli-
darity that underpins the European construction, which applies all 
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the more to Members of the Eurozone.
When a crisis looms on the horizon, both the above forces are at 
work. It is left at first hand to each state to render its own house 
in order. As Axel Weber writes: “Responsibility of individual member 
countries and no bail out remain essential for the EU… It is up to the 
Member countries themselves to consolidate their public budget and to 
initiate comprehensive economic reforms”.3 But if and when the risk of 
failure threatens not only the financial stability of the economy of the 
country in trouble, but also the financial stability of the European 
Union as a whole, then the principle of solidarity ends up prevailing.
In this paper, we shall formalize the working of this dynamic process.
Thanks to this analytical tool we shall explain the evolving interven-
tions of the European authorities since the beginning of the crisis; 
and then make use of this framework to figure out the potential out-
comes after June 2013. This paper will lastly conclude on the prob-
able complementary decisions that should be taken to reduce the risk 
of crisis that we may incur from this date.
1) The dynamics of the response of the European Union to the 
Eurozone crisis
When the European states signed the Maastricht Treaty, they had not 
foreseen any provisions to deal with a later possible crisis in the euro 
area. When faced with it, then they had to grope their own way to 
design the assumed proper devices under the market pressure.
The logic behind their implementation ultimately obeys a rational 
argument, that of an ex-ante cost-benefit analysis. There is an expect-
ed potential cost for the European Union not to intervene. It is made 
of the sum of the bankruptcy damages for the banking and financial 
sector and the economy of the Eurozone as a whole and of the harm 
suffered by the European Union in terms of its image since it would 
have left one (or several) of its members when in crisis fall without 
a helping hand. The perception of this cost rises as we approach the 
3 Axel Weber, “Europe’s reforms may come at a high price”, Financial Times, 
February 22, 2011.
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expected time of bankruptcy (Figure 1).
On the other hand there are also beneficiary reasons not to intervene.
Firstly helping a member will dent the incentive for the given coun-
try (and for others) to undertake the necessary reforms (“the moral 
hazard” issue). This “benefit” of non intervention is also increasing 
with the supposed vicinity of the expected bankruptcy; it corre-
sponds for the European Members involved to the expected savings 
of funds, which they would not need to mobilise. 
If on the same graph we draw the curve of these “expected” costs 
and “expected” benefits, as long as the crisis is considered far away 
enough, the benefits of non intervention outweigh the costs. How-
ever as perception of the crisis grows, the vertical distance between 
the two curves goes down to the point where they intersect; and 
the European authorities are ready to act. Rationally this intention 
must come before the country’s failing; hence the vertical line rep-
resenting the expected cost of bankruptcy is situated to the right of 
the intersection. One can say that the horizontal distance between 
the expected moment of intervention and the expected bankruptcy 
curve is an indication of stress, and therefore of the spreads of the 
Government bonds.
In 1977, Jean Monnet wrote in his memoirs, presciently: « L’Europe 
se construira à travers les crises et elle sera la somme des solutions ap-
portées à ces crises » (“Europe will be forged in the crucible of crisis, 
and will be the sum of the solutions that finds to crisis”). Lorenzo 
Bini Smaghi, a member of the Executive Board of the European 
Central Bank, says the same thing when he writes: “Europe is evolv-
ing, growing, continuously on its path of integration. This is not hap-
pening, however, according to some predefined, agreed plan, but rather 
in response to the challenges it faces, which in some cases are likely to 
endanger the very existence of the Union”.4 
4 Cited by Martin Wolf, “The grand bargain is just a start”, Financial Times, 
March 30, 2011.
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The use of the above analytical tool explains well enough the road-
map of European institutions since the start of the crisis, which has 
led to the gradual establishment of the new arrangements in a Mon-
net like approach.
Since the beginning of the crisis, the European authorities have in-
tervened on four occasions.
In May 2010, they have set up an assistance programme for Greece 
in the form of loans (ESFM) that was extended to all member coun-
tries with public finances in distress by establishing the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).
Secondly, bail out to the Irish banks came indirectly through aid 
to the Irish Government. Well in advance the European authorities 
had adopted the principle of a “permanent European mechanism” 
for crisis resolution (the ESM) to be applied from June 2013. They 
also announced that issuance of the sovereign debts after June 2013 
would bear Collective Actions Clauses (CAC), a decision which 
could be viewed as a means to mitigate moral hazard. This latter 
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signal was negatively interpreted by the markets. Market participants 
raised their expectations on the likelihood of a bankruptcy. It is not 
surprising therefore that interest rate spreads widened.
A reverse dynamic played out in March 2011 after the European 
Council adopted the Euro Pact, because in parallel the European 
authorities decided that the loans extended to Greece (and possibly 
later to other countries) under the European Stability Mechanism, 
will benefit from significantly lower rates (4.2%), and were also re-
scheduled to 2021.
The third bail out was decided for Portugal on April 6th. But the 
European authorities had already announced long in advance that 
they were ready to provide assistance to Portugal, which it reluctantly 
ended up calling.
2) The implementation of the European Stability Mechanism in 
June 2013
Let us explore now the consequences of the introduction of the Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism. As from June 2013, the ESM will have 
a funding capacity of € 500 billion (supplemented by funds from the 
IMF) in order to provide help to a Eurozone Member under strict 
conditionalities, through loans or purchases of public bonds on the 
primary market. The rules under which this assistance will be ex-
tended are fully described in the conclusion of the European Council 
of March 24-25, 2011.
If after a thorough analysis of the debt sustainability of the Member 
State requesting financial support, “it is concluded that a macroeco-
nomic adjustment program can realistically restore the debt to a sustain-
able path, the beneficiary Member State will take initiative aimed at 
encouraging the private investors to maintain their exposures”, and this 
Member State will be entitled to receive assistance from the ESM at 
a preferred interest rate. But “if, on the basis of a sustainability analysis, 
it is concluded that a macroeconomic program cannot realistically restore 
the public debt to a sustainable path, the beneficiary Member State will 
be required to engage in active negotiations in good faith with its credi-
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tors to secure their direct involvement in restoring debt sustainability. 
The granting of the financial assistance will be contingent on the Mem-
ber State having a credible plan and demonstrating sufficient commit-
ment to ensure adequate and proportionate private sector involvement”.5 
The assumption that after June 2013 the EU could let one (or more) 
Member(s) to fail lacks credibility. Solidarity has already been put 
to test three times: when the Eurozone prevented the downfall of 
Greece, then of Ireland and lastly of Portugal. It is highly unlikely the 
European authorities will take the risk of a bankruptcy in June 2013 
that could trigger a systemic crisis, and also will leave a country in a
state of insolvency after years of painful economic and social sacrifies.
In the most likely scenario, the ESM will take over a big chunk of the 
public debt of each of the countries which will have applied to the 
ESM, as the EFSF and the private sector loans coming to redemp-
tion are replaced by new issuances of the same amount.6 
3) Alleviating the pressure on the June 2013 “rendez-vous”
It would be better if the European authorities could avoid being 
faced with any of the two following options in June 2013. Either 
they conclude that the country (Greece, Ireland or Portugal) is on an 
unsustainable path and therefore cannot qualify for assistance under 
the ESM, and they let it default, or they consider that it is capable of 
stabilising its debt and allow it to receive ESM loans subject to strict
conditionality. In the latter case, it would probably be very difficult 
to subsequently withdraw ESM support, with the result that the 
country’s debt would gradually be assumed by the European Union 
itself.
The best situation would clearly be by the end of 2013 that none of 
these scenarios materializes and that each of these countries be in a 
position to refinance its debt directly on the financial markets. The 
5 Conclusions of the European Council, March 24-25, 2011
6 It is precisely to try to avoid the ESM taking over the whole public debts of these 
countries that in the conclusions of the European Council of March 24-25, there 
is an incitement to “beneficiary members [to] take initiatives aimed at encouraging 
the main private investors to maintain their exposures”.
Edmond Alphandéry 111
ESM is not designed to take on the debt of countries in difficulty.7It 
is a fund set up to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as 
a whole at a given point in time.
Let’s look at how the sustainability issue applies to each of these three 
countries whether they obtain financing in the future through the 
ESM or on the financial markets. We performed simulations based 
on International Monetary Fund inflation and economic growth 
forecasts. For the purpose of these simulations, we considered that 
the three countries would have complied with the economic adjust-
ment programmes imposed under their agreements with the IMF 
and the European Union.8 We also assumed that each country’s an-
nual refinancing needs would remain constant over the simulation 
period. We’re going to examine the sustainability of their public 
debt, that is whether public debt as a percentage of GDP is likely 
to stabilize and then decline. This means looking at the stabilizing 
deficit (as a % of GDP) which can be defined as the level of budget 
deficit at which the debt (as % of GDP) stabilizes. By comparing the 
actual deficit (as a % of GDP) with the stabilizing deficit, we can see 
whether the country is or is not on a debt sustainability path.9
7 These forecasts stop at 2015, and we have extrapolated the numbers from 2015 
to 2016 and 2017. These tables have been produced by Sophie Chardon and the
Economic Research Team of Natixis under the Direction of P. Artus (of course, 
I alone assume full responsibility for the content of this paper). I would like to 
thank them for their help.
8 For instance, a country whose average maturity of traded debt is 7 years is con-
sidered as having refinanced 5/7th of its total debt in 2016, at a rate of 1/7th per 
year starting in 2012.
9 Hence, the public debts dynamic can be written as:
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  tg  being the growth rate of GDP at time t
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GREECE 
GDP Deflator GDP growth (real)
Interest rates  
(%)
Interest burden 
(as % of GDP)
Total Deficit  
(as % of GDP)
Stabilizing 
Deficit        
(as % of GDP)
Public Debt 
evolution      
(as % of GDP)
2011 1.6 -3.0 4.2 -6.5 -8.6 2.0 151
2012 0.4 1.1 4.2 -6.7 -7.7 -2.2 156
2013 0.8 2.1 4.2 -6.8 -6.2 -4.4 158
2014 1.2 2.1 4.2 -6.8 -4.1 -5.0 157
2015 0.6 2.7 4.2 -6.7 -3.3 -4.9 156
2016 0.6 2.7 4.2 -6.5 -2.5 -4.9 153
2017 0.6 2.7 4.2 -6.4 -1.7 -4.8 150
Sources: National Statistics Service, Bank of Greece, Ministry of Economy and Finance, IMF, Natixis
PORTUGAL
GDP Deflator GDP (real) Interest rates  (%)
Interest burden 
(as % of GDP)
Total Deficit  
(as % of GDP)
Stabilizing 
Deficit        
(as % of GDP)
Public Debt 
evolution      
(as % of GDP)
2011 1.4 -0.9 7.0 -3.8 -5.3 -0.4 88
2012 2.7 0.3 5.8 -4.1 -4.2 -2.5 89
2013 2.1 0.7 5.8 -4.3 -3.5 -2.4 90
2014 2.1 1.3 5.8 -4.3 -2.9 -2.9 90
2015 2.1 1.3 6.9 -4.5 -2.4 -2.8 90
2016 2.1 1.3 7.0 -4.6 -1.9 -2.8 89
2017 2.1 1.3 8.0 -4.7 -1.4 -2.7 88
Sources: National Statistics Service,Ministry of Economy and Finance, IMF, Natixis
IRELAND
GDP Deflator GDP (real) Interest rates  (%)
Interest burden 
(as % of GDP)
Total Deficit  
(as % of GDP)
Stabilizing 
Deficit        
(as % of GDP)
Public Debt 
evolution      
(as % of GDP)
2011 0.4 0.9 5.8 -4.2 -12.4 -1.3 109
2012 0.8 1.9 5.8 -5.0 -10.6 -2.8 116
2013 1.4 2.4 5.8 -5.5 -8.9 -4.1 121
2014 1.6 3.0 5.8 -5.7 -6.7 -5.1 123
2015 1.6 3.4 6.9 -5.9 -6.2 -5.5 124
2016 1.6 3.4 7.0 -6.1 -5.7 -5.4 124
2017 1.6 3.4 8.0 -6.2 -5.1 -5.2 124
Sources: CSO, Department of Finances, IMF, Natixis
TRAJECTORIES OF DEFICITS AND DEBTS
IN GREECE, PORTUGAL AND IRELAND
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GREECE
GDP Deflator GDP (real) Interest rates  (%)
Interest burden 
(as % of GDP)
Total Deficit  
(as % of GDP)
Stabilizing 
Deficit        
(as % of GDP)
Public Debt 
evolution      
(as % of GDP)
2011 1.6 -3.0 4.2 -6.5 -8.6 2.0 151
2012 0.4 1.1 4.2 -6.7 -7.7 -2.2 156
2013 0.8 2.1 5.6 -7.2 -6.5 -4.4 158
2014 1.2 2.1 10 -8.5 -5.7 -5.0 159
2015 0.6 2.7 10 -9.3 -6.0 -4.9 160
2016 0.6 2.7 10 -10.0 -5.9 -4.9 161
2017 0.6 2.7 10 -10.4 -5.7 -4.8 162
Sources: National Statistics Service, Bank of Greece, Ministry of Economy and Finance, IMF, Natixis
PORTUGAL
GDP Deflator GDP (real) Interest rates  (%)
Interest burden 
(as % of GDP)
Total Deficit  
(as % of GDP)
Stabilizing 
Deficit        
(as % of GDP)
Public Debt 
evolution      
(as % of GDP)
2011 1.4 -0.9 7.0 -3.8 -5.3 -0.4 87.7
2012 2.7 0.3 5.8 -4.1 -4.2 -2.5 89.3
2013 2.1 0.7 5.8 -4.3 -3.5 -2.4 90.4
2014 2.1 1.3 5.8 -4.3 -2.9 -2.9 90.5
2015 2.1 1.3 10 -4.8 -2.8 -2.8 90.5
2016 2.1 1.3 10 -5.2 -2.5 -2.8 90.2
2017 2.1 1.3 10 -5.4 -2.1 -2.7 89.6
Sources: National Statistics Service,Ministry of Economy and Finance, IMF, Natixis
IRELAND
GDP Deflator GDP (real) Interest rates  (%)
Interest burden 
(as % of GDP)
Total Deficit  
(as % of GDP)
Stabilizing 
Deficit        
(as % of GDP)
Public Debt 
evolution      
(as % of GDP)
2011 0.4 0.9 5.8 -4.2 -12.4 -1.3 109
2012 0.8 1.9 5.8 -5.0 -10.6 -2.8 116
2013 1.4 2.4 5.8 -5.5 -8.9 -4.1 121
2014 1.6 3.0 5.8 -5.7 -6.7 -5.1 123
2015 1.6 3.4 10 -6.4 -6.7 -5.5 124
2016 1.6 3.4 10 -6.9 -6.5 -5.4 125
2017 1.6 3.4 10 -7.2 -6.1 -5.2 126
Sources: CSO, Department of Finances, IMF, Natixis
Scenario 2: BORROWING ON THE MARKETS AFTER 2013 AT 10%
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When they obtain financing through the ESM,10 we can see that all 
three countries will succeed in stabilizing their debt by 2017, with 
Greece making the fastest progress, followed by Portugal, and with 
Ireland bringing up the rear.
On the other hand, if they have to borrow on the financial markets as 
from 201311 at an interest rate of say 10%, none of them will man-
age to stabilize their debt (because their total deficit will exceed their 
stabilizing deficit). However, they will all come very close to meeting 
this target by the end of the simulation period.
In other words, for them to be able to meet their financing needs 
directly on the market, their debt burden would just have to be mar-
ginally reduced. This has to be the goal. It’s why the best course of 
action would be for each country to reduce its public debt as quickly 
as possible. For example, they could be encouraged to launch a large-
scale privatization programme, as Greece is already being urged to 
do. Or the terms of European Union loans could be further im-
proved by aligning them with those offered by the International 
Monetary Fund.
10 At a rate of 4.2 % for Greece assumed to be applied starting 2013 and for Ire-
land and Portugal at the AAA European Union public debt rate to which is added 
200 bps for the first 3 years and then 300 bps afterwards. 
11 Until 2013, we assumed that Ireland benefits from IMF, EFSM and ESFS loans 
of € 22.5 bn each at an average interest rate of 5.8%, the EFSM lending at 5.7%, 
the EFSF at 6.05% and the IMF at 5.7%. For Ireland, we take an interest rate of 
5.8% for a global amount of € 75 bn until June 2013.
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Exiting the Euro Crisis
Charles W. Calomiris
I. Introduction
What do economics and history have to tell us about the ways 
Eurozone countries are likely to resolve their problems of fiscal un-
sustainability and banking system insolvency? In answering that 
question, I recognize that I am among the most pessimistic observers 
at this conference about the likely future of the euro and its member-
ship. My relative pessimism reflects three personal attributes. 
Arithmetic Trumps Legalism
First, I am an economist, which means that I place more stock in 
arithmetic than in the legalities of what countries supposedly are or 
are not permitted to do; legislation or politicians’ pronouncements 
about the impossibility of a departure from the Eurozone count 
for little if arithmetic requires it. I will argue that in the case of at 
least one country – Greece – the fiscal arithmetic strongly favors not 
only a sovereign debt restructuring but also a departure from the 
Eurozone, and there may be others for whom this same outcome will 
soon become a necessity as well.
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Real Exchange Rate Theory and Political Economy
Second, I am an American. Since before the establishment of the 
euro, American economists have had a distinctly more pessimistic 
view of the euro experiment than have their European colleagues. 
Two years ago, Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea published a detailed and 
quite humorous review of the difference in opinion about the euro 
between American and European economists. Its title characterized 
what it (then) regarded as the excessive pessimism of the Americans: 
“The Euro: It Can’t Happen, It’s a Bad Idea, It Won’t Last. U.S. 
Economists on the EMU, 1989-2002.”1 In fact, my own 1999 pa-
per predicting the eventual collapse of the euro was included in that 
review. The implicit theory behind the Jonung and Drea paper was 
that American economists (perhaps out of jealousy or nationalism) 
did not want to believe that the euro would work. In light of recent 
events, an alternative theory may have greater weight: Europeans 
were in denial. After all, wishful thinking (the result of a need to 
resolve “cognitive dissonance”) is a fairly pervasive aspect of human 
nature.
In 1999, and subsequently, I predicted that roughly a decade after 
its creation, either some members of the Eurozone would be forced 
to leave, or the currency would depreciate dramatically as a means of 
keeping those countries in the Eurozone.2 In particular, I predicted 
that southern European countries would become fiscally unsustain-
able, and that losses of European banks would create significant bank 
insolvencies, which would put further fiscal pressure on governments 
through the costs of bank bailouts. 
No, I am not a modern-day Nostredamus. I was not alone in those 
prognostications, and the economists that predicted the outcome 
that Europe is now suffering did not rely on any supernatural access 
to insights. The consequences of the euro’s launch were predictable 
for the simple reason that the Eurozone was not an “optimal cur-
1 European Economy Economic Papers, No. 395, Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Directorate General, European Commission, December 2009.
2 Charles W. Calomiris, “The Impending Collapse of the European Monetary 
Union,” Cato Journal, Winter 1999, pp. 445-52; “The Painful Arithmetic of Greek 
Debt Default, March 18, 2010, Economics21.org; “The Euro Is Dead,” Foreign 
Policy, January 6, 2011.
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rency area.” Its demise was a likely result of the deadly combination 
of fundamental economic inconsistencies among its members and 
the predictably myopic political palliatives that would be applied by 
individual members to ease the pain caused by those fundamental 
inconsistencies. Here is the train of thought that I thought was pretty 
obvious in 1999.
Southern Europe (especially Greece, Portugal, and Southern Italy) 
has low long-term productivity growth, particularly in tradable 
goods. This relative productivity growth gap was likely to persist as 
the result of a combination of pre-existing trade patterns, human 
capital differences, rigid labor laws in the South, and low labor mo-
bility in Europe. As we learned from the experience of the East Asian 
fixed exchange rate collapses of 1997, and from the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson theory of real exchange rate determination (as embodied 
in many macroeconomic models, including the rational expectations 
models of real exchange rates pioneered by Rudiger Dornbusch in 
the 1970s), if two countries with persistent productivity growth dif-
ferences in their tradable goods sectors adopt a common currency, 
eventually the slow-productivity growth country will experience re-
cessionary pressure, and eventually, it will either have to suffer con-
tinuing price deflation or devalue its currency.
 
As Alwyn Young pointed out, East Asian countries’ relative produc-
tivity decline began several years prior to the crisis of 1997, and as 
Campbell Harvey and Andrew Roper point out, the financial lever-
aging of East Asia was a direct response to the lost profitability of 
manufacturers, who were able to obtain explicitly or implicitly sub-
sidized access to credit to fill the gap between their income and their 
expenditures. The result, however, was growing leverage and increas-
ingly unsustainable private sector and bank finances.3  
Of course, in the short run, countries do not have to accept the 
dismal choice between slow growth and devaluation. Instead, they 
can apply fiscal stimulus, or facilitate (through easy bank credit) the 
3 Alwyn Young, “The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities 
of the East Asian Growth Experience,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3), 
pp. 641-80; Andrew H. Roper and Campbell R. Harvey, “The Asian Bet,” Social 
Science Research Network, March 18, 1999.
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growth of the non-tradables sector (also known as housing). Even 
worse, that temptation to compensate with fiscal stimulus and easy 
credit will be greater if the establishment of the currency union itself 
lowers the interest rates on sovereign debt or bank debt that the low-
tradables-productivity-growth countries face. That was an important 
contributor to the fiscal binge of Greece, which ran fiscal deficits 
in excess of 5% of GDP in its boom years of 2004-2006. It should 
not be a surprise that Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Ireland all 
underwent (albeit in different degrees) significant fiscal spending and 
bank lending booms, and that some of them saw remarkable rates of 
appreciation in housing markets. This is precisely what one would 
expect from the long-run implications of real exchange rate theory 
and the short-run implications of political economy theory.
“Why, Sometimes I’ve Believed as Many as Six Impossible Things 
Before Breakfast.”4 
Third, I am an historian, and so I know that erstwhile impossible 
things – from a legalistic perspective – happen regularly in finan-
cial and monetary history. For example, consider the U.S. depar-
ture from the gold standard at the beginning of 1862, which began 
a seventeen-year period of U.S. experience known as the period of 
suspension under the “greenback” standard. Prior to the creation of 
legal tender notes by the Federal government and the suspension of 
gold convertibility in 1862, the U.S. government had never issued 
legal tender notes, nor was there any credible basis for the view that 
the government had the Constitutional authority to do so.
 
The government had issued some Treasury bills during the War of 
1812, for a brief time, and had made them receivable for payments 
of taxes, but it promptly withdrew those notes after the War ended, 
and never declared them a legal tender for private debts. That expe-
rience comported well with the consensus that had emerged from 
the founders’ Constitutional debates over the monetary powers of 
the U.S. government during the Constitutional convention. Under 
the Constitution, the Federal government was not given the right 
to declare anything but gold and silver a legal tender, but neither 
was it strictly forbidden from doing so (in contrast, the individual 
4 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass.
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states were forbidden). Delegates avoided the strict prohibition on 
the argument that it might be expedient as a temporary war mea-
sure to permit the federal government to issue paper legal tender, 
but there was also a consensus against allowing a permanent role for 
government-supplied legal tender.
Very few people would have argued, say, in 1860, that the federal 
government was likely to assert the right to create legal tender paper 
money as a permanent component of the money supply, or to sub-
stitute it for gold and silver as the definition of the dollar. But then 
the Civil War happened. Within a few months of the outbreak of 
the War – which was initially regarded as an event likely to cost the 
North little, and to last for only a few months – it became clear that 
the War would, in fact, cost much more, and take much longer, than 
anyone had guessed. In the fall of 1861, the initial debt offerings 
by the government had not gone well, and the government enlisted 
the banks of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia to subscribe to 
the debt as a syndicate. Within a few weeks of stuffing the banks 
full of new government debt, however, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Salmon Chase, released a report estimating substantial increases in 
war expenditures, and proposing not to increase taxes to help finance 
the war. The result was a collapse of the value of government debt, 
which prompted a suspension of convertibility by the banking sys-
tem (whose assets had consequently suffered major losses).
 
The legal tender law of 1862 was, effectively, a bank bailout. By cre-
ating a new, depreciated numeraire (the greenback), and by allowing 
dollar claims (including deposits) to be denominated in this depreci-
ated version of the dollar, rather than in gold or silver, the govern-
ment offset the negative shock to bank assets from government bond 
depreciation with a similar negative shock to the value of deposits. 
Later the legal basis for legal tender notes was challenged, but since 
it had been employed during wartime as an expedient to ensure the 
survival of the government and the banks, and since it would have 
been very difficult to unwind the sequence of payments that had 
been made on a depreciated currency basis over several years, its 
Constitutionality was upheld. To ensure that it was upheld, President 
Grant added two Justices to the Supreme Court (another outcome 
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that many would have dismissed as far-fetched in 1860).  The force 
majeure of fiscal necessity can be a source of great legal innovation. 
   
Nor was this U.S. experience exceptional. In 1933, the U.S. gov-
ernment prohibited the enforcement of gold clauses in private debt 
contracts. It did so to assist debtors to survive the double blow of a 
weak economy and a depreciated dollar (which increased the bur-
den of paying gold-denominated debt). In a five-to-four Supreme 
Court decision, that action was upheld in 1935.That Supreme Court 
decision was widely regarded as permitting the government to or-
chestrate illegal takings from creditors and was decried as such in an 
apocalyptic minority dissent.
 
As recently as 2002, the Argentine Republic put aside its Constitu-
tionally mandated adherence to a dollar-linked currency board when 
it left the dollar standard and redenominated dollar-denominated 
and dollar-indexed contracts into the newly depreciated peso. The 
precipitating event that led the Argentine government to recognize 
the need to resolve its longstanding fiscal crisis – which had been 
going on for over two years – was the run on Argentine banks that 
occurred in December 2001, which precipitated a suspension of con-
vertibility of deposits.
II. The Divergent Realities of the Eurozone
I will not repeat here in detail my prior analyses published elsewhere 
of the currently unsustainable paths of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, It-
aly, and (depending on its bank bailout policies) Spain, but I would 
emphasize that these countries are not all facing the same problems, 
and that their strategies for dealing with their problems should differ, 
as should the strategies of the EU for agreeing loss-sharing arrange-
ments to address those problems.
There are three distinct problems related to Eurozone membership 
that confront this group of countries: (1) over-indebtedness, (2) 
high deficits in combination with over-indebtedness, and (3) non-
competitiveness. These problems are distinct and pose different chal-
lenges for policy, and the relative weights to attach to these three 
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problems differ across the Eurozone countries that are currently un-
der the greatest pressure. 
First, debt sustainability refers to an excessive amount of debt relative 
to GDP, which must be addressed through some form of default and 
restructuring.
 
Second, high deficits add another dimension to that problem. A 
country that defaults on its debt will find it difficult to fund its con-
tinuing deficits through new issues of sovereign debt into the mar-
ket. Thus, a high-deficit country that is also in need of restructuring 
either must leave the Eurozone to print money to finance its con-
tinuing deficits, or obtain public-sector support for deficit borrowing 
“in arrears” in the wake of its default (presumably with the hope of 
quickly ending its deficits, so that public sector support does not 
result in a second debt default).
 
Third, countries with over-valued exchange rates (which resulted 
from their slow productivity growth in tradable goods and their rigid 
labor markets) face the difficult choice between a protracted period 
of recession as their wages and prices decline to restore competitive-
ness, or departing from the Eurozone, depreciating their currency, 
re-denominating their wages, prices, and bank deposits in the newly 
depreciated currency, and immediately beginning their recovery. 
Under either of those scenarios, long-term reforms of labor markets 
and other policies to address competitiveness are desirable, but those 
long-term reforms will not resolve the short-term problem; in the 
short term, over-valuation implies a clear tradeoff between continu-
ing recession and devaluation.
In my view, all three of the fundamental problems listed above are 
severe for Greece. It is a matter of simple arithmetic that Greece’s 
debt is not sustainable. Greece’s deficits are also large, and it would 
be challenging for it to succeed in credibly promising to shrink those 
deficits to obtain sufficient short-term financing in arrears to avoid 
leaving the Eurozone as it restructures its debts. Even if financing in 
arrears were possible, the costs of continuing over-valuation would 
deepen Greece’s recession because of over-valuation. It is hard to see 
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how – absent a massive transfer (not a loan) to Greece of roughly 
two hundred billion euros – Greece can avoid both debt default and 
exiting the Eurozone. Portugal’s situation is not as dire, but similar 
logic applies to its case. A restructuring and an exit from the euro 
would seem to make sense as a means of resolving all three problems.
 
Countries that leave the euro could and should re-join it in a mat-
ter of a few years, after undertaking significant reforms to their fis-
cal affairs, labor markets, and pension systems. It makes no sense to 
prohibit them from re-joining, and that prospect could be a useful 
source of encouragement for reforms.
Ireland and Spain are in a somewhat different position than Greece 
and Portugal. If they can avoid domestic government assumption 
of their local banks’ debts held abroad (e.g., by German, UK, Bel-
gian, and Danish banks), then they are not clearly in unsustainable 
fiscal positions (although Ireland’s absorption of bank debt already 
has placed it at substantial risk in that regard). And there is a more 
realistic possibility of improvement in Spain’s and Ireland’s competi-
tiveness positions and economic performance, if they can avoid the 
debt sustainability trap that would result from absorbing their banks’ 
debt problems. If instead they absorb their failed banks’ debts, they 
will make their sovereign debt problems much worse, and probably 
unsustainable. Although the right policy choice is clear, Ireland and 
Spain have come under enormous pressure from European counter-
parts (and from domestic political friends of insolvent cajas in the 
case of Spain) to absorb those debts. They must find the political will 
to say no.
Italy’s situation is also unique. Its debt sustainability problem could 
be solved with quick, significant, but not crippling, cuts in fiscal ex-
penditures, combined with significant reforms in tax collection and 
corruption. But Italy is deeply broken politically. There seems to be 
little prospect for timely and necessary policy changes to be imple-
mented.
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III. What Should Happen vs. What Will Happen
The best path forward for the Eurozone would be to encourage the 
policy adjustments for Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy 
discussed above, and to agree loss-sharing arrangements to absorb in 
an orderly way the losses that would result to German, UK, French, 
Belgian, Danish, and other countries’ banks from sovereign defaults 
and failed Irish and Spanish banks’ and cajas’ defaults.
If history is a guide, however, this is not the way the euro crisis will 
be resolved. Governments likely will prefer to try to postpone tak-
ing unpopular measures, and thus will not resolve the problems at 
hand. The most likely outcome will be a chaotic sequence of ad hoc 
and poorly coordinated emergency measures, taken in response to 
bank runs that will begin in Greece or somewhere else as depositors 
become increasingly wary of continuing euro convertibility of their 
deposits. The time to act is now, as the possibility of undertaking an 
orderly and sensible resolution of the crisis is slipping away.
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Life With and Without Sovereign 
Defaults: Some Historical  
Reflections
Youssef Cassis
The lines which follow are a few reflections destined to put the dis-
cussion on sovereign defaults in a historical perspective. Three points 
will be considered.
  
The first concerns the challenge presented to historians by the finan-
cial debacle of 2007-2008 and the ensuing economic and financial 
turbulence.  In some respects, historians were very well prepared to 
meet this challenge, in some others less so. The reason is that while 
the history of financial crises has attracted renewed interest since the 
late 1980s, the issues raised by the recent events had only been par-
tially addressed by the ongoing research.
Interest in the history of financial crises really took off, after the In-
ternational Debt Crisis of 1982 (Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989).1 
Unlike previous work, most notably Charles Kindleberger’s Manias, 
Panics and Crashes (Kindleberger, 1978),2 which primarily dealt 
1 Eichengreen, Barry and Peter Lindert, eds. (1989). The International Debt Crisis 
in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
2 Kindleberger, Charles (1978). Manias, Panics and Crashes. A History of Finan-
cial Crisis, London, Macmillan.
Life With and Without Sovereign Defaults: Some Historical Reflections 126
with advanced economies, the comparative history of financial crises 
has, since then, almost exclusively been concerned with emerging 
economies. This is not surprising given that, with the exception of 
the interwar years, most financial crises since the late nineteenth cen-
tury have taken place in developing countries (Bordo et al., 2001).3 
Attention has focused on various types of financial crises –banking, 
currency, and twin crises, as well as, increasingly, sovereign defaults; 
on the role of monetary regimes, especially the gold standard, and 
of capital flows; on the consequences of financial crises on the real 
economy, including conditions of recovery (Bordo and Rogoff, 1996; 
Goodhart and Delargy, 1998; Flandreau and Zumer, 2004; Ferguson 
and Schularik, 2006).4
At about the same time: historical analyses of financial crises became 
far more econometric in their approach, relying on vast databases 
and attempting to empirically test theoretical hypothesis. They have 
also adopted a ‘now and then’ approach, keen to draw policy les-
sons from past historical experiences (Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh, 
2006),5 and have been carried out by economists or economic histo-
rians coming from the economics rather than the history side of the 
profession. As a result, we have a clearer typology of financial crises; 
we have far more data on their frequency, their length and depth, 
their interactions with recessions, the effects of policy responses; we 
know more about their relationships with exchange rate regimes and 
international capital flows. The causes and unfolding of financial cri-
ses are also better documented. The drawback is that quantitative 
3 Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel, Maria Soledad 
Martinez-Peria, Andrew K. Rose (2001). ‘Financial Crises: lessons from the last 
120 years’, Economic Policy, 16, 32.
4 Bordo, Michael D. and Hugh Rockoff (1996). ‘The Gold Standard as a ‘Good 
Housekeeping Seal of Approval’’, Journal of Economic History, 56, 2.; 
Goodhart, Charles and P.J.R. Delargy (1998). ‘Financial Crises: Plus ça Change, 
plus c’est la Même Chose’, International Finance, 1, 2.;
Flandreau, Marc and Dominique Zumer (2004). The Making of Global Finance 
1880-1913, Paris, OECD.;
Ferguson, Niall and Moritz Schularik (2006). ‘The Empire Effect: The Determi-
nants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880 1913’, Journal of 
Economic History, 66, 2.
5 Mauro, Paolo Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh (2006). Emerging markets and 
financial globalization: sovereign bond spreads in 1870-1913 and today, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
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analyses lump rather than split, emphasize the common points rather 
than the differences and, by their very nature, cannot take into ac-
count micro-mechanisms.
However, this time is different, to paraphrase Reinhart and Rog-
off, whose recent book is the culmination of empirical studies on 
financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).6 The financial debacle 
of 2007-2008 was the most serious financial crisis in history; and it 
was a banking crisis taking place in advanced economies –a fairly rare 
occurrence since the 1930s. Crises erupting in emerging economies 
present a different reality –at economic, social and political levels. 
The same applies, though possibly to a lesser extent, to the sover-
eign debt crises in the Eurozone. On the one hand it is reminiscent 
of 19th century defaults by peripheral European countries, and the 
historical literature has paid much attention to sovereign debt crises. 
But on the other hand the European monetary union is a unique his-
torical experience –never before had a single currency been adopted 
by a group of politically independent countries.
My second point is about the effects of sovereign defaults in pe-
ripheral countries on core industrial countries. Put another way: to 
what extent have sovereign debt crises led to the outbreak of global 
financial crises? This point has some relevance to the topic of this 
conference, as it raises the question of the systemic consequences of 
a default –though we are talking about life with or without sovereign 
default in the periphery of the Eurozone, not the periphery as such. 
The simple answer to the question is: very rarely. In the 19th century, 
none of the Latin American debt crises of the 1820s or the 1870s, 
for example, triggered a global financial crisis (Marichal, 1989);7 nor 
did the Ottoman debt crisis of 1876, which led to direct interfer-
ence in Ottoman finance by the western powers through the Caisse 
de la dette publique ottomane (Thobie, 1977).8 Even the Russian 
default in 1918 did not have catastrophic consequences, even though 
6 Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff (2009). This Time is Different. Eight 
Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
7 Marichal, Carlos (1989). A Century of Debt Crisis in Latin America: from Inde-
pendence to Great Depression, 1820-1930, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
8 Thobie, Jacques (1977). Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l’empire ottoman, 
1895-1914, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne.
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it considerably weakened France’s financial position in the aftermath 
of the First World War. In fact, between 1890 and 1990, only two 
sovereign debt crises could have led to a collapse of the international 
financial system: the Baring Crisis of 1890 and the International 
Debt Crisis of 1982 (Cassis, 2011).9
 
The Baring Crisis of 1890 has long been forgotten, but it was a case 
when a leading bank could have collapsed following a default in a 
peripheral country. In 1890, Baring Brothers was one of the two 
biggest investment banks (the other was the Rothschilds) in the City 
of London, and therefore in the world, and if it had been allowed 
to collapse, most of the City’s big houses would fallen with them. 
The bank had over-committed itself in Argentina, where a serious 
crisis broke out in 1889-90. It was saved from failure at the eleventh 
hour by the London banking community, under orders from the 
Bank of England. A major international financial crisis was averted, 
but the shock was followed by several years of economic stagnation 
(Clapham, 1970; Ziegler, 1988).10
The international debt crisis in 1982 is better remembered. From 
the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, international capital movements 
were dominated by loans from commercial banks to Third World 
countries. These loans were fed by deposits from the oil-exporting 
countries, “petrodollars”, income from which rocketed after the two 
oil crises in 1973 and 1978. Panic broke out in August 1982, when 
Mexico unilaterally declared a three-month moratorium on payment 
of its debt principal. A number of major banks, primarily American, 
were seriously exposed and even risked failure if there were defaults, 
threatening the financial system with paralysis or even collapse. A 
major banking crisis was averted when agreement was reached be-
tween the banks and the Latin-American countries. The banks re-
scheduled the debt and agreed to new loans; the Latin American 
countries accepted the International Monetary Fund’s restructuring 
9 Cassis, Youssef (2011), Crises and Opportunities. The Shaping of Modern 
Finance, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
10 Clapham, John H. (1970). The Bank of England. A History. Volume II 1797-
1914, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.;
Ziegler, Philip (1988). The Sixth Great Power. Barings, 1762-1929, London, Col-
lins.
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programmes; and the US monetary authorities acted as mediator and 
offered the banks guarantees. However, the crisis heavily penalised 
the Third World countries, whose standard of living took a decade to 
return to pre-crisis levels (Devlin, 1989).11
In between these two events, there were of course two periods –one 
with very few crises, the Bretton Woods era, and another with the 
highest occurrence of financial crises, the interwar years, and espe-
cially the Great Depression. This was the last time that sovereign 
defaults took place in core industrial countries, including one of the 
world’s leading economic powers, Germany, which, moreover, was 
the world’s largest borrower. This is not the place to discuss Germa-
ny’s external debt following the banking crisis of 1931, the introduc-
tion of exchange controls and the advent of the Nazi regime in 1933 
(James, 1986).12 I would simply point out that sovereign default was 
a consequence rather than a cause of the world economic depression 
and very much part of what has been aptly called the Thirty Years 
War of the Twentieth Century. The same can be said of Austria and, 
to a lesser extent, of other small central and eastern European coun-
tries, such as Hungary, Romania, or Bulgaria.
 
Sovereign defaults had limited global consequences before 1914 be-
cause, on one hand the biggest borrowers (the United States, Canada 
and Russia until 1918) did not default; and on the other hand, for-
eign government bonds were held by individual investors rather than 
large financial institutions. Banks served as intermediaries and were 
only exceptionally threatened with collapse. As The Economist put it 
in November 1890: ‘Had Messrs Baring Brothers been able to shift 
the burden of their South American obligations upon the investing 
public they would now have been standing erect.’ This is of course 
the big difference with the International Debt Crisis of 1982. This 
time, it was the banks that were on the front line, which posed sys-
temic risks and required a different type of intervention.
  
My third and last point is the monetary context. Sovereign defaults 
11 Devlin, Robert (1989). Debt and Crisis in Latin America. The Supply Side of 
the Story, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
12 James, Harold (1986). The German Slump. Politics and Economics 1924-
1936, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
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have been more common under fixed than under flexible exchange 
rate regimes. This has less to do with the type of monetary regime 
than with the fact that defaults were more frequent before 1914, the 
classic age of the gold standard, because they carried far less systemic 
risks. Defaulting countries in the periphery would as rule leave the 
gold standard and return at a later stage, usually with a depreciated 
currency. This was for example the case of Argentina between 1876 
and 1883, and again between 1885 and 1899.
 
Fixed exchange rates are of course different for monetary unions. 
There were, however, monetary unions before 1914. The best known, 
though it has also been forgotten, was the Latin Monetary Union, 
formed in 1865 between France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland 
(Einaudi, 2001).13 The purpose of this convention was in fact rather 
limited: to reach agreement on the proportion of silver contained in 
the low-denomination coins of the four countries. The Union of-
ficially lasted until 1923, though it was de facto broken by the First 
World War, and it survived two suspensions of gold convertibility of 
the Lira. Moreover, Italy always had access to the international capi-
tal market, because of its commitment not to default on its external 
debt, and the support of the Rothschilds (Tattara, 1999).14
So in some respects it seems that we have seen it all before, in others 
that the current situation is entirely different. The lessons of history 
are more complex than it is sometimes tempting to believe. Some 
practical lessons can be drawn from the recent past and in this con-
text, it is astonishing that only scant attention has been paid so far, 
from the creditors’ point of view, to the International Debt Crisis 
of 1982 –an event which is just starting to belong to the historical 
past. The lessons of history are of a different order. History helps 
better understanding present events, not least by putting them into 
perspective –the risks of sovereign default in the Eurozone and their 
possible consequences look different when considered not only in 
13 Einaudi, Luca (2001). Money and Politics. European Monetary Unification 
and the International Gold Standard (1865-1873), Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.
14 Tattara, Giuseppe (1999). ‘Paper money but a gold debt: Italy in the Gold stan-
dard’, Working paper, Università degli studi di Venezia, Dipartimento di scienze 
economiche.
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the short term, but also over the longer term.
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The European Crisis: A View from 
the Market
Erik F. Nielsen
Market participants rarely agree on the effects on assets prices and 
exchange rates of economic and political events, but the degree to 
which they have disagreed on key aspects of recent years’ European 
crisis is extra-ordinary in several aspects.  Roughly speaking, one 
can identify at least three dimensions to the market’s views of the 
Eurozone crisis:  First, the majority of US and UK based investors 
– as opposed to the vast majority of Continental European and in-
stitutional Asian investors - initially saw the crisis as existential for 
the Eurozone; i.e. (in the “Anglo-Saxon” interpretation) this was the 
beginning of the inevitable break-up of the Eurozone.  As a result, 
the early stage of the crisis was characterised by the sell-off of the 
euro, but as time went by and senior European policymakers made 
clear that they stand behind the European project and as no serious 
voice emerged anywhere in the Eurozone arguing for anyone aban-
doning the Euro, this view began to fade.  As a result the Euro has 
strengthened recently even as more countries— Ireland and Portugal 
— received rescue packages.
Second, there has been an important difference in the approach to 
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the analysis of the crisis between “traditional G-7 investors” and 
“dedicated EM investors”, with the former group originally underes-
timating the severity of the fiscal crises, while the latter group – being 
more experienced in debt sustainability analysis – more accurately 
saw the severity of the sovereign debt dynamics.  However, the latter 
group typically underestimated the determination (and power) of 
the official sector, particularly the ECB.
Third, so-called “real money” investors reacted differently than hedge 
fund investors, as the former group originally appeared too depen-
dent on the credit ratings agencies and the agencies’ late recognition 
of the underlying weaknesses in parts of the periphery.  As the down-
grades began to roll along (at an impressive speed) real money man-
agers often got caught and began to hedge themselves in the CDS 
market, accelerating the spread-widening which further complicated 
matters for the sovereigns.
On the back of these broad characterisations of groups of market 
participants, I’ll focus on three aspects of the crisis, namely the 
causes of the crisis; the policy responses to the crisis; and the issues 
which need to be addressed to create a sustainable solution for the 
Eurozone.  These three aspects are of particular importance as market 
participants – with their varying backgrounds and mandates - con-
tinue to engage in the eternal probability game: Trying to interpret 
new information – economics, financial and political - as it became 
available with a view to guessing the impact on asset prices and ex-
change rates.
The causes of the crisis: 
Most importantly, one must recognise that the crisis was triggered 
not by one or two single events, but by an unfortunate combination 
of several factors.  I can think of at least five such factors, all of which 
would need to be addressed to lower the probability of another crisis 
coming around.  In no particular order: 
First, the world’s key central banks kept interest rates too low for too 
long, providing a period of too cheap money for too long.  It is not 
clear to me why the world’s central banks made this mistake, but the 
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last 10-15 years of inflation targeting may be part of the explana-
tion as the focus was on headline (or core) inflation during a period 
where Europe (and the US) imported significant disinflation from 
emerging markets and therefore mostly dismissed the excessive credit 
growth even though it fuelled asset price bubbles.  In Europe, cheap 
money fuelled housing in most countries and – further powered by 
the collapse in sovereign spreads following the adoption of the euro – 
the entire Eurozone periphery saw excessive increases in public sector 
wage bills (as their interest bills fell with lower rates), fuelling private 
sector wage growth and a de-link of wages from productivity; the 
now much discussed explosion in unit labour costs.
Second, credit rating agencies proved insufficient in understanding 
the underlying imbalances as they developed in the periphery.  Most 
importantly, the creditworthiness of sovereigns inside the Eurozone 
was (apparently) misunderstood, as was the importance of private 
sector balance sheets.  (For good order, the ratings agencies were not 
the only ones misjudging these developments.)
Third, insufficient regulation and supervision of the financial sec-
tor added to the underlying problem of too easy money as leverage 
grew quickly.  And the decentralised supervisory regime inside the 
Eurozone aggravated the problems.
Fourth, regardless of the macro and regulatory environment, in sev-
eral cases, individual financial sector participants did not have suf-
ficient internal risk management processes in place to shelter their 
institutions from adverse developments.  As a result, public money 
had to be employed in several places to prevent systemic risks from 
developing.
Fifth, official statistics proved insufficient.  Greece is the extreme 
case, of course.
The policy responses:  
Many market participants and commentators have been critical of 
the policy reactions both with respect to speed and content.  I mostly 
disagree.  Within the realm of political reality I give high marks for 
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the European policy reaction functions.  Of course, if one disregards 
normal processes of checks and balances in democratic systems, in 
particular with respect to the commitment by politicians of taxpay-
ers’ money, then one can usually come up with faster (and sometimes 
better) solutions to emerging problems.  Also, with the strength of 
hindsight, one can often identify better long term solutions. But, 
in my view, within the boundaries of political and legal realities, 
the ECB and key governments, as well as the Commission, reacted 
well – and sufficiently – to avoid the ultimate financial disaster of 
a “European Lehman Brothers” event. The often-heard interpreta-
tion of policymakers “kicking the can down the road” (used to argue 
for taking the presumably inevitable debt restructuring up front) is 
misguided in my opinion. A better narrative would be that policy-
makers are “buying time” to both provide the crisis countries with 
an increased (if – in some cases – still small) probability of sufficient 
adjustment to avoid a debt restructuring, and for the creditors to 
provision appropriately and hence prepare for a future possible sce-
nario of debt relief. And indeed, along the way, several countries, 
including Greece, Ireland and Spain have implemented impressive 
reforms to address the underlying weaknesses.
In my opinion, the one valid concern about the policy reactions re-
lates to the ECB.  While I fully compliment them for their first injec-
tion of unlimited liquidity, for their fixed-rate-full-allotment policy 
(instead of more traditional quantitative easing) and for their pur-
chases of sovereign debt in secondary markets, one must recognise 
that in doing so, the ECB has taken on a quasi-fiscal role (like several 
other major central banks), which must be reversed at the earliest 
possible opportunity.  Also, the ECB is now a member of the so-
called Troika (along with the Commission and the IMF) in setting 
policy conditionality and monitoring programs when bail-outs have 
been agreed.  As such, the ECB has taken on a role somewhat like a 
“European IMF”.  Beyond the most urgent situation, this is not an 
appropriate role for a central bank, and it should be phased out as 
soon as possible.
What should be done? 
Finally, let me turn to the issue of what needs to be done for the 
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Eurozone to survive and – indeed – prosper in the longer term.  First, 
much ado has been made of the claimed inevitability of introduc-
ing a degree of fiscal federalism, i.e. tax sharing, between Eurozone 
member states. Clearly, for the foreseeable future, this is politically 
impossible.  But even if politically feasible, would it be economically 
desirable?  I am not convinced.  The experience from other currency 
unions with greater fiscal transfers is hardly encouraging in terms of 
getting the weak parts to adjust, as illustrated in Germany, Belgium 
– and in the US. In contrast, lending money – possibly in combi-
nation with debt service relief either through concessional terms or 
outright debt write-offs – in return for good policy reforms have had 
a number of successful outcomes.  Indeed, there is no substitute for 
policy reforms to create internationally competitive economies with 
prudent fiscal policies – and hand-over of unconditional money is 
certainly not one.
In the Eurozone, policies need to be better coordinated, and coor-
dination needs to include attention to private sector balance sheets, 
competitiveness etc, as is now well recognised.  But while the new 
framework for such coordination is welcome, it will always be sub-
ject to domestic politics.  Therefore, in the longer term, markets need 
to play their role in terms of pricing different risks differently and in 
accordance with the underlying fundamentals.  And it must be pos-
sible for any borrowing entity – a government, a local entity, a bank, 
a business, a household – to be allowed to default.  A market-based 
economy will not allocate capital efficiently unless lenders know that 
money can be lost, thereby guiding the pricing of their loans cor-
rectly.
The ECB needs to play a more active role in this respect.  Specifically, 
securities accepted by the ECB in its repo operations must be rated 
according to their true creditworthiness so greater differentiation of 
haircuts should apply.  This cannot be implemented in the middle of 
the crisis, but longer term, the ECB cannot continue to treat almost 
identically sovereign credits with vastly different underlying funda-
mentals.  A properly differentiated policy on haircuts will help drive 
spreads at an earlier stage than in the past (and hence help encour-
age policy adjustments at an earlier stage) both because of its direct 
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impact on the cost of repo’ing, but also because of the signal it sends 
to market participants.
These are not huge changes to the Eurozone structures, and they 
don’t need to be.  More than two thirds of the Eurozone economy 
remains in fundamentally good shape, based on reasonably flexible 
markets and a generally competitive private sector, which has kept 
a savings surplus big enough to cover the public sector deficit.  The 
crisis in the Eurozone is a reflection not of a fundamental flaw in 
the system but of past excesses and lack of reforms to adapt to the 
new globalised world in no more than 10%-20% of the Eurozone 
economy.  Such a crisis calls for fine-tuning of the set-up; not of a 
major overhaul.
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How the EU Wants to Solve the 
Crisis – and Why This is Not Going 
to Work
Wolfgang Münchau
I think I now understand how the EU is planning to resolve the 
crisis. 
As a starting point, I believe that Angela Merkel will honour her 
pledge not to force debt restructuring until 2013. The German chan-
cellor agreed this formula with President Nicolas Sarkozy of France 
during their infamous walk on the beaches of Deauville in France. 
She is serious about this pledge, and has told aides that she will not 
renege.
While politicians have initially believed that Greece may just pull 
through on the basis of austerity alone, there is now an emerging 
consensus – though not held by central bankers – that the Greek 
public sector debt is not sustainable. For this realisation to look con-
sistent with Ms Merkel’s pledge at Deauville, the most likely route 
chosen will be a voluntary restructuring that involves a maturity 
transformation of Greek bonds. A voluntary restructuring, of course, 
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is an oxymoron, like German diplomacy. The idea is to get a group 
of large investors into a room, and bang heads. The problem is this 
will almost certainly not be sufficient, and will raise all sorts of free 
rider and moral hazard issues. Involuntary restructuring was a disas-
ter in pre-default Argentina, and in fact may have contributed to the 
default in the same year. It worked in Uruguay, but under different 
conditions. Uruguay was considered solvent, but faced a liquidity 
squeeze. Greece is considered insolvent, but has sufficient liquidity 
for the time being. 
In the case of Greece, debt sustainability would require a large re-
structuring. The projected debt to-GDP ratio will reach 160% in 
2012. There would be no point in a haircut of 10 or 20 percentage 
points. A haircut – or an equivalent debt restructuring – would have 
to be of sufficient size to persuade even sceptical investors that the 
Greek debt would be sustainable post-restructuring. A 50 per cent 
haircut would probably do the trick, and would still require signifi-
cant fiscal and economic reform, but at least Greece would have a 
more realistic chance to pull through.
  
But while a voluntary scheme is insufficient, it may work politically, 
and it may in fact be a pre-cursor for a political vote to release the 
next tranches of the existing loan, and to renew the loan in 2012. 
Under the old agreement, Greece is supposed to return to the capi-
tal market in 2012, but this is wholly unrealistic. Greece will need 
a follow-up programme, which would require some token gestures 
that the private sector participates.
 
So this is how I could envisage the sequence of crisis resolution in the 
Eurozone. After the initial loan, a token voluntary bail-in would be 
followed by a follow-up loan in 2012. By that time, the exposure of 
the private sector will be lower than today. The short term debt will 
have been fully repaid. 
Once we reach 2013, the same considerations will apply as they do 
today. Default would cut the country off from the capital markets 
for several years. It would risk contagion to other countries. It would 
require a recapitalisation of the ECB, and trigger immediate trans-
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fer payments under the rescue umbrellas. My hunch would be that 
the next generation of political leaders will be just as cautious about 
default in 2013 as the present generation is in 2011. They will give 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal another bridging loan. By 2015, a large 
chunk of the peripheral debt will be held by the EFSF and the ESM. 
Collective action clauses, investor bail-ins, all of that will be irrel-
evant. There will be no private sector left to bail-in. The privates will 
have bail-out by then.
By that time, there will be few Greek bonds left. Most of Greece’s 
debt will be in the form of an EU/EFSF/ESM credit. This alone will 
not make the Greek debt any more sustainable, but it allows some 
flexibility in the debt management. The loans may be extended to 
50 years, and the interest rate may be cut towards zero. In extreme, 
you could envisage a perpetual zero-coupon loan – in other words a 
complete debt forgiveness.
Once the EFSF/ESM end up with all the periphery debt, its own 
bonds will serve as a proxy for periphery debt. Over time, I would ex-
pect that the European Council will extend the size and remit of the 
ESM from the pure backstop it is now towards a proper debt agency, 
which will gradually absorb all debt. This may become necessary to 
stop further contagion. 
Even Spain may eventually come under this umbrella, as I suspect 
the adjustment of Spain will be much harder than currently acknowl-
edged. On my calculations, Spanish house prices have a further 20- 
to 30% to fall, and so will real incomes. This process will happen 
slowly, maybe over a decade. But it will wipe out large chunks of the 
country’s savings banks sector. I therefore expect a future ESM/IMF 
programme for Spain as well. 
At that point the focus will shift to Italy. Italy accounts for 18% of 
the EFSF/ESM guarantees. I suspect Italy will not honour its bailout 
commitment if and when Spain were to enter the mechanism. Even 
if Italy were willing to honour its commitment, it might not be able 
to, given its own debt sustainability problems. And once Italy de-
faults on its commitment, I cannot see Germany and France willing 
How the EU Wants to Solve the Crisis – and Why This is Not Going to Work142
to bankroll the entire system unilaterally. At that point, the intra-
governmental approach will break down, and the Eurozone will face 
a straight, and extreme choice: either make the big jump towards 
a common Eurozone bond, with a fiscal union, and an economic 
policy superstructure to mirror the ECB, or to retreat, and break up. 
Politically, the EU has always avoided extreme choices. But this is a 
luxury the Eurozone cannot afford given the dynamics of the debt 
crisis. So what will be the consideration of the next generation of 
EU leaders when faced with such a choice? Just think of the political 
dynamics at each node in this chain. The choice today is between 
crisis resolution, and kicking the can down the road. We are kicking 
the can. In 2013, the choice will be essentially the same. When it 
becomes impossible to kick the can any further, the stark choice will 
present itself. My guess is that, having kicked down the can, the EU 
will end up biting the bullet, once it realises that the alternative op-
tions are not all that much cheaper. It is not that they want this par-
ticular outcome. They will simply make the choice of least resistance 
at each node in the decision tree, and end up at this point. 
Is this a good outcome? Think of it this way: The Eurozone would 
survive in one piece; there would be no blood on the streets, just a 
once-and-for-all, albeit reluctant bailout, accompanied by a limited 
fiscal union. 
There is, I admit, a non-trivial possibility of a big game-changing 
accident. Ms Merkel may be serious about the Deauville commit-
ment, but a revolt in the German or Greek parliament, or some other 
shock, may force a default.
Some of these accidents are electoral shocks, such as the near victory 
of the True Finns in the recent Finnish parliamentary elections. The 
new Finnish government will include two of three parties, which 
are advocating a partial Portuguese debt default as a condition for a 
rescue package. 
Another accident is a revolt within Angela Merkel’s increasingly frag-
ile coalition. It looks as though the German chancellor is on the 
verge of losing her majority over the domestic legislation of the Euro-
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pean Stability Mechanism (ESM), the long-term financial umbrella 
for the Eurozone. She may have to rely on the opposition to ratify 
the ESM, which may come at a heavy political cost. 
Yet another accident would be a hasty debt restructuring – the result 
of political panic in Athens, or a vote in one member state not to 
pay the next tranche of the Greek credit. A premature Greek de-
fault would be a game-changing accident, and could provoke a crisis 
worse than Lehman Brothers. If the Finnish voted against the next 
tranche, and if Greece defaulted the next day, we would be in a sce-
nario, in which the ECB’s dire warnings of a financial Armageddon 
may prove correct.
Another accident would be a political hiccup in Portugal, where po-
litical leaders have been playing a game of hard to get. The Portuguese 
election on June 5 may once again fail to produce a government, and 
that  would make it difficult for Portugal to adhere to a very stringent 
austerity and reform programme. The agreed programme includes 
extremely controversial issues such as reductions in dismissal days. 
This is not something a minority government could implement.
 Another problem would be a ratification failure of the ESM in the 
German, Finnish or Dutch parliaments; or the refusal by the Greek 
parliament to accept the new privatisation and austerity measures; 
or a realisation that the Spanish cajas are in much worse shape than 
recognised, and that Spain cannot raise sufficient capital.
 
Another big accident waiting to happening is a downgrade threat for 
French sovereign bonds. I recall asking a French official about this 
issue, and got the smug answer that the rating agencies could hardly 
downgrade France if they maintained a triple-A rating for the US. 
That was before the threat of a possible US downgrade by Standard 
& Poor’s.  President Sarkozy’s economic advisers are now recognis-
ing the problem, and have advised the president to do everything in 
his power to maintain the triple-A rating, including an austerity 
package. A downgrade of France would destroy the logic of the EFSF. 
It is built on guarantees by the triple-A countries. Without France, 
the lending ceiling of the EFSF would melt down further.
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The list of potential accidents is long. They share a joint theme - se-
rial political crisis mismanagement. 
My best guess is that the Eurozone will fudge the many crises that 
will yet break out, but once they reach the point of unfudgeability, 
they will jump towards a closer union, because the other jump is too 
risky, and potentially extremely unpleasant. There is no guarantee 
that it will be happening, and even if it is happening it will not be 
a happy monetary union, with strong political pillars. It will be a 
somewhat toxic monetary union, but it will be stronger than today’s.
 
145
POSTSCRIPT  
 
The EU in 2013:  
Debt Defaults and More?1
Janet Kersnar  
  
It’s summer 2013, and Greece is basking in praise. After three gru-
eling years meeting the terms of its multibillion euro bailout loan 
package from other European Union members and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and pursuing austerity measures that have 
frozen public-sector pay and decimated state spending, the Mediter-
ranean country has chipped away at its debt and been allowed back 
into the international financial markets with open arms. European 
leaders, meanwhile, are also congratulating themselves for prevent-
ing a banking crisis by holding Greece to the pledge it made back 
in 2010 that it would pay back all of its debt on time. Greece’s big-
gest creditors -- northern European’s overstretched financial institu-
tions -- are heaving a sigh of relief since they have had time to hedge 
their exposures to Greek debt after receiving EU assurances that until 
2013, none of the coupons on the sovereign debt they have been 
holding will be cut.
As summer 2011 begins, many experts are not convinced that the 
1 Reprinted with permission from Knowledge@Wharton (http://knowledge.whar-
ton.upenn.edu), the online business analysis and research journal of the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania.
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“official,” happily-ever-after version of the EU’s debt crisis will play 
out. Even as European finance ministers weigh up whether Greece is 
meeting its current targets to receive the next tranche of the bailout 
package, there are a number of other “endgame scenarios” in which 
Greece restructures its debt either before or after the terms of the 
110 billion euro rescue expire in June 2013. None are ideal, and “all 
come at a cost,” said Lee C. Buchheit, a New York-based lawyer at 
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, who participated as a panelist 
with other banking and finance experts during a Wharton co-spon-
sored conference held at the European University Institute (EUI) in 
Florence, Italy. The event was titled, “Life in the Eurozone: With or 
Without Sovereign Default?” 
“What I’m hearing here sounds an awful lot like what we were hear-
ing in the U.S. after the Bear Stearns bailout,” noted panelist David 
A, Skeel, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania. “It’s what 
many economists were calling ‘constructive ambiguity.’ If you don’t 
know you’re going to be bailed out, that’s a good thing, because you 
will act as if you’re not going to be bailed out. In the U.S. in 2008, 
constructive ambiguity proved to be a complete failure. Everyone 
assumed the worst, and acted as if the best was going to happen,” he 
said. “That’s where we are in Europe now. People keep saying that 
in 2013, there are not going to be any more bailouts. Unless some-
thing dramatically changes in the next two years, that’s not a credible 
promise at all, and we should act as if it is not a credible promise.”
With Ireland and Portugal also receiving bailout packages of their 
own in recent months -- and bets being taken for when or whether 
Spain and Italy will go the same route -- the word “restructuring” 
does not receive the same reaction of alarm, or “paralyzing fear,” that 
it did a year ago, Buchheit added. 
A Will and a Way
According to Buchheit and other conference participants, any sce-
nario that does not involve Greece defaulting looks less and less re-
alistic. For one thing, Buchheit noted, if Greece hobbles to 2013 
without restructuring, it can’t expect to be embraced by the public 
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markets as it once was -- back when investors “to their regret today, 
failed to conceive of any credit differences between Germany and 
Greece” and piled into Greek sovereign debt. Forecasters predict that 
Greece’s public sector debt-to-GDP ratio in 2013 will be between 
150% and 170%, compared with 143% at the end of 2010 -- which 
at the time was the highest in the EU and more than double the 60% 
ceiling EU members have agreed to maintain under the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
In 2013, Buchheit said, more than half of that debt will be held 
by the so-called “official” sector -- the EU, the IMF and the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), which has been buying big chunks of the 
Eurozone’s “peripheral” countries’ debt on the secondary markets. 
The official sector will be able to claim “preferred creditor status” 
ahead of other creditors, Buchheit noted, leaving investors in private 
capital markets out in the cold should Greece’s economy teeter again. 
“So is it cheaper to have Greece default, or hand Greece the money?” 
asked panelist Arnoud Boot, corporate finance and financial mar-
kets professor at the University of Amsterdam. Ultimately, he added, 
“these are political questions” that have more to do with the where-
withal of Greece’s politicians than with finance and economics. 
Franklin Allen, Wharton finance professor and co-chair of the con-
ference, agreed. “Projections [suggesting] that [Greece is] going to 
spend 5% to 10% of GDP on interest payments alone are just not 
going to happen,” he said in an interview after the event. “I just don’t 
think they have the political will to go out and tax people and cut 
expenditure in a way that would generate 5% to 10% of GDP,” not 
least because Greece’s economy has been contracting since 2008, and 
a -3% GDP is forecasted for 2011. At some point over the next few 
years, he predicted, Greece’s debt will climb to around 340 billion 
euros, and the country will have to restructure its debt by either writ-
ing off a portion of it or rescheduling repayments, potentially forcing 
banks to accept heavy losses and triggering a larger crisis across the 
region’s financial sector.
Therein lies the rub. “This isn’t a debt problem,” observed Charles 
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Calomiris, professor of financial institutions at Columbia Univer-
sity’s Graduate School of Business in New York. “This is a debt prob-
lem with a banking problem -- and one where a run on [Greece’s] 
banks will make the crisis come to a head. How do you stop that 
once it starts?” Were the balance sheets of Greece’s banks to crumble 
as investors and customers fled, “the big problem is: Who is going to 
put up the money to save the Greek banks?” asked Allen. “If that’s 
a big enough number, and no one is willing to come up with the 
money, then Greece will leave the Eurozone. They need to be able to 
print money so that the banks don’t go bankrupt.”
But that’s a scenario EU politicians -- the most vocal being Prime 
Minister Angela Merkel of Germany, one of Greece’s biggest creditor 
nations -- refuse to acknowledge. “Politicians are very reluctant to 
discuss that as an option,” said Allen. “But that’s what has happened 
historically. With the gold standard, if you got into trouble, you got 
off the gold standard, sorted yourself out and then got back in. That’s 
what they don’t seem to understand.”
Solidarity or Bust?
It’s a perplexing situation, said Calomiris. As more and more public 
money is poured into the bailouts, European officials refuse to en-
tertain the thought of any of the 17 Eurozone members leaving the 
currency union, despite the drag on the long-term competitiveness 
of individual members and the growing unhappiness of their citizens 
living under the constraints of the euro. “And you’re doing all that 
because you really love this European idea,” he said. “The change to 
the euro is first going to happen as a redenomination of the banks’ 
liabilities. I predict the end of the Eurozone as we know it.” 
Calomiris’s comments raised some audible consternation in the audi-
ence in Florence. But he was not alone in foreseeing Eurozone exits, 
with or without defaults. For example, in an op-ed published in De-
cember on Bloomberg.com, Elena Carletti, an economics professor 
at the EUI and a conference co-chair, wrote that the EU’s politicians 
have spent month after month debating whether to include collec-
tive action clauses in Eurozone debt contracts, to the detriment of 
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tackling the EU’s larger crisis issues. “These clauses, which make debt 
restructuring faster by forcing minority bondholders to accept the 
terms agreed to by a majority of creditors, are no doubt important to 
include, but are a distraction from what is likely to be the main issue, 
namely financial stability,”Carletti wrote. What is the best option for 
a country like Greece? 
According to Carletti, it’s either a quick default or an exit from the 
Eurozone, perhaps temporarily, with a market-determined exchange 
rate between the new currency and the euro.”The great advantage 
would be for the defaulting government to regain control of mon-
etary policy and potentially be able to guarantee the banking system. 
There would be inflation, but this, together with the devaluation 
of the local currency, would help the country to grow by boosting 
exports,” she wrote.
Part of the challenge for the EU, if it wants to avoid the costs of 
future rescue funding like that of Greece -- and moral hazards of 
making defaults too tempting for member countries -- is that there 
is no bankruptcy framework to follow, said Skeel. “The problem in 
bankruptcy ... when you’re dealing with sovereigns is that you don’t 
have the stick that we have in normal bankruptcy proceedings,” he 
noted. “In normal proceedings, there’s direct liquidation -- you’re 
just going to shut everything down if bankruptcy doesn’t work. You 
can’t liquidate a nation.” 
Skeel recommended that the EU adopt a “rules-based” bankruptcy 
framework, similar to what he and Patrick Bolton of Columbia Busi-
ness School developed in early 2004. A key part of the framework 
includes a “first in time” priority system to reduce the risk of debt 
dilution in a restructuring based on when bonds are issued. For ex-
ample, investors with bonds from 2010 would have priority over 
investors with bonds from 2011. Higher priority bondholders would 
be paid in full; others would not. 
A Peso for Your Thoughts
If there’s good news for the likes of Greece, it’s that history is littered 
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with examples of debt restructurings to learn from -- thanks to as 
many as 60 sovereign debt defaults in recent decades, according to 
Buchheit. What history shows, he said, is that a country has a lot of 
leeway in negotiations with creditors, as long as it does not discrimi-
nate against any of the creditors through legislation and it has a good 
justification for the negotiations. Managed efficiently and fairly, a 
default can take six months from beginning to end, he added. 
Throughout the conference, references were made to various debt 
restructurings in Latin America. One recent default that often con-
jures up grimaces -- and is perhaps a lesson on how not to manage 
a default -- is Argentina’s. Argentina is “a poster child for how a re-
structuring can be so terrible and so costly,” said G. Mitu Gulati, a 
law professor at Duke University in North Carolina. Many factors 
led to Argentina’s crisis and the government’s decision in 2001 to de-
fault on $95 billion of debt to private creditors, the largest sovereign 
default in history. Ten years later, the country -- whose debt, like 
Greece’s, was largely in bonds -- has struggled to return to interna-
tional financial markets. “But the economists I meet with always tell 
me that you can’t just look at one case; you have to look at the other 
cases,” of which there have been as many as 60 in recent years, said 
Gulati. 
Another example is Uruguay. When the country’s government de-
faulted in 2003, it was days away from running out of money to 
repay its creditors. So it “re-profiled” its external bonds by extending 
the maturity of each of its 18 series of bonds by five years. There was 
no “haircut” on the principal and coupons were kept the same. Un-
like Argentina, Uruguay was back in the international capital mar-
kets in 31 days, and has returned frequently since, noted Buchheit, 
who was an adviser on the Uruguayan default program. 
The Trouble with Greece
As for Greece, it could do a “Uruguay-style” reprofiling, according to 
a paper published in April by Buchheit and Gulati. Getting creditors 
-- including many northern European banks -- to agree to stretch 
out the terms might require the official sector to provide some sort 
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of guarantee or collateral security. 
According to Wharton’s Allen, however, Uruguay has “a small enough 
problem, and they just needed more time to cut expenditure. The 
trouble with Greece is that time doesn’t help them very much.” Roll-
ing over the debt, he said, “won’t be enough to solve the problem. 
They need to get rid of more of the debt before they can start doing 
that.... But then somebody has to take the hit.”
Despite the challenges ahead, Gulati pointed out that Greece has 
a number of factors working in its favor that other financially dis-
tressed countries don’t have. One of those factors involves Greece’s 
debt contracts. As much as 90% of its debt has been issued under 
local law, with the rest falling under U.S., Swiss and a handful of 
other jurisdictions. And unlike most loan instruments in other coun-
tries, Greece’s do not have what’s known as “negative pledge clauses,” 
which prevent the use of assets to secure other loans. “Their contracts 
are actually set up to do a restructuring,” he said. Whether inten-
tional or not at the time of bond issuance, “the Greeks negotiated for 
a lot of flexibility. It’s almost as if they knew as soon as they joined 
the Eurozone, there would be restructuring,” he joked.
Using local legislation, Greece can put in an orderly mechanism for a 
voluntary exchange of debt, “the kind of thing politicians are saying 
does not exist,” Gulati said. “If that’s not what we want to do, then 
we have to go to other, much more painful solutions, where we’re go-
ing to creditors and saying, ‘We owe you a euro or a dollar, but we’ll 
pay you a fraction thereof.’” Echoing Buchheit, Gulati argued that a 
steep haircut, say of 50%, was legally possible.
“The story cannot be that there is no mechanism,” he said. “Greece is 
almost in a better position than any other country in recent memory 
to do a restructuring.”
Legal issues aside, the EU political machine continues to work on 
a different outcome. On May 7, the finance ministers of the EU’s 
“inner circle” of creditors initially vehemently denied press reports 
that they had met secretly in Luxembourg a week earlier to discuss, 
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among other matters, Greece’s exit from the single currency. Later 
that weekend, however, the finance ministers issued a statement say-
ing that they had been “called to participate for an exchange of views 
regarding the financial developments in Greece.... It is absolutely 
evident that in these talks, there was no discussion nor was any issue 
raised concerning Greece’s participation in the Eurozone, as various 
foreign media outlets said irresponsibly and for their own reasons.”
In or outside the Eurozone, Buchheit wondered whether it’s the term 
“restructuring” -- “which connotes a degree of coercion on the affect-
ed creditors” -- that the EU is struggling with. Calling the solution 
“voluntary liability transaction management” might be more accept-
able if action needs to be taken on Greece’s debt before 2013. But 
call it what you will, Buchheit summed up his thoughts about the 
conundrum facing the entire EU -- creditors, politicians and taxpay-
ers -- with an old joke about several people lined up before a firing 
squad. As the guns are drawn, one of them turns to another and asks, 
“Would you like to trade places?”
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